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ABSTRACT
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND RESPECT
MAY 2020
ANDREA WILSON, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Hilary Kornblith
While it is intuitive to many that oppressive socialization undermines autonomy in virtue
of its ability to shape the desires and values of the oppressed, it’s difficult to provide a
plausible account of autonomy that can explain when and why socialization is autonomy
undermining. I provide such an account, arguing that self-respect is a necessary condition
for autonomous choice and that oppressive socialization functions in part by undermining
the self-respect of the oppressed. On my account, our choices lack autonomy to the
degree that they are motivated by a failure to respect ourselves as beings whose plans and
desires matter as much as anyone else’s; whose capacity for rational deliberation and
practical reasoning are valuable; and whose particularities and interests contribute to our
value. This theory of personal autonomy is able to account for the lack of autonomy in a
wide range of cases, for example, a cult member being brainwashed by a cult leader, or a
wife being subservient to her husband. I defend this account against objections which
claim that it is disrespectful to the oppressed to claim that their autonomy is undermined
by their oppression, and in the final chapter, I expand my theory to explain not only what
our minds must be like for us to be autonomous, but also what the world outside of us
must be like.
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CHAPTER 1
WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT PERSONAL AUTONOMY?
1.1 Introduction
While most everyone seems to agree that personal autonomy is important, few
can agree on what it actually is. Of course, being autonomous means being selfgoverning or self-guiding, but what does it mean to be self-guiding? We’re concerned for
the woman who was once fiercely independent and eager to succeed, but who has
become infatuated with a religious leader and has decided to give up on her goals to live
simply in a cooperative. We also worry about the person who is addicted to shoplifting,
and the young girl who has been forced to marry against her will. Each of these people
seems to display a lack of self-determination, but in spite of this similarity, the sense in
which each of them lacks self-determination is very different. In the first example, the
woman lacks self-determination because she has been influenced by factors that seem to
be foreign to her. The shoplifter seems to act on compulsion rather than on what he truly
wants to do, and the woman who is forced to marry is compelled by other agents. So
while all seem to lack self-guidance, it isn’t obvious that there is one notion of selfguidance that can capture what seems to have gone wrong in each of these cases. When
we are then forced to choose between various conceptions of self-guidance, it isn’t clear
how we should choose which of them is most appropriately deemed autonomy.
In philosophical debates about which conception of autonomy is the best, it often
seems as though we are at a stand-off; different philosophers prefer their own conception
of autonomy because it best accounts for the intuitions they have about their favorite
cases, but none of the definitions seems to be theoretically better than any other. In this
1

paper, I will suggest that in order to make progress here and determine which theory of
autonomy is more theoretically fruitful than the rest, we must first determine what
theoretical role we need our theory of autonomy to play in the first place. Once we have
some idea of what theoretical role our theory of autonomy should play, we can compare
different theories to see which plays this role best while remaining intuitively plausible.
In what follows, I begin by giving some background on the autonomy debate so
that we have some idea of where it currently stands, and I’ll explain the problem and my
proposed solution to it in more detail. Then, in the second half of the paper, I’ll go
through a number of possible theoretical roles we might what our conception of
autonomy to play. These are based both on things various autonomy theorists say and on
my own predictions of what others will find plausible. For each of these possibilities, I’ll
consider whether a theory of autonomy could plausibly play the relevant role and, if so,
what our theory of autonomy would have to look like in order to adequately do so. I will
argue that, for some of the theoretical roles I consider in this paper, no theory of
autonomy can adequately play it, and for other theoretical roles, some theories of
autonomy play them better than others. Thus, depending on what theoretical role we
think is most important, we will have some reason for preferring certain theories of
autonomy over others. Alternatively, we may think that there is an additional theoretical
role for autonomy to play that has not yet been explicitly identified in the autonomy
literature.
1.2 Background and Set-Up
The first distinction I’ll make is between what I will call psychological autonomy,
on the one hand, and external autonomy on the other. I understand psychological
2

autonomy to be, roughly, the ability to guide one’s own choices, where a choice is a
mental act. So for one to be psychologically autonomous, one must have control over
one’s choices. External autonomy is autonomy with respect to one’s interaction with the
world outside of one’s mind. Depending on one’s view, this might require a lack of
certain physical barriers or the availability of a variety of choices. So if one were to
choose to stand up from ones chair on the basis of one’s desires, without manipulation,
and with proper reasoning capacities, only to realize that one’s body was tied to the chair
by some villain, then one would plausibly have psychological autonomy but lack external
autonomy. Since the notion of autonomy is so complicated and controversial, it seems
valuable to focus on one of these kinds of autonomy at a time in trying to understand
autonomy better. In this paper, I will focus exclusively on psychological autonomy.
A second distinction is between autonomous persons versus autonomous choices.
While it seems as though both choices and persons can have psychological autonomy,
and that the criteria for each are different (though they likely overlap), it is not clear
exactly what the relationship is between the two. Plausibly, one is more fundamental than
the other, so that we should understand one of these notions in terms of the other, but it’s
not clear which of them we should start with. While some1 theorists think that autonomy
of choice is more fundamental—and that whether or not a person is autonomous depends
on which of her choices is autonomous—others2 think that our focus should be on
autonomy of persons. I do not take a stand on this issue here, and for my purposes it does
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See, for example, Oshana, 2006 or Dworkin, 1988.
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See, for example, Christman, 1991 or Stoljar, 2000.

3

not matter which of these options we prefer. I move back and forth throughout the paper
between talking about autonomous choices and autonomous persons in order to stay true
to the theories I’m discussing and to present the ideas as the proponents of those ideas
present them.
While there are many ways to taxonomize theories of psychological autonomy,
the final distinction I will make here—and the one that I will focus on throughout the
paper—is the distinction between content-neutral views, on the one hand, and substantive
views on the other. Even this distinction has been made in different ways by different
people, but for my purposes I will define a substantive theory of autonomy as one which
places constraints on the values, desires, or general pro-attitudes a person can have while
still being fully autonomous, and content-neutral theories of autonomy are those
according to which a person can be fully autonomous regardless of the particular proattitudes she has. An example that can help make this distinction clearer is Thomas Hill’s
Deferential Wife.
This is a woman who is utterly devoted to serving her husband. She buys clothes he
prefers, invites the guest he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the
mood. She willingly moves to a new city in order for him to have a more attractive job,
counting her own friendships and geographical preferences insignificant by comparison.
…[S]he tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and, when she does, she
counts them as less important than her husband’s. She readily responds to appeals from
Women’s Liberation that she agrees that women are mentally and physically equal, if not
superior, to men. She just believes that the proper role for a woman is to serve her family.
As a matter of fact, much of her happiness derives from her belief that she fulfills this
role very well. No one is trampling on her rights, she says; for she is quite glad, and
proud, to serve her husband as she does. (Hill 1991)

There are some ways in which the Deferential Wife (DW) is clearly self-guiding: she has
reflectively endorsed her values, she is not coerced or manipulated, etc. These are the
facts about her that are most relevant to the content-neutral theories of autonomy.
However, she also seems to lack self-guidance in some sense given that she consistently
4

defers to someone else; she does whatever it is he would like her to do even when she has
a different opinion on the matter. She also refrains from forming opinions of her own
very often and follows her husband’s lead instead. For the substantive theories of
autonomy, these facts are also crucial when considering her level of autonomy.
According to content-neutral theories of autonomy, the DW is fully autonomous
assuming that she has reflectively endorsed her values and desires (Friedman); she has
the skills of self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction (Meyers); the process by
which she came to have the relevant values and desires is not one that she would feel
alienated from if she were to reflect on it (Christman); and other proposed conditions
having to do with the process by which she came to have her pro-attitudes and their
structural relation to other of her mental states. As a result, she would probably end up
being autonomous on most plausible ways of understanding the details of the case. In
contrast, substantive theories of autonomy would maintain that the DW is not fully
autonomous insofar as she has the relevant values and desires if she has them because she
has internalized false norms of feminine socialization (Stoljar) or because she takes
herself to lack the standing to be accountable for her choices (Benson). So for the
substantive theories, the content of her values and attitudes matter. As a result, on most
plausible ways of filling in the details of the case, she would not be fully autonomous on
these views.
The disagreement between these two camps does not seem to be one regarding the
theoretical virtues of the respective theory of autonomy—at least not for the most part.
Instead, the disagreement is one about whether there is any interesting sense in which the
DW, and others relevantly like her, are lacking some important kind of self-guidance.

5

The proponents of content-neutral theories think she isn’t, and the proponents of
substantive theories think she is. It seems to me that in order to move this debate forward,
we need to stop and ask: Important for what? It’s straightforward that there is some
plausible sense in which she is lacking self-guidance, but when we take a stand regarding
whether this is or is not an important kind of self-guidance, we need to be clear about
what it might be important (or not) for. That is, what is the theoretical value or role of this
notion of self-guidance that we want our theory of autonomy to pick out? Our claims
about the importance of the self-guidance the DW is lacking can be defended only if we
have some explanation for why it is important or not, and we can have this explanation
only if we have some clear idea of what our theory of autonomy is supposed to be doing
for us.
What I am proposing is that we do the kind of thing for autonomy that Harry
Frankfurt does with freedom. He claims that our notion of freedom is important because
it connects up with moral responsibility in important ways and that, as a result, we should
define freedom such that it plays the role of determining who is morally responsible and
who is not (Frankfurt, 1988). Of course, the notion of freedom is important because it
picks out some phenomenon in the world, but Frankfurt is claiming that we care about
that phenomenon largely because it connects up with other theoretically and practically
important phenomena. One possibility regarding autonomy is that the concept simply
picks out the phenomenon, it is theoretically valuable for that reason, and there is nothing
more to say about it. This is a possibility I will consider. However, another possibility is
that our concept of autonomy connects up with other of our concepts in important ways,
so we need to appeal to it when we’re discussing other interesting issues in moral or
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political philosophy. Once we have some idea of what role we need autonomy to play in
our theorizing, we will then have a clearer standard by which to judge various proposed
definitions. Ways of understanding autonomy that better allow it to play the theoretical
role it needs to play will, all else being equal, be more plausible.
It’s also possible that there are multiple, distinct roles we want a theory of
autonomy to play, in which case we may need to adopt multiple, distinct theories of
autonomy. The discussions in the literature suggest that most autonomy theorists take
there to be one worthwhile way of defining autonomy, since they debate solely about
what autonomy is rather than about which conception of autonomy is most relevant to a
particular question or problem. However, it seems initially plausible that there could be
multiple theoretical goals we could want a theory of self-guidance to play, but that while
each of them is a valuable goal, there is no single conception of self-guidance that can
fulfill each of the goals. If this were to turn out to be the case and it seemed appropriate to
call each of these ways of understanding self-guidance “autonomy,” then it seems like
we’d have good reason to suppose that there are simply multiple, distinct conceptions of
autonomy, each of which is worth recognizing. I do not argue one way or the other in this
paper regarding whether we should accept multiple notions of autonomy; I’m interested
simply in thinking through some of the potential theoretical roles we might want our
theory of autonomy to play and thinking about whether content-neutral or substantive
theories are better suited to play that role. I will argue that, for any of the theoretical roles
for autonomy that I consider in this paper, existing theories of autonomy are ill-equipped
to play them.

7

1.3 Considering the Theoretical Role for Autonomy
In the remainder of this paper, I will consider five possible ways of explaining
why the notion of autonomy is theoretically valuable, or what theoretical role we need
our notion of autonomy to play. I will argue that, for each of them, either it is not a useful
goal for a theory of autonomy at all, or if it is, existing theories of autonomy cannot do
the relevant work.
1.3.1 Option 1: Picking out a Valuable Phenomenon
It seems to me that one of the most intuitive explanations of why the notion of
autonomy is theoretically valuable is that it picks out and allows us to theorize about a
valuable phenomenon. While this may initially seem like a straightforward way to go, it
turns out that—by itself—it does not give autonomy theorists any reason to do what it is
they are doing, nor does it provide justification for any theory of autonomy over another.
To make this clear, I’ll begin by distinguishing between two ways of understanding this
approach, and I’ll go on to consider each of them in turn. The first is that autonomy is just
intrinsically valuable, and for that reason it’s worth being able to talk about clearly, and
the second is that the notion of autonomy captures that kind of self-guidance that is, or
tends to be, well-being enhancing.
Consider first the claim that autonomy is just intrinsically valuable, and that it is
for this reason that it is theoretically valuable to be able to discuss it and come to better
understand it. While this is plausible, this cannot be the whole story. To see why consider
first the fact that there are a variety of folk conceptions of autonomy, and that any general
appeal to the notion of autonomy is likely going to be ambiguous for this reason. Nomy
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Arpaly, for example, has distinguished between eight things we could mean when we talk
about autonomy (2003). Some of these include: “Agent Autonomy,” or a kind of selfcontrol; “Independence of Mind,” or a lack of servility; “Authenticity,” or being true to
one’s values; “Self-Identification,” or coherence among one’s desires and values; and
“Ability to Respond to Reasons,” or deliberativeness and self-reflection. Philosophers
who construct theories of autonomy often combine some of these ways of understanding
autonomy to form their own preferred definition, and of course they come up with
various more precise ways of explaining what is needed in order, for example, to have the
proper kind of self-control, or the proper kind of lack of servility. For example, Meyers
seems to require a combination of Agent Autonomy, Authenticity, and Ability to
Respond to Reasons (1989). Natalie Stoljar, in contrast, focuses on Independence of
Mind and Authenticity (though perhaps she does take more than this to be required for
full autonomy) (2000).
Return now to the claim that we care about being able to theorize about autonomy
because it is intrinsically valuable. Presumably someone who would be inclined to
endorse a view like this would think that each distinct kind of autonomy noted above
(e.g. Agent-Autonomy, Authenticity, etc.) is intrinsically valuable (or, if they weren’t
inclined in this way, they should focus their arguments on explaining why some of these
are not intrinsically valuable after all). But we still need some additional reason for
thinking that the combination of Agent Autonomy + Authenticity + Ability to Respond to
Reasons has special value, as Meyers would claim, or that Independence of Mind +
Authenticity matters more, as Stoljar would claim. So in order for some special
combination of these kinds of autonomy to matter at all, let alone matter more than some
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other combination, we need more than an appeal to its intrinsic value. As a result, this
leaves us right back where we started. We entered this discussion looking for an
explanation of the theoretical value of the notion of autonomy, but now we’re looking for
the explanation of the theoretical value of some particular combination of folk
conceptions of autonomy; so appealing to intrinsic value didn’t get us anywhere.
The second route one could take is, instead of claiming that autonomy is merely
intrinsically valuable, maintain that autonomy is also valuable in that it tends to
instrumentally enhance our levels of well-being. Thus, the notion of autonomy would be
valuable because it would allow us to pick out and theorize about the kind of selfguidance that is well-being enhancing. While this seems like it could be a nice standard
by which to judge theories of autonomy—the theory that gives us an account of
autonomy that is most well-being enhancing is the best one—in practice neither
substantive nor content-neutral accounts of autonomy focus much, if at all, on whether or
not their preferred kinds of self-guidance are well-being enhancing.
Consider, for example, a slave who has been conditioned (through years of
physical and emotional abuse) into thinking that she is unable to make decisions for
herself, and that it is lucky for her that she has others to make those decisions for her. On
most content-neutral or substantive views, she lacks psychological autonomy, but she has
come to feel peace regarding her situation and gratefulness for those who “take care” of
her. She has food, shelter, and a community of friends who share her point of view.
Contrast this slave with one whose physical and emotional abuse was unsuccessful, and
who constantly defies her masters. She continues to be abused, but she also continues to
think for herself and to try to escape to live a life of her own. Of course, while this person

10

still lacks autonomy in the broad sense, since her options are quite limited, she has
significantly more psychological autonomy than the slave from the first example. The
second slave’s autonomy detracts from her well-being, and the first slave’s lack of
autonomy increases her well-being.
It might seem as though this is just an extreme example and that it could still be
the case that, typically, some forms of autonomy do increase well-being. However, I am
doubtful of this. Women around the world are denied their moral rights and are forced to
suffer through various harms which would no doubt be more tolerable if they were
simply to accept them as part of life in the way the second slave does. We could see this
happen in the case of the women in India who reported low levels of hunger during a
famine—even though they were starving—because they did not take themselves to be
entitled to any more (Nussbaum, 2001). This is in contrast to the men in the same
scenario who reported hunger because they knew they ought to have more food than they
do. Often, resigning ourselves to our problematic situation can allow us to cope with it
better, but on many views of autonomy this kind of thing can be autonomy undermining.
Human beings generally suffer through disappointment and regret that could be
avoided if some all-knowing, benevolent being were to simply change our preferences so
that what we wanted more reliably matched up with what we could get. Although this
would leave us more satisfied, it would also leave us less autonomous. As a result, most
theories of autonomy are not generally well-being enhancing, so if we are to take this as
the theoretical value of the notion of autonomy, both content-neutral and substantive
theories of autonomy will prove to be inadequate. Those who support either of these
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approaches need to look elsewhere for an explanation of the role autonomy should play in
our theorizing.
1.3.2 Option 2: Properly Respecting Individuals
The second potential theoretical role of autonomy that I’ll consider was proposed
by Paul Benson in his paper “Feminist Commitments and Relational Autonomy.” Benson
suggests that the role of our theory of autonomy is—at least in part—to show respect to
women and members of other oppressed groups by finding a balance between respecting
their voices, on the one hand, and recognizing the authority that comes with being
autonomous on the other. Benson claims that these are in some sense two competing
desiderata—the more we focus on respecting the voices of the oppressed, the more
inclusive we will want our theory of autonomy to be, and the more we focus on whether
individuals have the proper agential authority over their values, choices, etc., the more
exclusive we will want our theory of autonomy to be. His claim is that, since both of
these goals is crucial in feminist theorizing, our feminist theory of autonomy should find
the proper balance between the two. This gives us a moderately restrictive theory of
autonomy which takes seriously women’s claims regarding what they want and value but
also takes seriously the fact that oppression makes it more difficult for the oppressed to
authoritatively form desires and values of their own.
It seems to me that in Benson’s explanation of the theoretical role of the notion of
autonomy, he is putting the cart before the horse. While I agree with him that our theory
of autonomy should capture the proper kind of agential authority over their values,
choices, etc. individuals must have to be autonomous, I have concerns about his claim
that our theory of autonomy should respect women’s voices (and the voices of other
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oppressed individuals). Benson explains that those who are motivated by this
consideration believe that “theories of autonomy should be as inclusive as they
reasonably can be… because this is the best way to ensure that they respect appropriately
persons’ authentic voices as realized in their decisions and conduct” (107). The idea here
is that in order to respect women’s voices—or their claims about what matters to them
and how they want to live their lives—we must have a theory of autonomy that includes
them and their choices autonomous (or, at least, this is the best way to respect their
voices).
There are at least two problems with this approach. First, it’s not clear what,
exactly, it means to respect women’s voices, or to respect their avowed desires and
preferences. Presumably Benson thinks that there is a special kind of respect that comes
along with deeming a person or her choices “autonomous,” but it isn’t obvious that this
exists, or, assuming it does exist, what it is. Perhaps it involves having a particular kind
of positive appraisal of them, helping them achieve their ends, or at least not trying to
prevent them from achieving their ends. Whatever this respect is, it seems as though
Benson owes us an argument for the claim that there is some special kind of respect that
most individuals are due and that deeming them autonomous is (one of?) the only way(s)
of affording them that respect.
A second, and more important problem with this approach is that Benson seems to
think that we can know who deserves the respect of being deemed “autonomous” before
we know precisely what autonomy is—after all, he is claiming that we are supposed to
rely on our intuitions about who deserves the respect of being deemed “autonomous” to
determine what autonomy is and how difficult it is to achieve. But a more intuitive way

13

of thinking of these things is that we should first determine what autonomy is and how
difficult it is to achieve, and only then will we have some way of knowing who deserves
the respect of being deemed “autonomous,” assuming there is some special kind of
respect that we are afforded in this way. The people who plausibly qualify as autonomous
given the criteria our definition of autonomy specifies are those who would deserve to be
called “autonomous,” and those who do not meet the relevant criteria would, plausibly,
not deserved to be deemed “autonomous.” So Benson seems to have gotten the process
inverted here.
While Benson seems clearly right that there is a special kind of agential authority
we have over our choices when we are autonomous and that our theory of autonomy
should capture that, this is saying nothing more than: Autonomy is a special kind of selfguidance. But knowing that autonomy is a special kind of self-guidance and wanting our
theory of autonomy to accurately describe that special kind of self-guidance does not help
us understand the special theoretical role we need our notion of autonomy to play.
Benson’s other desideratum for a theory of autonomy—namely, that it respect the voices
of women and members of other oppressed groups—would give us an interesting and
helpful explanation of the theoretical role of the notion of autonomy if he had some clear
account of what this special kind of respect is, how we determine who deserves it, and
why it is that we can know that all those who deserve it should be deemed “autonomous.”
It seems unlikely to me that we could satisfy these requirements because it seems to me
that we won’t know who deserves the respect of being deemed “autonomous” until we
know what autonomy is. As a result, neither proponents of content-neutral or substantive
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theories of autonomy would do well to try to develop a theory of autonomy that played
this theoretical role.
1.3.3 Option 3: Determining the Appropriateness of Paternalism
The next option I’ll consider is that the notion of autonomy is important because
whether or not a person is autonomous determines whether or not paternalistic
interference in their affairs is warranted. This is an option defended most ardently and
extensively by John Christman, who simply defines autonomy as being necessary and
sufficient for freedom from paternalism, but Marilyn Freedman expresses a similar view,
for example, when she claims that personal autonomy is “a necessary condition for being
entitled to live free of domination by others” (68).
Christman’s own view is that the notion of autonomy is important largely because
we need it to distinguish between those for whom paternalistic interference is morally
appropriate and those for whom it is not. As a result, he uses his intuitions about when
this paternalism is appropriate to help determine what conditions must be satisfied for
someone to be autonomous. When considering theories of autonomy which deem nonautonomous individuals who, intuitively, ought not to be subjected to paternalistic
interference, Christman takes this to be sufficient reason to reject them.
It seems to me that defining autonomy in terms of the appropriateness of
paternalistic interference is unmotivated and gives us an implausible theory of autonomy
and its value. It’s not at all clear what theoretical reasons we have for thinking that
autonomy should be defined in this way in the first place, and my own view is that
defining autonomy in this way gives us a notion of autonomy that is watered-down and
fails to capture many of our important intuitions about autonomy.
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With respect to proponents of substantive views in particular, while they would
want to maintain that the DW is lacking autonomy so long as her choices are motivated
by a certain kind of failure of self-respect or her acceptance of false norms of
womanhood, they certainly would not (or, at least, should not) claim that it would be
permissible for the state to interfere with her choices. Christman seems to be right that a
certain kind of minimal procedural independence is all that is needed for paternalistic
interference in one’s affairs to be inappropriate, and this minimal procedural
independence would be far from adequate for autonomy on substantive views.
1.3.4 Option 4: Defining Moral Responsibility
A fourth possible theoretical role we might want the notion of autonomy to play is
to pick out who is morally responsible for their actions and who is not. This could either
be because the requirements for autonomy are identical to the requirements for moral
responsibility or because autonomy is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Any
combination of Agent Autonomy, Independence of Mind, Authenticity, SelfIdentification, or Ability to Respond to Reasons could be a plausible candidate as a
theory of autonomy or moral responsibility, so it is quite reasonable to initially think the
two might be importantly related in some way.
I’ll consider first the possibility that the requirements for moral responsibility are
just the same as the requirements for autonomy. If this is how we are thinking of the
theoretical role of the notion of autonomy, it seems pretty clear that we don’t need it.
After all, if we define autonomy in just the same that we define moral responsibility, then
the notion of moral responsibility will do all the theoretical work we might have

16

otherwise wanted our theory of autonomy to do. As a result, establishing a theory of
autonomy that leaves autonomy identical to moral responsibility seems unmotivated.
The alternative is that autonomy is necessary for moral responsibility. If this is
right, then the notion of autonomy will be theoretically valuable because it will help us
draw conclusions about moral responsibility in various cases. On a view like this, there is
some special combination of Agent Autonomy, Independence of Mind, etc. which, when
combined with some other condition(s), gives us moral responsibility. “Autonomy”
would then just be shorthand for this combination of these otherwise distinct folk
conceptions of autonomy, but it would fall short of moral responsibility and would
remain a distinct concept. Another way of thinking about it is that the notion of autonomy
would be the combination of requirements for moral responsibility that have to do with
self-guidance.
Depending on one’s view of moral responsibility, it may turn out that we can
construct a plausible account of autonomy that plays the role we would want it to.
However, taking this approach to defining autonomy seems to have two important
methodological implications. First, those who are theorizing about moral responsibility
should stop relying on their intuitions about autonomy. After all, we will not know what
kind of self-guidance is needed for moral responsibility—and thereby what autonomy
is—until we know what moral responsibility is. So while we may be tempted to claim
that a person in a particular case lacks moral responsibility because our gut tells us they
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lack autonomy, this will be a question-begging way to go if we are defining autonomy in
terms of moral responsibility.3
The second methodological implication of autonomy just being the self-guidance
that is needed for moral responsibility is that those who are spending their time trying to
define autonomy should stop doing this and instead try to figure out what moral
responsibility is. For, once they know what is required for moral responsibility, they will
thereby know what is required for autonomy. If this seems unnecessary, and if focusing
on autonomy seems worthwhile, then that gives us some reason to think that, at the very
least, there is some other interesting notion of autonomy out there that does important
theoretical work too but that is not directly related to moral responsibility.
While I take these to be good reasons for thinking that we should look elsewhere
for our explanation of the theoretical value of the notion of autonomy—whether we take
a content-neutral or a substantive approach—there are additional reasons for proponents
of substantive theories to look elsewhere. Return again to the case of the DW. Suppose,
for example, that she votes for a particularly corrupt politician because her husband will
be doing so. She knows the politician is corrupt and is familiar with many reasons that
make it the case that it is morally wrong to vote for this candidate. However, since she
has thoughtfully determined that her husband’s preferences and opinions counts for more
than hers, she decides to vote for the candidate anyway. It’s not that she thinks that it
might be morally permissible to vote for this candidate because perhaps her husband is

3

This is true unless by autonomy we mean one of the various folk conceptions of autonomy. If this is what
we mean, then we must not only be clear about which of them we are referring to, but we must also give an
argument defending the claim that that particular notion of autonomy is necessary for moral responsibility.
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aware of some facts that are unknown to her; instead, she votes as her husband does
because it is more important for her to please her husband than it is for her to do the
morally right thing.
In a case like this, it seems relatively clear that she would be morally responsible
for her choice—given that she made it freely, without coercion, after reflection, and in
accordance with her values—but substantive theories of autonomy would maintain that
her choice is not an autonomous one. There are many cases like this, in which a person is
plausibly morally responsible for their choices though the choices are not autonomous on
substantive theories of autonomy. As a result, proponents of these theories have
additional reasons—above and beyond those reasons that I have argued we all have—for
finding an alternative explanation of the theoretical value of the notion of autonomy that
does not appeal to moral responsibility.
1.3.5 Option 5: Identifying the Wrongness of Oppression
The final option I will consider for the theoretical role the notion of autonomy
should play is suggested by proponents of substantive theories themselves. This
suggestion is that we need a notion of autonomy to capture a particular kind of harm that
oppressive socialization inflicts on members of oppressed groups. Benson has suggested
something like this throughout his writing, in that he is consistently concerned with the
ways in which certain oppressed women lack autonomy, and he wants his theory of
autonomy to contribute to an explanation of the harms of oppression. He takes Marina
Oshana in Personal Autonomy in Society to argue explicitly for an approach like this, and
he characterizes her as claiming that “it is the role of a conception of personal autonomy
(among other things) to underwrite and explain what is wrong when women are
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systematically deprived of power and authority in patriarchal societies” (Benson 2014,
92). Natalie Stoljar (2000) makes a similar claim when she states that a theory of
autonomy must be able to account for the “feminist intuition,” or the intuition that a
choice cannot be autonomous if it was motivated by oppressive norms of feminine
socialization.
The general idea motivating this approach is that certain choices women make in
oppressive, patriarchal societies are not autonomous ones, and that the oppression itself is
(at least partly) the explanation for why they are not autonomous. The DW would be one
example of a woman like this. Assuming she lives in a society like ours, she has grown
up learning that men’s preferences count for more than women’s preferences do and that
good women please their husbands. These myths are pervasive, false, and harmful, so
perhaps we can use our conception of autonomy to capture (at least some of) the ways in
which norms like these are harmful.
It is worth noting at this point that one problem here is that it is not immediately
clear that we need a conception of autonomy to capture this harm, since presumably we
can explain the harms of norms like these without appealing to autonomy. For example,
we can appeal to the value of things like knowledge, well-being, moral respect for equals,
fulfillment, or flourishing; it’s not obvious that these notions by themselves couldn’t
capture the wrongness of this kind of socialization. As a result, it seems as though we
need an argument for why they can’t before we should find it plausible that we need our
notion of autonomy to do this work. But supposing there is something missing in our
explanation if we are restricted to appealing to some of the things I’ve listed, the next
step is to consider what our theory of autonomy would have to look like in order for it to
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capture the harms of oppressive socialization. For this approach to work, our appeal to
autonomy should give us a plausible enough theory of autonomy while also allowing us
to explain the relevant harms, but I will argue that a theory of autonomy cannot do both
of these things.
In order for a theory of autonomy to play the role proponents of this approach
want it to, it needs to turn out to be the case that oppressive socialization undermines
autonomy, and this will be (at least part of) why oppressive socialization is bad. We
would be taking it for granted, then, that autonomy is a good thing to have. It seems that
if we are taking this approach, we must maintain that a person or her choice is lacking in
autonomy to the degree that it was influenced by false norms of oppressive socialization.
This seems to be precisely what Benson (1991) and Stoljar (2000) have in mind, so it
seems that we’re on the right track so far to establishing a plausible theory of autonomy
that plays this role. However, as I will argue, the theory of autonomy we end up with
once we ensure that it plays this role is unintuitive and ad hoc, and the fact that someone
has been subjected to oppressive norms of socialization seems to be neither necessary nor
sufficient for their autonomy to be undermined.
First, this approach does not give us a necessary condition for being
autonomous—that is, it is not the case that anyone who is influenced by oppressive
norms of socialization is to some degree lacking autonomy. Consider the case of a
feminist who embraces some norms having to do with feminine beauty, such as wearing
make-up and high heeled shoes. It’s hard to imagine that she would be motivated to dress
in these ways were it not for the oppressive norms according to which doing so is beautyenhancing and beauty is important. However, it seems to me that her embrace of these
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ways of presenting herself could be completely autonomous. We need not, I think,
maintain that her choice to wear high heels is necessarily lacking in autonomy to any
degree. So long as she understands that the norms exist and that they are problematic, but
decides she’d like to go on dressing this way because she enjoys it and not because she
feels as though she must or because she is in some sense dependent upon male attention,
it seems to me like her choice in dress is as autonomous as one’s choice in dress could be.
Of course, it would be quite difficult to determine for any particular woman how
significant a role her oppressive socialization played in motivating her to do such things,
but it is hard to imagine that for any woman her oppressive socialization played no role at
all. So as long as we can grant that 1) no woman is motivated to wear uncomfortable,
expensive shoes without having been subjected to oppressive socialization that
glamorizes such shoes, and that 2) some women completely autonomously choose to
wear such shoes, then it seems that the claim under consideration deems too many
choices non-autonomous. It follows from substantive views that focus on false oppressive
norms that, given that her preference was shaped by these false oppressive norms in the
first place, the choice must lack autonomy to at least some degree. This seems to me like
an unacceptable result, not only in the specific case under consideration, but for many
cases in which women decide to do things that would not be attractive in the first place if
it weren’t for the existence of oppressive norms (e.g. get married).
This approach also does not provide us with a sufficient condition for autonomy,
as there is no obvious way for a theory like this to account for cases which, intuitively,
involve a lack of autonomy, but do not involve these oppressive norms. Cases like these
would include the case of someone who is persuaded to join a cult and whose personality
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changes drastically as a result; someone who has been subjected to gaslighting outside of
an oppressive context; or just anyone who is not oppressed but who nonetheless seems to
be lacking autonomy. Perhaps these people should be considered autonomous, but given
how counter-intuitive that is, we’d need a strong argument in favor of the relevant view
of autonomy for this to be an acceptable result. As a result of all of these considerations,
we can see that this approach to autonomy does not seem to give us necessary or
sufficient conditions for what it takes to have or lack autonomy.
In addition to this problem, it also faces certain problems having to do with its
theoretical motivation. First, consider the requirement that the oppressive norms be false
in order to undermine autonomy. It’s not clear what the relevance is here of the norm’s
being false, since it seems as though some oppressive norms are more or less true.
Consider, for example, the claim that women should try to look attractive if they want to
get jobs, or that they must be amiable and demure if they are to be liked by others. If a
mother were to teach this to her daughter, it would be a mistake to claim that the mother
was telling her daughter something false; these claims are just true in our society. But
when we go on teaching these things to our children, we contribute to the oppression of
women and we encourage them to suppress their own desires and goals for the sake of
succeeding or getting along with others in a way that men don’t have to. It is thus quite
plausible that the acceptance of these norms makes women less autonomous than men,
but the norms do not seem to be false.
Another question that arises when we consider the claim that false oppressive
norms undermine autonomy is: What is it about oppressive norms, in particular, that
makes it the case that when they are false and we accept them, our autonomy is
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undermined? Why isn’t it just that, any time we accept something false, our autonomy is
undermined? If falseness should matter at all, it seems like we need an explanation of
why falseness is relevant only with respect to oppressive norms but not to other claims a
person might accept and use to structure the course of their lives. For example, why is it
that a pre-Copernican sailor should not count as having his autonomy undermined given
that he formulated his life plans around a false belief in the relation of the earth to the
sun? No theory of autonomy would want to maintain that a person’s autonomy is
undermined in any case in which they believe something false and make choices on the
basis of that false belief, but it’s not clear why a claim’s falsehood should suddenly
become relevant to autonomy once it’s an oppressive norm that is false.
Consider next the requirement that the false norms be oppressive in order to
undermine autonomy. It’s not clear why oppression, in particular, should be relevant
here. Some false norms are not oppressive, but still seem to influence people’s choices in
important ways. For example, men in our society are not oppressed, but they are still
subjected to certain false norms that, on the face of it, seem to undermine their
autonomy.4 It’s likely that there are many men who might have pursued a career in dance,
design, or some other field typically characterized as “feminine”—and thereby
inappropriate for men—had it not been for the fact that it is characterized in this way. As
a result, they may feel alienated from many of the choices they make and be motivated by

I am relying on Marilyn Frye’s well-known and well-respected definition of “oppression” (1983). Perhaps
the proponents of this conception of autonomy have in mind a different understanding of “oppression,” but
if this is the case then they should be clear about it.
4
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a sense of inadequacy that often characterizes oppression for proponents of substantive
views.
This approach to understanding autonomy also seems to be unmotivated except
by a desire to explain the significance of oppression. It is quite intuitive that oppressive
norms might undermine autonomy; after all, oppressive norms often function by
convincing people that they are unfit to pursue their goals, or by altering their preferences
in ways that seem problematic. But if this—or something like it—explains why false
oppressive norms undermine autonomy, then it seems as though any time someone is
motivated by a false belief that they are unfit to pursue their goals or by preferences that
have been problematically altered we should think they are lacking in autonomy. But then
we need an explanation of when someone’s preferences have been altered in a way that is
relevantly problematic and why, and appealing to false oppressive norms at this point will
take us in a circle. So it seems to me that this appeal to oppressive norms, while plausible,
is nonetheless in need of defense because it does not, by itself, seem to explain anything
and gives us no motivation for accepting it as a way of understanding autonomy.
As a result of these considerations, it appears that a theory of autonomy that plays
the role of explaining the wrongness of oppression is both theoretically and intuitively
unacceptable because it deems non-autonomous choices which are intuitively
autonomous. It also seems to stipulate conditions that are not directly related to whether
or not a person has or lacks autonomy—like the truth of their beliefs—and others which
may be related to autonomy but only because of some feature they have—like oppression
being relevant because of its tendency to cause people to sacrifice goals they would
otherwise pursue or to feel incapable of making choices for themselves. Proponents of
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substantive theories of autonomy must, then, look elsewhere for their explanation of the
theoretical role the concept of autonomy should play.
1.4 Summary and Conclusion
I began this paper by noting that the disagreement between proponents of
substantive and content-neutral theories of autonomy seems to be one having to do with
what kind of self-guidance is important enough to be called “autonomy.” This seems to
be so because in cases over which these folks disagree, the disagreement isn’t regarding
whether the protagonist in the example is lacking some kind of self-guidance—that much
is granted by both parties (or ought to be, anyway). Instead, the disagreement is about
whether or not the protagonist is lacking the kind of self-guidance one must have to count
as autonomous. But, so I have claimed, in order to determine whether a particular kind of
self-guidance is important enough to be called “autonomy,” we must first determine why
it is that autonomy is supposed to be important in the first place. That is, why should we
care about autonomy? What theoretical value does the concept have? Once we have some
idea of the role the concept should play, then we will be better suited to determine
whether or not some particular kind of self-guidance might be relevant to autonomy.
I went on to consider five different theoretical roles we might want our concept of
autonomy to play; I claimed that none of them will be suitable for proponents of contentneutral views or for proponents of substantive views, though my focus was on the
substantive views. These roles were: simply to allow us to pick out a valuable
phenomenon; to properly respect individuals; to help us determine the appropriateness of
paternalism in various cases; to help us understand and identify moral responsibility; and
to allow us to explain the wrongness of oppression. These potential roles are
26

unsatisfactory because they are theoretically unmotivated, lead to a theoretically
problematic theory of autonomy, lead to an extremely counter-intuitive theory of
autonomy, take us no distance at all toward a theory of autonomy, or some combination
of these. As a result, if autonomy theorists are going to successfully defend their own
theory of autonomy over some alternative, they must first put forward some explanation
of why the concept of autonomy is theoretically valuable in the first place. Only then will
they be in a position to defend the claim that their theory of autonomy picks out the kind
of self-guidance that is most appropriately deemed “autonomy.”
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CHAPTER 2
NO AUTONOMY WITHOUT SELF-RESPECT
2.1 Introduction
Consider the case of a woman who has been socialized to believe that women are
incapable of managing their own affairs, and that they need a man to do it for them. As a
result of this socialization, she comes to believe that she is indeed incapable in this way
and chooses to let her husband guide the course of her life for her. Is this woman
autonomous? If you’re inclined to say “no,” then you might have a substantive notion of
autonomy—or an approach to autonomy that places restrictions on the desires, plans,
beliefs, attitudes, etc. that can motivate autonomous choice. But it’s difficult to give a
satisfying explanation of why she counts as lacking autonomy since, after all, she is freely
choosing to defer to her husband, and she has some good reasons for doing so.
In this paper, I argue for a new requirement for a choice to be an autonomous one
that would explain why this woman lacks autonomy, and I argue that it is preferable to
some of the leading substantive theories for a variety of reasons. In particular, I argue that
we should understand autonomous choices as those choices that involve the kind of selfguidance the self-respecting person would engage in. Thus, the woman in the example
lacks autonomy because she lacks an important form of self-respect and this lack of selfrespect has impacted the way in which she guides her choices. While this appeal to selfrespect as a necessary condition for autonomy may at first seem to be changing the
subject from what autonomy theorists have been discussing, I argue that it is actually
quite in line with the kind of theories they’ve been proposing, but is free from the kinds
of problems its rivals face.
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In establishing this new approach to autonomy, I identify and explain three core
features of self-respect that those in the literature generally seem to agree on, namely,
appreciation of our own value, appreciation of the value of reasons and rationality, and
appreciation of the value of acting in accordance with our personal values. I argue that by
focusing on the kind of self-guidance required by each of these three components of selfrespect, a plausible account of autonomy emerges. From the feature of self-respect that
involves our appreciation of our own value, we get the result that one's choice is not
autonomous if it is motivated by false beliefs about one's worth as a person or a failure to
be appropriately motivated by this belief. From the second feature of self-respect—that
we appreciate the value of reasons and rationality—we get the result that when a choice
is motivated by a failure of self-reflection that self-respect would require of us (perhaps
because one takes oneself to be incapable of guiding one's choices well anyway, or
simply doesn't care about one's capacity for rational agency), that choice is thereby
lacking in autonomy. The final feature of self-respect I’ve noted is that the self-respecting
person cares about shaping themselves into someone with values and goals that they take
to be objectively worth having. With this as a requirement for autonomous choice, we get
the result that when we act without appreciating the significance of our actions to our
character or our goals, we are failing to act autonomously. Similarly, when we fail to
consider who we want to be and go on making mundane choices about how to live
without any reflection, our choices are lacking in autonomy.
The results this view gives us are, I think, quite intuitive, and are also in line with
the kind of results popular substantive approaches to autonomy give. For example, on one
leading substantive view of autonomy, the woman who takes herself to be incapable of
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managing her affairs would lack autonomy because she takes herself to lack the
competence to navigate the choices available to her.5 But this failure to appreciate her
own competence just is a failure of self-respect, so the direct appeal to self-respect can
give us a more fundamental explanation of what has gone wrong in the relevant case. On
a second popular view, the woman lacks autonomy because she has internalized false,
oppressive norms, and choices motivated by beliefs of this sort simply cannot be
autonomous ones.6 Again, it seems as though the problem with believing false,
oppressive norms is that norms like these tell oppressed individuals that their value as a
person depends on something it does not, in fact, depend on. Thus, in accepting them,
they fail to have proper respect for themselves. We can see, then, that the appeal to these
problematic norms is at bottom a concern with a lack of self-respect. It seems to me that
by considering the relationship between self-respect and self-guidance directly, we get a
theory of autonomy that is more unified and explanatorily powerful.
We can see the virtues of this theory over alternatives when we consider how it
would respond to the example of the woman who feels incapable of competently guiding
her life. It seems right that part of what explains her lack of autonomy is her very lack of
confidence in herself. However, it also seems right that part of what explains her lack of
autonomy is her internalization of oppressive norms according to which women are not
too assertive or opinionated and they defer to the men around them. The theories
discussed above cannot account for the fact that both of these explanations seem relevant,
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See, for example, Paul Benson (1994).
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See, for example, Natalie Stoljar (2007).
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but a direct appeal to the relevance of self-respect to autonomy can explain this. We see
the power of this account in other cases as well. For example, the appeal to oppressive
norms cannot explain failures of autonomy in cases of, say, gaslighting, whereas the
appeal to self-respect can.
In this paper, I start by laying out the leading explanations of why people like the
deferential woman lack autonomy, and I argue that these explanations lead to conditions
for autonomy that produce counter-intuitive results and theories that seem theoretically
unmotivated and disjointed. I go on to explain the ways in which both approaches seem
to be concerned with self-respect, and argue that a direct appeal to self-respect as a
necessary condition for autonomy allows us to address the concerns that motivate these
alternatives without running into the problems they have. I also give some purely
theoretical reasons for thinking that self-respect is necessary for autonomy, and I end the
paper by giving a sketch of what this theory of autonomy would look like. I argue that it
gives us appealing results in important cases, and that it seems to be able to account for
these cases in a more unified, explanatorily powerful way than other popular theories of
autonomy.
2.2 Autonomy According to Popular Substantive Approaches
The distinction between content-neutral and substantive theories of autonomy is
not as straightforward as one might like it to be, but the difference can be understood to
be roughly between theories of autonomy which do not place restrictions on the desires,
plans, beliefs, etc. that can motivate an autonomous choice, and those which do. Contentneutral theories maintain that a choice can be autonomous regardless of what the content
is of the motivating pro-attitude that ultimately caused the choice; they merely place
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restrictions on the structure of one’s pro-attitudes and/or their history. In contrast, while
substantive theories are also concerned with the structure of one’s pro-attitudes and/or
their history, they place additional restrictions on the content of pro-attitudes that can
motivate autonomous choices.
Consider, for example, someone who gives up their life to save someone else.
Regarding the pro-attitude that motivated the person to make that choice, content-neutral
theorists will ask questions such as: What was the source of that pro-attitude? Did they
reflectively endorse it, or would they do so if they were prompted to? How does that proattitude relate to other of the agent’s pro-attitudes? Are they consistent or is there a
conflict? While substantive theorists will also be interested in the answers to these
questions, they will be concerned with further questions such as: Was this person
motivated by false beliefs about their own moral standing? Did they believe as a result of
oppressive norms that they had a duty to do what they did? What kind of attitude did they
take toward themselves? Was it one of confidence and self-assurance, or was it one that
displayed a lack of a sense of self-worth? So while the substantive theorists will think
that the content of the agent’s pro-attitude is relevant to their autonomy, the contentneutral theorist will not. In this section, I consider some of the possible necessary
conditions for autonomy that would make a theory substantive, focusing on the views of
Paul Benson and Natalie Stoljar.
Benson’s early work in autonomy7 is motivated by the importance of what he
called “normative competence,” or “an array of abilities to be aware of applicable

He talks about “free agency” rather than autonomy, but it’s common to understand discussions of
freedom, agency, and autonomy to inform one another in certain ways.
7
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normative standards, to appreciate those standards, and to bring them competently to bear
in one’s evaluations of open courses of action.” (1990; p.54) He claims that this condition
on autonomy allows us to explain our intuition that children, persons with certain mental
illnesses, and others with the relevant features lack autonomy in certain contexts though
they do have the ability to act reflectively and intentionally. For example, a child can
think about whether or not to hit his sister and reflect on the fact that his mother has told
him how important it is that he not do it, but when he chooses to hit his sister nonetheless
we are inclined, according to Benson, to deny that the relevant choice was an autonomous
one. Certainly, at the very least, we would not think that his choice to hit his sister
revealed something significant about his character. Benson’s explanation for this is that
people of the sort he is describing “are not aware of or cannot adequately appreciate
certain things which free agents must be able to understand and be capable of bringing to
bear upon their choices and plans… [T]hey cannot be expected to know any better than to
do what they do.” (p. 52).
This appeal to normative competence leads Benson to a view according to which
our choices can be autonomous in one context but non-autonomous in another, depending
upon whether we have knowledge of and the ability to appreciate and act upon certain
normative standards that are generally accepted in the relevant domain. A child may be
unable to appreciate the significance of normative standards in all domains and so lack
autonomy across the board, but if I find myself suddenly being “assessed in relation to
the standards governing the conversation and manners of British nobility,” then since I
have no knowledge of or ability to act in accordance with the relevant standards, my
choices will not be autonomous in that context. (p. 55) Benson takes this to be a plausible
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way of thinking of things because, after all, my actions in that context do not really reveal
anything about who I am; if I act in ways which, given the context, are disrespectful and
offensive, this should not inform anyone’s understanding of my character. An important
feature of autonomous action, then, is that it reveals something significant about who we
are in ways that non-autonomous action does not.
Of course, it’s possible that a person is, in fact, knowledgeable and capable
enough to respond appropriately to the norms in a given context without realizing that
they are. They might mistakenly come to think of themselves as incompetent and/or as
lacking the standing to participate in the relevant interactions, and this may cause them to
make choices they would not otherwise make or to give up on making their own choices
altogether. Benson’s concern about cases like these motivated him to move from focusing
on normative competence—an objective measure of whether a person has the knowledge
and ability to act in meaningful ways in a given context—to an agent’s “sense of
worthiness to act” in a given context. (1994; p. 660) This subjective sense of one’s own
normative competence is another necessary condition for autonomy on Benson’s view.
Thus, if a member of a racial minority who does, in fact, have the same worth and moral
competence as those around him has come to falsely believe that he has lesser worth and
that he is lacking in moral agency, he might lack autonomy as a result. When he chooses
as a result of this false belief to consistently defer to the people around him who are
members of the racial majority, that choice will not be an autonomous one.8
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Of course, there may be other factors that could do a better job in certain cases of explaining the choice to
defer from a member of a racial minority. In particular, threats of violence are often the explanation. But
even if threats of violence—explicit or implicit—are absent, the individual’s choice to defer could still lack
autonomy if it is motivated by this sense of incompetence.
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Benson has provided us with two necessary conditions for autonomous choice—
we must in fact have normative competence in a given context, and we must (justifiably)
take ourselves to have that competence, which involves taking ourselves to be answerable
for our choices if someone were to criticize our choice or to press us for reasons for
choosing as we did. This gives us the result that many oppressed individuals, including
women in our society, are lacking autonomy in many contexts. Since women are often
socialized to believe that they are less competent than men or have less value than men
do, they may choose to give up making choices of their own and to defer to others who,
as they see it, have more worth and better decision-making abilities than they do.
Alternatively, they may go on making decisions of their own, but they may do it in a way
that is unreflective and disengaged from their capacities for practical reasoning. We can
see examples of both kinds of autonomy failure in Kristin Luker’s discussion of women
who take contraceptive risks; these were women who had access to birth control but did
not use it, had unprotected sex resulting in pregnancies, and then had abortions (Luker,
1975 cited in Stoljar, 2000). Some of these women chose not to use birth control because
they deferred to the claims of others that doing so was wrong, while others chose not to
use birth control by, in some sense, not making any decision at all; this second group of
women took themselves to lack the kind of decision making capacities to choose for
themselves whether or not to have sex or try to prevent pregnancy. Both groups of
women would, on Benson’s account, lack autonomy in the relevant case.
There is, however, at least one other group of women in the study who are worth
considering. These are women who reflectively endorsed the norms of femininity
according to which good women do not try to prevent pregnancy because good women
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do not engage in premarital sex. These women do take themselves to have the standing to
make the decision for themselves, and they think the decision they made was a good one.
On Benson’s view, these women would be autonomous in the relevant case since they
had both normative competence and a sense of worthiness to act. However, according to
Stoljar their choice not to use contraception is not autonomous after all. This is because
their choice not to use contraception was motivated by false, oppressive norms that they
internalized. If these women had not believed false claims about the source of the worth
of women or their proper role in life, they would have made a different decision (all other
things being equal). Additionally, in coming to believe these false norms, the number of
options that remained available to them decreased and they were more likely to remain
subordinate to men.
Stoljar’s proposed necessary condition for autonomy, then, is that the relevant
choice not be motivated by the acceptance of false, oppressive norms. She seems to think
that this condition should be accepted because, once these norms are internalized, the
agent becomes unable to evaluate their plausibility and reject them when they are
inapplicable. This is related to a commonly appealed to condition for autonomy called
“procedural independence,” or, as Stoljar puts it, “whether the influence on the formation
of the preference constituted coercive persuasion or was reflection-distorting due to
insufficient exposure to alternative possibilities or some other factor.” (2014, p. 238)
Plausibly, when a person internalizes false oppressive norms, they lose the ability to
adequately consider alternative options or to reflect on the legitimacy of the relevant
norm, so they would lack procedural independence as Stoljar conceives of it. With this
condition, Stoljar can capture the lack of autonomy in Benson’s example of the member
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of the racial minority and his example of the woman subjected to gaslighting, but she can
also capture the intuitive lack of autonomy in additional cases in which individuals do
have normative competence and a sense of worthiness to act but may seem to lack
autonomy nonetheless.
While it seems to me quite plausible that the individuals Benson and Stoljar are
concerned with lack autonomy in the relevant cases, their accounts of autonomy face a
number of challenges. In the next section, I consider problems for their views and argue
that proponents of substantive theories who want to capture the lack of autonomy in these
cases are going to have to look elsewhere for the necessary condition for autonomy that
can do the work while still providing us with a theoretically plausible view. Then, in
sections III and IV, I explain how appealing directly to the notion of self-respect can
provide us with just such a condition.
2.3 Challenges to these Substantive Conditions
Return again to Benson’s requirement that for a choice to be autonomous, it must
be the case that i) the agent has normative competence in the domain in which the choice
is being made, and ii) the agent takes themselves to be worthy to act in that domain, or to
be answerable for the relevant choice. It seems to me that the first requirement is
unacceptable as a necessary condition for autonomy. I suspect that we all would maintain
that I can, in fact, autonomously choose to use my fork to eat my salad even if those
around me happen to be assessing me based on the norms of British nobility and I am
unfamiliar with those norms. While this could certainly lead to a misunderstanding or a
miscommunication, it seems implausible that that is sufficient to make my choice lacking
in autonomy.
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Consider first a version of the case in which I am aware that I am being assessed
on the basis of norms I do not understand. In this case, I can appreciate that I lack the
relevant information to make the choice that will express what I want to express, and I
can use my values, goals, practical reasoning abilities, and so on to autonomously choose
how to go forward given my lack of information. I can choose to use my fork while
looking out for reactions from others and responding to those actions in ways that seem
appropriate to me. For example, if they seem offended or upset, I can explain that I was
unaware of relevant conventions and am sorry for any offense I’ve caused. If none of this
is taken as I intended it either, it’s still unclear to me why that should make it the case
that my choices were not my own, or that I did not have the relevant control over them.
We rarely have control over how our choices are interpreted by others, but lacking this
kind of control is certainly not sufficient to undermine autonomy.
Even if I am unaware that I am being assessed based on those norms, I am still at
a loss regarding why my choice can’t still be my own choice. It may simply be the case
that those around me are holding me to a standard that it is unreasonable to hold me to,
but surely I do not lose my ability to act autonomously whenever I am held to an
unreasonable standard by others. Or, if it is reasonable to hold me to the relevant standard
and I am responsible for acting in inappropriate ways, then it seems as though we would
want to say that I made an autonomous choice to ignore the relevant standards and act in
inappropriate ways.
While Benson is no doubt correct that in these cases I am lacking information that
would allow me to make a better-informed choice and that, if I had the information, I
would be likely to choose differently, this is not enough to undermine my autonomy. We
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often lack information that it would be useful to have before we make some choice, and
it’s often the case that we would choose otherwise than we do if had it. But simply not
knowing, for example, how much I will like the tea before I buy it does not make my
choice to buy it lacking in autonomy. Perhaps Benson would reply to this example by
reminding us that it is only norms that we must be familiar with on his view, and not
relevant information more generally. But if that’s his response, he’ll need to explain what
it is about norms that makes them such that we must be familiar with them but not other
relevant information. After all, as I’ve noted, it could be that other information unrelated
to norms matters to our decision-making more than the norms do.
So making choices that are misunderstood by others does not undermine my
autonomy, nor does making a choice without having all (or even most) of the relevant
information. It’s unclear, then, why we should think that we must have normative
competence in a relevant domain in order to make autonomous choices with respect to
that domain. Additionally, such a view leads to results that are implausible to say the
least.9 We may be tempted at this point to consider rejecting the first condition for
autonomy but still accepting the second, namely, that the agent takes themselves to be
worthy to act in that domain, or to be answerable for the relevant choice. However,
accepting this condition while rejecting the former condition will lead to a theory of
autonomy that is far too subjective unless we add some alternative objective requirement.
This is because the second of Benson’s conditions allows us to be mistaken in thinking

Benson’s acceptance of this feature of his view was in a paper from 1990, and to my knowledge he has
not reaffirmed it since then. However, he has since provided different conditions that must be met for
one’s belief that one has normative competence in some domain to be a reasonable one. For this reason, I
suspect that he would now reject the initial proposal.
9
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that we are competent in the relevant domain, or that we are answerable for the choices
we make. For example, a child may take themselves to know all they need to know and
have all the deliberative skill required to make the choice to get a tattoo sleeve, but most
people would claim that children cannot autonomously make choices about things as
permanent as tattoo sleeves. So their belief that they are answerable for the relevant
choice is not sufficient to make the choice an autonomous one.
Benson has recently given a more promising explanation of what objective
conditions must be met in order for someone’s choice to be autonomous. His claim is that
our attitude of competence must be reasonable, and in order to determine whether or not
our confidence in our answerability is reasonable, we should “consider what kinds of
revelation about the circumstances under which our attitudes were formed would, upon
rational consideration, typically undermine our sense of competence and worthiness as
answerers.” (2005; p. 118) So if we would lose our confidence upon rational
consideration of the circumstances under which we formed that confidence, then we lack
autonomy in spite of our taking ourselves to be answerable for our choice.
The problem here is in determining what “rational consideration” involves.
Benson himself seems to problematize such a condition in his discussion of “historical”
approaches to autonomy which place restrictions on the choices that count as autonomous
by appealing directly to the causal history of the pro-attitudes that motivated the relevant
choice. On these historical views, if one were to rationally reflect on the process by
which one came to have the relevant pro-attitudes and feel resistance to or alienation
from the pro-attitudes as a result, then the choices motivated by those hypothetically-
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resisted pro-attitudes are not autonomous.10 In order to argue that the appeal to
hypothetical rational consideration is unsuccessful in this context, Benson asks us to
consider a case in which a woman is a victim of gaslighting that is not intentional. She
lives in a time in which medical science does not understand women’s mental health
well, and although her doctor genuinely has her best interests in mind, he ends up
convincing her that she is hysterical when really, she is merely passionate. She comes to
doubt her own ability to make decisions on the basis of the judgment of the best medical
science of her time, so it doesn’t seem as though rational reflection on the process will by
itself undermine her sense of incompetence. Instead, she needs access to more
information. However, as I’ve already noted, it’s implausible to maintain that our choice
is not autonomous in any case in which we would have made a different one had we had
more information.
Of course, in the case just discussed, the woman does in fact have normative
competence, but she does not believe she does. According to Benson, rational reflection
on the process by which she came to have her lack of confidence in herself will not
correct her judgment. Thus, the appeal to rational reflection on the process by which one
came to have one’s attitudes does not solve the problem in this case. The question now is
whether we could get the same kinds of results in a case in which someone lacks
normative competence but believes they have it. I think it’s clear that we could.

10

See, for example, John Christman, 1991.
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Imagine someone with undiagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) living in a society in which the disorder is unrecognized as such.11 This person
might find themselves doing things like consistently running late for meetings and
appointments, forgetting to take care of their household responsibilities, struggling to
focus when listening to their spouse, etc. Since they do not know that their behavior is the
result of ADHD, they take themselves to be answerable for it and as a result have quite a
negative evaluation of their own character. However, if they were to reflect on the
process by which they came to think of themselves as normatively competent, they would
not have available to them facts about ADHD. They would only have available the
intuitive thoughts about personal responsibility and self-control that seem to be true in
others and in other realms of their life. Thus, I think it would be reasonable for them to
conclude that they are answerable for their choices and behaviors given their lack of
information. However, I doubt that Benson would claim that their choice to, for example,
put an assignment off until the last minute or leave late for an appointment is an
autonomous one. But since this person does take themselves to be answerable and they
would maintain that attitude upon rational reflection of the process by which they came to
form the attitude, Benson gives us no way of explaining why their choice was not
autonomous after all.
To sum up the problems with Benson’s view, the subjective sense of one’s
worthiness to act or one’s answerability for one’s choices may be necessary but is not

While various psychological disabilities and disorders are relevant to autonomy on Benson’s view, it’s
not clear to me that theories of autonomy need to deliver verdicts in these kinds of cases. However, since
Benson does, his own view should be able to account for them.
11
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sufficient for autonomy. We need an objective constraint that requires that one in fact be
answerable. One way to flesh this out is to claim that one have normative competence of
the standards by which one’s choices will be assessed, but this leads to implausible
results and seems to be unmotivated. A second way to flesh it out is to say that one is
only in fact answerable if one’s sense of answerability would not be undermined upon
rational reflection on the process by which one came to take oneself to be answerable.
But this does not work either, since there are cases in which one meets both of these
conditions but lacks autonomy nonetheless.
Consider next Stoljar’s requirement that, in order to be autonomous, choices may
not be motivated by internalized false oppressive norms. The first problem with this
condition is that it appears to lead to a theory of autonomy that is disjunctive, or one
which consists of a list of necessary conditions which do not seem to be theoretically
motivated but instead simply seem to be attempts at responding in the right way to cases.
This is because Benson seems right that gaslighting can undermine autonomy without
impairing one’s rational abilities, and one need not have internalized oppressive norms in
order to be a victim of gaslighting (though it would make it easier, no doubt). So in order
to account for cases like that, we will need not only Stoljar’s condition but also a version
of Benson’s, and unless we can find a single consideration that motivates both of them,
the resulting theory seems cobbled together.
A second problem with Stoljar’s view is the supposed relationship between the
internalization of false oppressive norms and procedural independence. To remind us,
Stoljar understands procedural independence to be undermined when one’s choice was
motivated by coercion or as a result of one’s ability to reflect being distorted “due to
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insufficient exposure to alternative possibilities or some other factor.” (2014; p. 238) But
it isn’t clear that internalized false norms distort one’s ability to reflect any more than
other kinds of socialization do. Any time we internalize norms—whether oppressive or
not, false or true—our ability to reflect on that norm is diminished to some degree.
Additionally, our society prevents us from adequate exposure to alternatives for all kinds
of beliefs and norms, like that brides wear white dresses, that movies are in English, that
female babies can have pierced ears but not pierced noses, and so on. Our failure to
appreciate alternatives can be explained based on the way we have been socialized, and it
may impact the choices we make in all kinds of ways. Thus, if internalizing false
oppressive norms undermines autonomy by preventing us from appreciating alternatives,
then it seems as though the lack of exposure to alternatives in the cases above should
undermine autonomy as well.
However, I take it to be implausible that our preference for watching a movie in
English is not autonomous since we have not been exposed to adequate alternatives, or
that a parent cannot autonomously choose to pierce their young daughter’s ears (I would
maintain that they shouldn’t do this, but we can autonomously choose to do things we
ought not do). It’s a desideratum of a theory of autonomy that it be humanly possible to
be autonomous (and, in fact, many theorists want a theory according to which most
people and choices count as autonomous), but given the unavoidability of socialization
throughout various aspects of our lives, Stoljar’s approach seems to give us the result that
many, if not most, of our choices are lacking in autonomy. Perhaps Stoljar would want to
say that there is something special about the internalization of false oppressive norms that
causes it to undermine procedural independence in a particularly pernicious way, or
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perhaps she would want to say that it undermines autonomy regardless of its effects on
procedural independence. If she were to choose the former, she would need to give us
some reason for thinking this is so, and if she were to choose the latter, she would have to
simply stipulate that the internalization of false oppressive norms undermines autonomy
with no explanation why. Given the large number of autonomy theorists who do not share
her intuitions about the cases she uses to motivate her view, relying solely on those
intuitions seems to be a problematic way to go.
I have argued so far that while the leading substantive theories of autonomy are
able to provide intuitive response to a number of important cases, like the enslaved
person, the victim of gaslighting, or the women who forgo contraception because they
have internalized false oppressive norms, they face serious challenges that should prompt
us to look elsewhere for our substantive account of autonomy. In the next sections, I
show that even though these particular conditions for autonomy fail, they share a
motivation which, when appealed to directly, may be able to provide us with a plausible
approach to understanding autonomy.
2.4 The Importance of Self-Respect for the Standard Theories
Although the conditions discussed above are problematic for various reasons, it
seems to me that they have in common an underlying concern for self-respect. Thus, it is
worth considering what a theory of autonomy would look like with self-respect as a
necessary condition for autonomy. In this section, I begin by describing features of selfrespect according to popular approaches, and I go on to explain how the views discussed
above ultimately seem to be motivated by a concern for the kinds of self-guidance that
self-respect promotes.
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One of the most influential accounts of self-respect comes from Robin Dillon’s
various works on the topic. While it is not possible in this paper to provide a detailed
discussion of her view or a precise definition of self-respect that encompasses all of its
aspects, it will be useful for our purposes to consider some cases of individuals who seem
to lack self-respect. These include, according to Dillon, the Servile, the Ashamed, and the
Self-Doubter. Consider first the Servile. This person, according to Dillon, disavows “their
moral rights, either because they do not understand that they have these rights or what
having these rights signifies about their status in the moral community, or because they
do not properly value their rights.” (p. 126) “Moral rights” in this context are just the
rights one has as a person to fair consideration and treatment, and Dillon claims that those
rights represent and protect “one’s moral status and worth as a person.” (p. 126) To lack
an appreciation of these rights, then, is to fail to see or properly care about what it is that
they represent about us, namely, that we have the same moral worth as those around us,
that we deserve respect and consideration, that our preferences and goals matter just as
much as anyone else’s preferences and goals, etc. The Servile would then be comfortable
consistently deferring to others on matters of significance to them merely because they do
not sufficiently appreciate the value of their own preferences, and they would be
comfortable allowing others to mistreat them because of their lack of appreciation of their
worth.
A second example of someone who lacks self-respect is the Ashamed, or someone
who takes themselves to have failed to live up to some significant standards that
determine one’s worth or standing. They have some idea of what it takes to live a
worthwhile life or be a person that it is worth being, and they take themselves not to
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measure up. This person’s lack of self-respect shows us, according to Dillon, that selfrespect requires confidence in the worth of one’s values and in one’s ability to live up to
them. The final example, the Self-Doubter, need not have taken themselves to have
already failed in living up to some significant standards as the Ashamed does. Instead,
they simply lack confidence in their ability to do so in the future. Perhaps they come to
doubt the worth of those values altogether and their ability to evaluate them, or perhaps
they doubt their ability to live up to them. This shows that self-respect requires us to have
confidence in our evaluative skills and our practical reasoning abilities.
With some idea of what is required to be self-respecting, we can now consider
how self-respect relates to the necessary conditions for autonomy that are proposed by
Benson and Stoljar. We see a direct relationship between Benson’s conditions for
autonomy and the conditions for self-respect when we consider the subjective component
of his view. This is the condition according to which the autonomous person must take
themselves to be answerable for their choices, or to have the standing and competence to
act in the relevant context. Consider Benson’s own discussion of some of the cases that
motivate his view:
The psychologically degraded slaves whom I described lost (or failed to gain)
respect for
their own moral dignity as persons. The victim of gaslighting and the person
experiencing shame normally would not completely lack moral self-respect. And
whereas the gaslighted woman is liable to doubt her competence to make
reasonable evaluations of herself, the ashamed person normally trusts his
evaluative assessments of himself. So these agents differ considerably in the kinds
of self-worth they lack. What, then, is the common element among them which
accounts for their diminished freedom? (1994; p. 659)
Benson’s answer to this question is that “The person's view of herself has been altered so
that she does not regard herself as being in a position to meet various normative standards
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that she would judge to govern her interpersonal interactions.” (p. 660) But a more
straightforward answer is in Benson’s own description of the cases: they each lack a
certain sense of self-worth. The slave in his example has clear similarities with Dillon’s
example of the Servile, and the person who is a victim of gaslighting is a clear example of
a Self-Doubter. Of course, Benson’s example of the person who lacks confidence in their
standing as someone who is answerable for their choices because of their shame is clearly
parallel to Dillon’s Ashamed. So if self-respect is a requirement for autonomy, we can
explain the lack of autonomy in those from Benson’s examples by appealing directly to
their lack of self-respect.
The relevance of self-respect is also obvious in Stoljar’s account of autonomy.
The crucial condition for autonomy that she proposes is that an autonomous choice
cannot be motivated by the acceptance of false, oppressive norms. Note that it is not
adequate that the norms be either false or oppressive; they must have both features in
order to undermine autonomy. One might wonder why this should seem plausible,
especially given that, as we determined in Section II, there is no straightforward route
from requiring procedural independence to requiring this specific combination of
features—that is, it seems just as plausible that false norms that are not oppressive, for
example, interfere with procedural independence. I suspect that the reason this particular
requirement seems plausible is that it is related to self-respect in a way that other factors
potentially related to procedural independence are not. When a norm is oppressive, it
tends to cause those who it oppresses to think less of themselves than they otherwise
would, and when oppressive norms are false, they cause this self-deprecation to occur
when it is unwarranted. So false oppressive norms are particularly interesting because
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they tend to cause people to lack a sense of self-respect, or to think of themselves as
having less dignity than they in fact have.
In Stoljar’s case of the women who have internalized the norms about what a
woman ought to be like and have, as a result, failed to use contraception before engaging
in sexual activity, they clearly lack some of the features of self-respect that Dillon has
identified. They believe that their worth as a woman depends in part on their sexual
activity and fail to appreciate that their moral status as a person depends not at all on
things like sexual activity but rather on their personhood itself. Some of these women
also experience self-doubt and perhaps also shame, which is what Benson would focus
on, but they need not experience these things on Stoljar’s view in order to lack autonomy.
Similarly, they need not experience these things in order to lack self-respect. For
believing that one’s worth as a person is precarious and that it can be lost is sufficient to
lack an appreciation of one’s value and the treatment one is entitled to as a result of that. I
want to suggest that Stoljar takes false oppressive norms to undermine autonomy
precisely because they function by causing certain individuals to feel compelled to do
things because their self-worth hangs in the balance. If this is right, then it is self-respect
more generally that Stoljar is concerned with, not false, oppressive norms in particular,
and these norms will undermine autonomy insofar as they undermine self-respect.
In this section I have argued that the leading accounts of autonomy rely on
conditions for autonomy that importantly related to self-respect. Benson’s requirement
for normative competency requires us to take ourselves to be capable of properly
evaluating our own goals and preferences and of effectively pursuing them, and Stoljar’s
requirement that we not be motivated by the acceptance of false, oppressive norms
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requires that we not be motivated by a sense of having to do something or else losing our
worth as a person. All of this is clearly related to self-respect. The question now is just
whether a direct appeal to self-respect as a necessary condition for autonomy can lead to
plausible responses to the kinds of cases Benson and Stoljar are concerned with without
also leading to the problems their theories face as outlined in Section II. In the next
section, I address these issues by first discussing some ways in which self-respect is
importantly related to self-guidance. I then sketch the theory of autonomy that would
result from making self-respect a necessary condition for autonomy, show how this
theory can give us the desired results in the relevant cases, and argue that this theory is
free from the problems that Benson’s and Stoljar’s theories face.
2.5 Self-Respect as a Necessary Condition for Autonomy
The goal of this section is to get a better idea of what a theory of autonomy would
look like with self-respect as a necessary condition, and to show that this theory would be
free from the problems that Benson and Stoljar face.12 The first thing to consider is
whether this approach to autonomy has sufficient motivation in the first place, or whether
self-respect has any clear relevance to self-guidance. It seems to me that it does. Consider
first the ways in which this is made clear from a review of Benson’s theory of autonomy.
He claims that one condition for guiding one’s choices is taking oneself to be capable of
guiding one’s choices. If a person feels genuinely incapable of choosing the course of
their life and gives up on the task altogether, then there is an important sense in which
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I am certainly not the first to propose that self-respect is importantly related to autonomy, or even that it
is necessary for autonomy. See, for example, Hill, 1991; Meyers, 1989; Westlund, 2003. However, there
has been no detailed exploration of what an account of this type would like or how it could account for
various cases.
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they are no longer doing it. As I pointed out in Section II, this appeal to one’s sense of
oneself as capable of directing one’s life just is an appeal to a feature of self-respect. The
self-respecting person is not the Self-Doubter; they believe in their ability to form
worthwhile life plans and to pursue those plans effectively (though of course there is
certainly room to fail in spite of making a competent effort), and they take themselves to
have the standing to do so for themselves. And as Benson has pointed out, taking oneself
to be capable of and having the standing to guide one’s life is necessary for guiding one’s
life in some significant sense.
Stoljar’s theory also helps us see some of the ways in which self-respect is
importantly related to self-guidance. Her concern with the effects of internalized, false,
oppressive norms seems to reveal that there’s something about taking our self-worth to be
at risk of being lost that undermines our ability to guide our choices. We again see
features of the Self-Doubter, who is concerned that any false move could cause them to
lose the standing to choose the course of their life or to lose the capacity to do so
effectively. There seems to be something parallel to coercion going on, in that when one
is coerced to do something, one chooses to do it but only because the alternative is
unacceptable; we say that people in situations like this are forced, or that they had no
choice but to do what they did. In the cases Stoljar is concerned with, we take ourselves
to face the prospect of either losing our worth as a person or making a particular choice.
It seems quite plausible to me that when we face the possibility of losing the very features
about us that give us the standing or capacity to choose at all, we lack the ability to guide
the course of our lives and are instead driven to preserve our self-worth. Of course, we
are never actually at risk of losing our self-worth or the standing to choose our course in
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life simply by choosing to be sexually active, etc., but if we believe that we face this risk
then we will be compelled to make certain choices all the same. Only once we have
confidence that our capacity to guide our choices and our worth as a person are stable and
incapable of being undermined by any choices we might make will we be in a position to
choose for ourselves how to live our lives.
A final way in which self-respect seems to be directly relevant to autonomy is that
we cannot be guided by someone unless we have some kind of respect for them; thus, if
we lack this respect for ourselves or some crucial component of ourselves, then we
cannot be guided by it. The kind of respect that I take to be necessary in order for us to
be guided by something is what Stephen Darwall calls recognition respect (1995). We
have this form of respect for something or someone when we are disposed to recognize
the significance of some thing or some feature of a thing, to give it appropriate weight in
our deliberations, and to act accordingly. Robin Dillon, for example, claims that we can
have this kind of respect for a mountain when we recognize how dangerous it would be to
climb it, or for an agreement that we've made when we appreciate the significance of
violating it (1997). On this way of understanding respect, it’s simply built into what it
means to respect something that we are guided by it in the appropriate ways. And it is
difficult to see how we could possibly be guided by something without having this kind
of respect for it. It seems reasonable to conclude that we cannot be guided by our selves
unless we respect our selves, where I am understanding our moral status, or rational
capacities, and our particularity as being fundamental to who we are. We must then have
respect for these components of ourselves in order to be autonomous.
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These are just a few of the ways in which I take self-guidance and self-respect to
be importantly related to one another. A more complete discussion of the relationship is
better suited for a paper of its own. But given that we have some reasons for thinking that
the two are connected, it is now worth thinking about what a theory of autonomy would
look like with self-respect as a necessary condition. Again, a complete account of this is
not suitable for this paper, but we need to understand what this theory would be like well
enough to assess 1) whether it can account for the cases Benson and Stoljar are concerned
with, and 2) whether it faces the same problems their theories do.
Following Dillon’s discussion of self-respect, I maintain that proper self-respect
has at least three components: we must respect ourselves as persons with equal moral
standing to those around us; we must respect ourselves as rational agents by reflecting on
our reasons for action and our motivations in order to ensure that they are worthy of us;
and we must respect ourselves in our particularity as the persons we are by appreciating
the distinctive qualities we have and striving to live up to worthwhile standards we set for
ourselves. By considering what kinds of self-guidance the self-respecting person would
engage in, we get a nice picture of what autonomy with self-respect as a necessary
condition would look like. So, for example, the self-respecting person would not defer to
others because of a sense that their opinions matter less than others’ do. They would not
live a life of passivity because they take themselves to lack the ability or the standing to
make decisions about how to live. They would not debase themselves by acting in ways
that conflict with the values that they take to partially constitute who they are, nor would
they idly allow their rational abilities to grow duller by underutilizing them because of a
lack of appreciation of their value.
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It follows from this conception of self-respect, along with accepting self-respect
as a necessary condition for autonomy, that one’s choice to defer to others because of an
improper appreciation of one’s value would not be fully autonomous. Our choices
regarding how to live our lives would also lack autonomy if they were motivated by a
lack of confidence in our ability or standing to make such choices. There would also be a
lack of autonomy in one’s choice to, say, start making cheap, low-quality prints of one’s
artwork for sake of making money, so long as one would have made a different choice
had one appreciated how deeply one valued art and one’s own artistic abilities. The
choice to work a mind-numbing job and come home to watch hours of bad television
before going to bed would also not be fully autonomous if it were motivated by a lack of
appreciation of the value of one’s rational capacities. Of course, a choice could be
autonomous in some ways but lacking autonomy in other ways. Perhaps one’s choice to
spend all of one’s free time watching television is autonomous insofar as it is consistent
with one’s conception of oneself as a being with moral worth equal to that of others, but
it could still be lacking autonomy in another sense—thus, my talk of these choices not
being fully autonomous. We need not (and often should not) claim that the choices lack
autonomy altogether.
Given this picture of what autonomous choices are like, must now consider
whether the appeal to self-respect as a necessary condition of autonomy can account for
the many cases Benson and Stoljar discuss to motivate their own theories. Benson’s
enslaved person, who consistently defers to non-enslaved individuals around him because
he takes himself to lack the standing and ability to choose for himself, clearly lacks selfrespect and so would not be fully autonomous on my approach. Neither would the victim
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of gaslighting who doubts her competence to make choices about her life, or the women
who do not use contraception because they do not believe that they have the ability to
make these significant choices about their lives. The women who do believe in their
capacity to choose and still choose not to use contraception because of their belief that
doing so would cause them to lose their worth as a person are also lacking in autonomy
on this view because their choice is inconsistent with a proper appreciation of their worth
as persons.
Since this approach to understanding autonomy does seem to be able to account
for the kinds of failures of autonomy that Benson, Stoljar, and other proponents of
substantive views are concerned with, the remaining question is whether it is subject to
the same problems these other views are. Recall that the problem for Benson’s view is
that the subjective component of his requirement—that individuals take themselves to be
answerable for their choices—requires an objective component as well, and he has yet to
propose a plausible objective component. His first suggestion lead to a view that resulted
in our lacking autonomy whenever we are being held to standards we do not know we are
being held to or are not competent with respect to. This seems like too broad of a
requirement. His more recent suggestion is that our sense of ourselves as answerable for
our choices must be able to survive rational consideration of the circumstances in which
that confidence arose. Here the problem is in determining what is involved in “rational
consideration”—too lenient an understanding of this will not give Benson the results he
wants. On the other hand, too stringent an understanding of this will require us to have
access to certain facts we currently lack access to, and this leads to the problem of non-
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arbitrarily determining what information we must have access to in order to be
autonomous.
The view I propose faces none of these problems. Self-respect is a multifaceted
phenomenon that contains within it both subjective and objective components. For
example, believing that one respects oneself is not sufficient for respecting oneself; there
are certain attitudes and beliefs one must have in order to in fact respect oneself. This
gives us one objective component. On the other hand, some of those beliefs and attitudes
that partially constitute self-respect are beliefs and attitudes about one’s self—one’s
value, one’s abilities, one’s standing among others, etc.—so there is a subjective
component as well. Additionally, we need not claim that a person’s autonomy is
undermined any time they lack competence with respect to some particular normative
standards, nor need we depend on a notion of rationality that leads us to implausible
results any way we define it.
Accepting self-respect as a necessary condition for autonomy also does not lead to
the problematic results we get from Stoljar’s view. Her theory ends up either theoretically
unmotivated, inconsistent, or with far too many restrictions on what choices are
autonomous. This is because her concern with false oppressive norms is either related to
concerns about procedural independence or it is not. If it is related to concerns with
procedural independence, then it seems as though the acceptance of any falsehood should
undermine autonomy; but this is a very implausible way to go. If Stoljar were to maintain
that she cares about some falsehoods on the grounds of procedural independence but not
others, this would seem to result in an inconsistent view (unless she were able to give us a
principled explanation of why some matter and some don’t, as I have attempted to do).
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Alternatively, if she were to maintain that false oppressive norms matter for autonomy for
no explicable reason, this seems to give us an unmotivated account of autonomy.
Although she is able to deliver plausible responses to cases, a theory which could give
similar results but with a nice explanation of why would be far preferable. It would also
be preferable for her to have a unified theory that can also account for cases like
Benson’s gaslighting victim. The theory I propose faces none of these problems. I have
argued that there are clear ways in which self-respect is importantly related to selfguidance, so the view is motivated (while still being able to account for Stoljar’s cases).
It can also account for Stoljar’s as well as Benson’s intuitions about various cases with
one unified explanation.
2.5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to motivate a new approach to understanding
autonomy by problematizing some of the popular substantive theories of autonomy and
pointing out a common motivation between them. By appealing to the common
motivation directly, I argued that we can construct a new theory of autonomy that
produces positive results without facing the same problems its alternatives do. In
particular, I argued that the theories of autonomy proposed by Paul Benson and Natalie
Stoljar are both motivated by a concern for the ways in which self-respect seems
importantly related to autonomy. By taking self-respect itself as a necessary condition for
autonomy, we end up with a view that is well-motivated, can explain a number of
important intuitions, and that avoids the problems Benson and Stoljar face. Of course, a
more complete explanation of self-respect and the proposed theory of autonomy is
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needed. However, I take it that, at the very least, such an approach is worth taking
seriously as a new substantive theory of autonomy.
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CHAPTER 3
SELF-RESPECT AND SELF-GUIDANCE: THE AUTONOMOUS PERSON AS
THE SELF-RESPECTING PERSON
3.1 Introduction
The idea that autonomy and self-respect are intimately related is not new. Kant's
own account of these phenomena—an account that has inspired most, if not all, of our
current discussions of self-respect and autonomy—maintained that we could not have one
without the other. That is, we are not exercising our capacity for autonomy if we are not
respecting ourselves, on this account, and we are not respecting ourselves if we are not
exercising our capacity for autonomy. Today, most theories of both autonomy and selfrespect stray far from what Kant had in mind, and many contain explicit criticisms of his
views. Nonetheless, it is still quite common to maintain that recognizing a relationship
between these two phenomena is critical for understanding one or the other of them.
Among those whose aim is to understand self-respect, we have people like Robin
Dillon who explicitly claims in various works that properly respecting ourselves requires
us to strive to be autonomous (1992, 1997). Elizabeth Telfer, in her explanation of what
is required for self-respect, claims that people lack self-respect "if they are not ‘their own
masters’ in a metaphorical sense—not in control of themselves" (1995; 111). From the
other side, many of those attempting to determine what is required for an agent to be
autonomous maintain that there is a close relationship here as well. Diana Meyers (1995),
for example, argues that not only does autonomy increase self-respect, but self-respect
also increases autonomy. And Paul Benson (1994) and Marina Oshana (2006) both claim
that we do not meet the standards for autonomous agency unless we respect ourselves.
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However, while there is significant agreement regarding the important
relationship between autonomy and self-respect, there is much less agreement regarding
what, exactly, either of these things is, and how the two are related. In what follows, I
look for common ground among those who discuss self-respect in order to find some
features of self-respect that are generally accepted as important. I then consider how selfrespect, understood in this way, can inform our understanding of autonomy by
considering the various requirements for self-respect that are relevant to self-guidance. In
this paper, the goal is simply to lay out some features of this self-respect inspired
conception of autonomy, and not to explain it in great detail or defend it against potential
objections. Nonetheless, I will point out some ways in which the resulting theory of
autonomy is consistent with various views that are currently taken quite seriously in order
to motivate its initial plausibility.
In Section I, I identify and explain three core features of self-respect that those in
the literature generally seem to agree on, namely, appreciation of our own value,
appreciation of the value of reasons and rationality, and appreciation of the value of
acting in accordance with our personal values. In Section II, I consider the relationship
between self-respect and morality. In particular, I'm concerned with whether or not the
self-respecting person must necessarily be a morally good person or at least be motivated
to be morally good. This is important for my project because my goal is to present us
with a theory of autonomy that is determined by the requirements of self-respect; if being
moral is required to respect oneself, and respecting oneself is required for being
autonomous, then this would leave us with a view according to which immoral actions
cannot be committed autonomously. Given the implausibility of a view like this, it's
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something I'd like to avoid. However, as I will argue, while morality is related to selfrespect in important ways, we need not be particularly good people to be self-respecting.
Finally, in Section III, I will remind us of the features of self-respect that are related to
self-guidance in order to formulate a sketch of a theory of autonomy that is grounded in
self-respect.
3.2 Three Features of Self-Respect
One of the most influential accounts of self-respect is Stephen Darwall's in his
"Two Kinds of Self-Respect" (1995). In it, he distinguishes between what he calls
recognition respect, on the one hand, and appraisal respect, on the other. To have
appraisal respect for someone is to have "an attitude of positive appraisal of that person
either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit" (184). While we certainly can
have appraisal respect of ourselves, either by having a positive appraisal of ourselves
overall or by having a positive appraisal of some feature of ourselves (our commitment to
some good cause, for example), I will not focus on this form of self-respect because it has
less to tell us regarding self-guidance than recognition respect does.
Recognition respect, as he defines it, is a disposition to recognize the significance
of some thing or some feature of a thing, to give it appropriate weight in one's
deliberations, and to act accordingly. Dillon in "Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional,
Political" (1997; 227) claims that we can have this kind of respect for a mountain when
we recognize how dangerous it would be to climb it, or for an agreement that we've made
when we appreciate the significance of violating it. For our purposes, though, it makes
sense to focus on the ways in which we might have recognition respect for ourselves. It is
almost unanimous in the philosophical literature on self-respect that all persons are due
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respect in virtue of the fact that we are persons. The question, then, is regarding what
features of persons are significant enough to warrant consideration. It seems to me that
the consensus in the literature is that the following three features of persons warrant being
taken into consideration: simply that they are persons, that they have the capacity for
rationality, and that they are the particular persons they are.13 I'll consider each of these in
turn.
3.2.1 Respecting Ourselves as Persons
The first and perhaps most obvious feature of persons that is frequently taken to
warrant recognition and consideration is that they are persons. Of course, it isn't obvious
what it is about persons, exactly, that makes it such that we warrant consideration, but
although there is disagreement about why we matter, those concerned with self-respect
tend to agree about much of what follows from the (purported) fact that we matter. Much
of what is said on this subject is inspired by Kant, who maintained that, in the first place,
all persons deserve equal consideration, and all persons' morally permissible ends matter
to the same degree (Kant cited in Hill, 1980). If we were to take this seriously about
ourselves, then, we would appreciate the fact that our preferences, goals, etc. are worthy
of no less consideration than anyone else's. Kant claims that it follows from this that we
may not degrade ourselves in various ways, and while much of what he says on this
subject is contentious, there is significant agreement with his claim that consistently
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These three categories or features of recognition self-respect are inspired by and very similar to ones that
Dillon discusses in many of her papers (see, for example, 1992, 1995a., 1995b., 1997, 2004). However, I do
not follow her way of dividing them up exactly.
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being servile to others or allowing others to violate or ignore our rights and our status
constitutes a failure to appreciate the respect we are due as persons.
Darwall, for example, echoes these claims when he gives us the following list of
actions that are incompatible with self-respect: "Submitting to indignities, playing the
fool, not caring about whether one is taken seriously and being content to be treated as
the plaything of others …" (1995; 111). So if we were to allow ourselves to be
mistreated, degraded, or consistently ignored by others, we would, all other things equal,
be failing to respect ourselves.14 Unlike appraisal self-respect, or the respect we might
have for ourselves if we have a positive attitude toward ourselves (perhaps because we're
pleased with our good behavior), recognition self-respect is something we owe ourselves
regardless of our character or how we compare to those around us. Thus, there is nothing
we could do to deserve to be treated in these ways or to make the treatment defensible.
This is something that self-respect requires us to recognize about ourselves.
Probably the most famous proponent of this form of self-respect is Thomas Hill
with his example of the Deferential Wife (1991a). The Deferential Wife believes that
women ought to serve their families, so she is happy to defer to her husband on issues
such as what she wears, who she is friends with, where they live, and so on. While she
has preferences of her own on these matters, she takes them to be less significant than
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There are, of course, far too many cases in which not allowing oneself to be mistreated, degraded, or
ignored, would result in significantly worse treatment (e.g. slaves defending their moral rights, women
confronting their sexual harassers, or abused spouses standing up for themselves.) Discussion of cases like
these is rare, but Carol Hay discusses them in Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism. She claims that as
long as one mentally acknowledges the wrongness of their treatment, they have shown themselves
sufficient self-respect in circumstances like these. However, she maintains that we are required to give up
some conveniences for the sake of self-respect. Exactly how to determine when we must act and when we
may simply acknowledge our mistreatment is unclear.
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those of her husband so she takes no issue with doing as he pleases with no regard for her
own desires. She falsely believes that her own goals and preferences count for less than
her husband's do; this reveals a failure to appreciate that she and her husband are moral
equals, or that they have the same moral standing and are due the same consideration.15
The kind of self-respect that she lacks is recognition self-respect for herself as a person.
Hill also provides as examples the Uncle Tom and the Self-Deprecator. The Uncle
Tom is a black man who believes that black people are owed less than white people are.
He defers to white people and is grateful for whatever his government and employers
provide him with, even when it is consistently less than his white peers receive. He
believes that "what he values, aspires for, and can demand is of less importance than what
whites value, aspire for, and can demand" (page?). The Self-Deprecator, in contrast to the
Deferential Wife and the Uncle Tom, takes himself to have less value than others because
of his character and his actions. While his moral inadequacies are real, the conclusion he
draws from them regarding his worth as a person are mistaken. He fails to realize that,
although he has failed himself and those around him, this does not justify others in
mistreating him and using him. He feels a deep sense of shame and self-hatred that
ignores the respect he is due in virtue merely of being a person.
In all three of these cases, recognizing ourselves as respect-worthy in virtue of our
being persons provides us with restrictions on what attitudes we may have, what we may
do, and how we may allow ourselves to be treated. But while they tell us much about how
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Hill actually describes the failure of self-respect in this case and the following case as a failure to
appreciate one's moral rights. However, he doesn't tell us what our moral rights are or why we count as
violating them by deferring to others, so it isn't clear to me that this is the best way to explain the lack of
self-respect in these cases.
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a self-respecting person would not behave, they don't tell us much about how a selfrespecting person would behave. Bernard Boxill provides us with helpful insight
regarding some of the positive requirements of respecting oneself as a person. He
explains that when a person respects herself, she cares about respecting herself. This
echoes Dillon's claim that the self-respecting person "values valuing herself
appropriately" (2004; 49). The idea is that when we appreciate the value we have, we
care about having the proper attitudes toward ourselves. Knowing that we have value
causes us to want to continue knowing it and to respond appropriately to this fact.
This becomes especially important in cases in which those around us ignore or
deny the fact that we have value as persons. Since allowing ourselves to be treated in this
way is a sign of a failure of self-respect, we might start to worry that we do not, in fact,
respect ourselves in cases in which we have no choice but to allow others to deny our
worth. Boxill claims that, in cases like these, "the powerless but self-respecting person...
is driven to make his claim to self-respect unmistakable...[H]e will declare his selfrespect. He will protest" (1995; 102). There is an abundance of cases of this sort that
arose in the civil rights movement. One clear example of this is the Memphis sanitation
workers’ strike of 1968 when, in response to dangerous working conditions and low
wages, the black workers went on strike. They held signs that read “I AM A MAN,”
thereby asserting their equal worth with white men in the society and their entitlement to
equal respect and consideration. So in cases in which our value is denied, the selfrespecting person will insist that they do, in fact, have value. If we can't respond directly
to those who deny our worth—perhaps because doing so would put us in danger, or
perhaps because our worth is denied systematically rather than by any individual—we
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will attempt to find some other way to declare our worth. Protest is one positive, active
way in which a self-respecting person can affirm their value.
3.2.2 Respecting Ourselves as Rational Agents
A second feature of persons that warrants respect is that they have the capacity for
rational agency. This capacity is generally understood as a cluster of abilities such as the
ability to engage in theoretical reasoning, understand how to achieve our ends, recognize
inconsistencies in our goals or desires, act in accordance with reasons, and develop our
rational capacities so that we can exercise them with accuracy and consistency. This is
why Kant thought that we fail to respect ourselves when we become drunk, thereby
diminishing our ability to think clearly and act rationally (Kant cited in Hill, 1980). Telfer
motivates this idea that our rational agency is due respect when she claims that "[w]e
naturally identify the self with the reason and speak of a man as 'not his own master' if
reason is not in control... thus we think of a man who is 'enslaved' to drink, or who is
swayed from his purposes by emotion, as lacking in self-respect" (1995; 111).
We see this same idea in Andrea C. Westlund's "Autonomy and Self Care" when
she claims that "the agent who cares about herself...cares about her reasons" (2014; 194).
The underlying thought here is that when we have respect for ourselves, we are
concerned with our reasons for choosing to engage in one course of action rather than
another. We would feel as though we let ourselves down if we were to act for mistaken
reasons or to care about things that have negative value. Part of what matters about us as
persons is our ability to choose what activities to engage in, and this is an ability that the
self-respecting person takes seriously. We are not fully appreciating our value if we are
not appreciating the value of utilizing these capacities. Dillon echoes this idea in her
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discussion of what she calls "agentic recognition self-respect." She explains that "insofar
as [the self-respecting person] understands herself to have some control over her conduct
and character, she can regard the dignity she has as a person as both demanding and
constraining the exercise of her agency in living her life, as giving rise to a responsibility
to shape herself and direct her living so that they are congruent with and honor her
dignity as a person" (2004; 51).
This leads the self-respecting person to engage in a certain amount of selfreflection on her values and her motivations and to self-revise as she deems it
appropriate. In addition, she will be concerned with understanding others' perspectives on
these matters. If someone denies that what she values is, in fact, valuable, she will want
to engage with them in order to determine whether or not she has made a mistake. If
someone has insights regarding her motivations for acting in a particular way that suggest
that she was mistaken about why she did what she did, this will be of great interest to her.
Thus, the self-respecting person is motivated to engage with others in an attempt to better
understand herself and to better herself.
However, Dillon points out in "What's a Woman Worth?" that while the selfrespecting person is necessarily motivated to reflect on her reasons and motivations in
order to improve her ability to engage in practical reasoning, she does not have serious
doubts about her ability to engage in practical reasoning. She knows that it is a capacity
that requires her attention in order for it to function properly, but this is consistent with
her trusting her abilities. If she did have serious doubts about her practical reasoning
abilities, or take them to be generally less reliable than those of others, she would thereby
have compromised self-respect. An interesting point about this is that we humans tend to
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need affirmation from others, so if we consistently hear from others that we lack a
particular ability, it will be difficult if not impossible for us to believe that we have it. As
a result, to respect oneself by respecting one's capacity to engage in practical reasoning,
we must receive confirmation from others that we have this capacity. In this sense, our
ability to respect ourselves depends on being respected to some extent by others.
We may worry, in response to Dillon’s claims here, that perhaps we ought to have
some doubts about our practical reasoning abilities, so perhaps her conditions for selfrespect require us to be overly optimistic. After all, surely not everyone has the same
practical reasoning abilities, so perhaps some people should take theirs to be less reliable
than others’. And there’s an abundance of social psychology research that seems to show
that our practical reasoning abilities are perhaps not as good as we typically take them to
be. This seems just right to me, so while I agree with Dillon that trust in our practical
reasoning abilities is crucial for self-respect, it seems to me that we’ll need some
alternative way of spelling out what this trust needs to involve.
One very practical implication of this feature of recognition self-respect is
discussed by Carol Hay in Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism (2013). She is
concerned in particular with the ways in which the sexual harassment of women
contributes to women's oppression, and she argues that respecting oneself requires
women to confront those who sexually harass them (assuming that doing so won't put
them in danger, etc.). This is because women's oppression reduces our capacity to
effectively engage in practical reasoning. We are conditioned to believe that certain goals
are worth having even when they are not, and we are taught that certain courses of action
are best for our well-being when in fact they diminish our well-being. Since oppression
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undermines a crucial feature of ourselves that has value, and since sexual harassment
contributes to our oppression, we must fight back in whatever ways we can against our
sexual harassment. This means letting harassers know that we will not stand for it
whenever doing so is plausibly conducive to reducing the prevalence of harassment.
3.2.3 Respecting Ourselves as Individuals
So far, I have discussed the importance of respecting ourselves as persons and
respecting ourselves as agents who act for good reasons. Being a person and being an
agent with the capacity to act for reasons are features that all persons have in just the
same way. These capacities do not distinguish us from one another but instead highlight
what we all have in common. To say that persons are valuable only insofar as we have
these features is to say, as Dillon puts it, that "[i]ndividual humans are objects of respect
only insofar as they are instances of some universal type" (1995b; 57). She claims that
this is a hugely problematic way of understanding what makes us valuable because it is
self-alienating. It fails to recognize that we have value as the particular individuals that
we are rather than merely as instances of a type. It suggests that we can respect ourselves
fully as persons without paying attention to any features of ourselves that distinguish us
from others. Not only is this approach self-alienating, according to Dillon, but it also
seems to rely on a mistaken conception of what selves are. There exist no abstract selves
that are blank slates with only the value of persons and the capacity for agency.
Instead, there are only unique individuals with their own sets of desires, projects,
and needs. Dillon claims that "we are essentially fully specific and concretely particular
individuals," (60) and that respecting ourselves therefore requires us to respect the
particular persons that we are. Our individuality, Dillon is pointing out, is just as much a
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part of what it means to be a person as our moral equality and our rational capacities.
This kind of self-respect requires not only appreciating the features we, in fact, have, but
also determining what features we think we should strive to have. As Meyers explains,
"“[h]uman agency...comprises self-chosen constraints on choice. To make only first-order
decisions to do this or that, then, is to neglect an important potentiality inherent in
personhood, hence to show disrespect for the fact that one is a person” (1995; 220). This
is similar to Dillon's discussion of the wanton, who “can have no aims or ideals, no order
and design to his life, no clear definition of himself. He therefore cannot be a selfevaluator, nor has he any standards by which to assess himself if he could... [H]e cannot
judge certain sorts of behavior and treatment to be degrading or fitting, in keeping with
his dignity or beneath him, admirable or despicable, a betrayal of himself, and so on”
(1992; 129). Respecting ourselves as the individuals we are, then requires us not only to
appreciate ourselves as we are, but also to determine the person we want to be.
Appreciating ourselves as we are does not require a blanket embrace or even
acceptance of every single feature of ourselves, but it does require us to appreciate the
features of ourselves that distinguish us from others and to be patient with ourselves
regarding our flaws. The self-respecting person will, of course, want to engage in selfimprovement, but this desire for self-improvement must be consistent with a recognition
of the fact that it is impossible for us to be completely without flaws. So respecting
ourselves as the individuals we are does not require (or even encourage) us to endorse
every characteristic or tendency we have, but it does require us to take seriously those
features of ourselves that make us who we are, including some of our values, goals,
character traits, and features of ourselves that are out of our control, like intelligence
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(Telfer, 1995). In Gabriele Taylor's discussion of what contributes to our individual
identity she claims that “what [the agent] thinks very worthwhile doing, and what he
thinks very important not to do, contributes essentially to his being one sort of person
rather than another,” and that we can lose our identity if we consistently fail to act in
accordance with these standards (1995; 164). Self-respect requires us to reflect on who
we are, to determine what kind of life would be worthwhile for us to live, and to attempt
to live in accordance with it.
While these self-defining features of ourselves will result in standards for
ourselves that we cannot fall below without displaying a lack of respect for who we are,
these standards will differ from person to person. For example, if someone has a talent
for teaching, they should appreciate that about themselves and, depending on their values
and goals more generally, work on developing that skill. While we need not pursue every
talent we happen to have, respecting ourselves requires us to pursue some of them. We
must also take seriously the values that we take to be constitutive of who we are, even if
we do not take them to be objective values that all must appreciate. For example, if I take
certain forms of sex work to be debasing for me, then while I need not think that this is a
moral standard that all should adhere to, it is one that I should adhere to (Meyers, 1995).
And if it seems to me that being a good artist requires me to not "sell out," and I value
being a good artist, then I must not sell out (Hill, 1991b). There is a certain consistency
that is required here, or a commitment to standing one's ground, and a disregard for who
one is for the sake of convenience or acceptance would be to fail to respect oneself.
However, a drive for self-improvement is consistent with this; while we cannot
mindlessly abandon our values, we can change them if, upon consideration, we determine
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that it is what reason demands. After all, self-respect requires us to act for good reasons,
so if we determine that our reasons for acting are bad ones then we should give them up.
However, while these norms by which we guide our lives are up to us to some
extent, they are also inter-subjective in at least two ways. First, we must take the norms to
be the kind of thing that could be recognized by others as worthy of living in accordance
with. While they need not endorse the norms themselves, they must be able to appreciate
them as worthwhile. If, upon reflection, it seems unlikely to us that most other selfrespecting individuals would have this response, then we have good reason to doubt that
the relevant norms are fitting for a self-respecting person. For example, if my main goal
in life is to make as much money as possible, with little regard for the well-being of those
around me, I would be deceiving myself if I thought that others would view this course in
life to be worthy of a person. In contrast, the teacher or the artist would have good reason
to think that their conception of themselves is one that is worth acting in accordance with.
According to Dillon, the self-respecting person "believes she would earn the evaluative
respect of those who assess her impartially, for she has confidence in her merit as a
person, in the worthiness of her values and in her ability to continue to live in accord with
them.” (1992; 134)
These standards are also objective in that it is an objective matter whether or not
we live up to them. As Telfer explains, "the fulfillment of some role is to be tested by an
objective standard, even if the choice of role is a personal one” (112). Communication
with others becomes relevant at this point as well. We have a better chance of
successfully living up to our standards if we do the best we can to determine what,
exactly, is required in order to do so. And while we may be able to deceive ourselves into
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thinking we've done what we believed we ought to in a particular situation or to make a
bad faith decision to suddenly change our values when sticking to them becomes
difficult, this is not sufficient for actually conforming to our own standards. Of course,
sometimes we decide to change our standards because we’ve had a change of heart or a
conversion experience. In cases like these, we can be self-respecting when we fail to live
up to our old standards if doing so is consistent with our new ones.
3.3 Self-Respect and Morality
We now have some understanding of what is required in order for us to have
recognition respect for ourselves—namely, we must respect ourselves as persons with
equal moral standing to those around us; we must respect ourselves as rational agents by
reflecting on our reasons for action and our motivations in order to ensure that they are
worthy of us; and we must respect ourselves in our particularity as the persons we are by
appreciating the distinctive qualities we have and striving to live up to worthwhile
standards we set for ourselves. In the final section of the paper I will sketch a theory of
autonomy that is inspired by these features of self-respect, as it seems to me that what we
are concerned about when we discuss the autonomy of persons is really the degree to
which persons are engaged in the kind of self-guidance that a self-respecting person
would engage in.
Before doing so, however, it's important to consider the ways in which self-respect
and morality might be related. This is because it will be important to consider the degree
to which autonomy and morality might be related. A theory of self-respect that requires
us to strive for moral perfection may seem rather plausible (and seems to be endorsed by
some of the authors discussed above), but a theory of autonomy with this requirement
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would be rejected outright by most (including me). For this reason, it's important for me
to argue before we move on that while morality is always importantly related to selfrespect, our choices need not be a morally good ones for them to count as consistent with
self-respect.
In what follows, I begin by distinguishing between self-esteem and self-respect to
make clear the way in which morality is necessarily related to self-respect. I then explain
what some authors take to follow from this regarding what kind of people we will be
morally if we do, in fact, respect ourselves. For some, quite a range of moral failings
prevent us from counting as a properly self-respecting person, but this is a bad result for
me since it would follow from this that these moral failings prevent us from being
autonomous as well. In the final part of this section, I'll argue that we don't have good
reason to believe that these moral failings must prevent us from counting as properly selfrespecting after all.
3.3.1 Self-Respect versus Self-Esteem
It may seem somewhat intuitive that morality need not have any connection with
self-respect. After all, consider Dillon's example of the unscrupulous business person
whose sole purpose in life is to make money, regardless of who he must trample on in the
process (2004). We could easily imagine him being very good at reaching his goals and
feeling quite pleased with himself as a result. He could have an image of himself as
successful, competent, and rational, and given this, it can seem appropriate to describe
him as having respect for himself in spite of the fact that he is a very morally bad person.
But if someone so immoral can have what appears to be self-respect, then it seems as
though we have no reason to think that morality need be involved here at all.
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In response to this case, Dillon points out that a crucial feature of self-respect is a
recognition of one's value and a pursuit of a life that one takes to be worthy of something
with such value. Pursuing such a life involves evaluating our actions, motives, and
values, and attempting to determine whether they are the kinds of things that other selfrespecting people would endorse as worthwhile. We have to take our pursuits to be
objectively justified, and to the extent that it is implausible that we do, in fact, take them
to be justified in this way, it also becomes implausible that we are truly motivated by
self-respect. After all, while there is some leeway in what kinds of goals a self-respecting
person can set for themselves, there are rational constraints on them as well. Regarding
the business person, Dillon claims that "it is difficult to see his attitude as anything other
than inordinate ego-driven self-esteem" (2004; 61).16
In contrast to self-respect, self-esteem—as it is typically taken to be understood
by psychologists—merely involves our positive evaluation of some feature(s) of
ourselves, where this positive evaluation need not be based on a concern for our own
value or the worthiness of our actions. Dillon describes it as "not so much grounded or
justified as caused (by one's relationships with others, for example)," but when there is a
justification for one's self-esteem it can be pretty much anything that one takes to have an
important connection to oneself (1995a; 30). One's looks, wealth, partner, car, hometown,
and so on can all contribute to one's self-esteem even when none of these things is taken

I will argue later that there are ways of understanding what’s going on in the case of the unscrupulous
business person according to which he does have self-respect after all, but what’s important here is just
seeing the distinction between self-esteem and self-respect.
16
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to be up to oneself or worthy of pursuit for a being with the kind of value that persons
have.
An additional distinction is between the focus of self-respect versus that of selfesteem. When we are motivated by self-esteem, we are motivated by our desire to feel
valuable, but when we are motivated by self-respect, we are motivated by our belief that
we already are valuable, or that we have a kind of value that cannot be earned. This is
compatible with the fact that respecting ourselves requires us to take charge of our lives
in various ways because while we want our pursuits and our characters to match the
worth that we have, our worth is not at risk of diminishing if we fail. Our concern when
we are motivated by self-respect is not one about whether or not we ourselves have value,
but one about whether or not our commitments and life plans are worthy for someone
with the value that we have (1995; 173). The self-respecting person is not pursuing
happiness, but instead an ability to recognize those things that have value and to pursue
them. While the person with a high self-esteem may not be motivated to reflect on the
course of their lives and the kind of people they are, as doing so might harm their selfesteem, a person with self-respect will be motivated in this way. For the self-respecting
person isn't concerned with being able to have a favorable attitude of herself as she would
be if she were seeking self-esteem; "her real concern is the objective reality of her
worthiness and the appropriateness of her valuing to that reality.” (Dillon, 2004; 53)
So there are important distinctions between self-respect and self-esteem, and these
distinctions are importantly moral. The value that the self-respecting person takes herself
to have is a moral value, and the person who merely has self-esteem lacks self-respect
because they are not motivated by a recognition of some moral facts about themselves. It
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is clear, then, that self-respect is a moral notion, but it is not immediately clear what the
consequences of this are in considering what kind of life a self-respecting person can lead
or regarding how immoral a self-respecting person can be. If a self-respecting person
must be pursuing a life that is worthy of them as a morally valuable individual, then it
may seem as though the self-respecting person is necessarily pursuing moral perfection,
or that insofar as a person falls short of some moral norm, they thereby fall short of selfrespect. In the remaining part of this section, I argue that self-respect does not place these
strong moral requirements on us after all.
3.3.2 Getting Clear on the Moral Implications for the Self-Respecting Person
Self-respect and morality could be related in a few ways. One option is that both
notions are off/on, and we only have one if we also have the other. Another possibilities
is that they both come in degrees, and we have one to the degree that we have the other.
A third option, which I will endorse, is that while the two are related, there is no direct
correlation between them. That is, we can be perfectly self-respecting while also being
seriously morally bad. I will argue that self-respect is simply a recognition of the moral
status we have as persons, rational agents, and individuals, and a motivation to act in a
way that reflects that value.
Consider first the strongest of these thee options. In Kant's discussion of respect
for oneself, or for one's autonomy, he makes it clear that he thinks a perfectly selfrespecting person will be a perfectly moral person. For on Kant's view, autonomy is a
capacity to legislate and act in accordance with the moral law; this means that when we
exercise our capacity for autonomy, we are acting morally (Kant in Dillon, 1995a;14). In
addition, when we appreciate the moral value that we ourselves have in virtue of our
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capacity for autonomy, we are rationally required to recognize that value in all
autonomous beings. This means that “a person shows respect for himself only by treating
himself (and others) as an end in himself, that is, by determining his will in accordance
with the moral law. According to Kant, the self-respecting person has the attitudes and
performs the actions characteristic of the fully virtuous person.” (Massey, 1995; 203).
But while all contemporary views of self-respect take Kant's theory to be far too
demanding, it is not uncommon to claim that there is a direct correlation between selfrespect and morality. Diana Meyers, for example, claims that "uncompromised selfrespect requires the exercise of the complete range of one’s moral faculties,” and that
"[t]o the extent that [one's] self-respect is based on conduct that no morally autonomous
agent could adopt, it is compromised” (1995; 230). Dillon also makes some claims about
certain immoral actions that a self-respecting person simply cannot engage in while
remaining self-respecting. She claims that the self-respecting person must appreciate the
value of others because “to respect oneself is to understand and value oneself as a person
among persons…” (1995b; 63).
It seems to me that Meyers and Dillon are wrong on this point. Regarding Meyers,
her claim here seems to rest on the idea that to the extent that we make moral mistakes,
we are thereby less self-respecting. The only way that we could possibly adopt faulty
norms, she suggests, is by mindlessly following the herd or by intentionally ignoring
some features of ourselves and refusing to evaluate them. But it seems clear to me that
good-faith efforts to determine how we ought to live can go wrong, and that we can
unintentionally ignore some features of ourselves in spite of caring very much about
engaging in the kind of self-evaluation that is necessary for ensuring that we are meeting
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our own standards. Being a self-respecting person does require us to have a particular
conception of ourselves and to be motivated in various ways because of who we take
ourselves to be, but I see no reason to suppose that we will always succeed in achieving
the goals that self-respect motivates us to pursue. Nonetheless, we may still be fulfilling
the requirements of self-respect perfectly.17
Consider, for example, Dillon's example of Mrs. Warren from George Bernard
Shaw's play Mrs. Warren's Profession (1894). She is a former prostitute who is now
running a brothel, and while many may claim that this is a morally unacceptable way to
live, Dillon describes Mrs. Warren as being motivated by her recognition of her own
value. Her options are to either live the life she is living or live in filth, desperate for food
and in ill health. She claims that Mrs. Warren "cares deeply about being and knowing
herself to be worthy, she tries to value herself appropriately, to hold herself to her own
conception of what is worthy in defiance of oppressive conventional respectability, to
evaluate herself honestly, and to have good reasons for regarding herself as not
unworthy." (2004; 61). Some may say that her actions are in tension with what morality
requires of us, but Dillon describes her as someone who is trying her hardest to live the
life that she thinks she ought to live, or the kind of life that is worthy of her.
Contrast the case of Mrs. Warren with the case of the unscrupulous business
person from above. It is hard to believe that someone who lies, cheats, and destroys lives
for the sake of monetary gain could be as reflective and eager to live a worthy life as Mrs.

17

While I am discussing recognition self-respect throughout this paper, it seems as though Meyers is
discussing evaluative self-respect here. If she is discussing evaluative self-respect, her claims are more
plausible, but since she doesn't recognize this distinction, it's hard to know for sure what she has in mind.
Regardless, the claims she makes are ones that I suspect many would find at least initially plausible when
applied to recognition self-respect, so I take them to be worth considering in this way.
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Warren is. It was for this reason that Dillon concluded that the business person merely
has self-esteem but not self-respect. But suppose he truly does recognize his moral value
and is honestly doing the best he can to live a life that is in line with that worth. Suppose
that upon deep reflection, discussion with those around him who he takes to be selfrespecting, and honest regard for the consequences of his actions he concludes that this
way of living is the one that most reflects his value as a person. It's hard to conceive of
this as a genuine possibility, but if this were an accurate depiction of the goings-on of the
business person, then we would, I think, have to concede that he has full recognition selfrespect. For on this description, he is aware of his own moral value, he cares about acting
for reasons and making sure those reasons are good ones, and he has an appreciation for
his personal strengths and a desire to pursue a course in life that is worthy of pursuit. He
has made a horrible mistake, no doubt, but he is self-respecting nonetheless.
Return now to Dillon's claim that a self-respecting person, in recognizing her
value as an equal among persons, must also recognize the moral value that all other
persons have as well. It seems right to me that to respect ourselves we must have an
accurate conception of our moral value, which means that we must recognize that our
moral value is equal to those around us. However, it also seems to me that we can have a
very basic, unreflective appreciation that everyone matters equally while failing to
consider all of the implications this might have regarding what kinds of attitudes and
actions we should be taking toward others. For self-respect, the crucial step is
appreciating our own value, and while Kant and Dillon take this value to be conceptually
tied to the value of others, it seems to me that, even if they’re right, it's quite easy for us
humans to appreciate the one without fully appreciating the other.
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Additionally, to the extent that we do recognize the value that others have, it
seems perfectly possible to make mistakes when trying to determine what requirements
fall out of this. It is not clear to me that there are any particular actions that are
straightforwardly ruled out merely by acknowledging that all persons have moral value
(though there are certain attitudes toward them that I take to be straightforwardly
inconsistent with it). Perhaps the business person appreciates the value that all persons
have, but believes that he only has obligations to his own family and that harming others
is the only way to fulfill those obligations, though he regrets it deeply. And as my
students in ethics courses frequently point out, perhaps valuing everyone requires us to
torture one for the sake of saving hundreds since those hundreds have significant moral
value too. Since not all persons have incredibly strong, well-defined Kantian intuitions, it
seems very possible to me that they could acknowledge and respect the value of others
without taking that to have any clear implications for how they should act.
I agree with Dillon and others that there is a moral component to self-respect in
that we cannot count as having recognition respect for ourselves if we do not recognize
our own moral value and our moral status as equal to all other persons. However, I do not
think that there is very much moral content that must be built into that belief, and I don't
think that we have any reason to believe that recognizing this moral equality among
persons will necessarily result in an absence of some particular immoral behaviors. In
addition, while the self-respecting person should be attempting to live a life that reflects
her value, I see no reason to think that she will get it right even if she is making a sincere
attempt. An attempt at living a morally worthy life will make it significantly more likely
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that one will do so, but it will not guarantee it. As a result, although it is unlikely, a selfrespecting person can be a profoundly immoral person.
3.4 Self-Respect and Autonomy
In this last section of the paper, I begin by reminding us of some of the features of
self-respect that are particularly relevant to self-guidance. I then use that to sketch a
theory of autonomy that takes self-respecting self-guidance to just be what autonomy is.
This isn't meant to be a precise account with necessary and sufficient conditions.
However, I do give some explanation of why I take this to be a plausible approach to
understanding autonomy by comparing it to some other views of autonomy, and I hope to
help the reader understand the implications of this view by applying it to some particular
cases. I also give a very brief, incomplete response to a potential objection that I expect
will be on some readers’ minds regarding externally imposed barriers to autonomy.
Before moving forward, it's important to be familiar with some distinctions in order
to get clear on what my topic is. First, we can distinguish between psychological
autonomy and what I will call external autonomy. Psychological autonomy is concerned
with what is required in order for one's choice, in particular, to count as an autonomous
one. In contrast, external autonomy is concerned with what the world needs to be like in
order for one to autonomously act. So, for example, if I were to make the choice to stand
up and get some more tea right now based on my genuine desire for tea, I would
plausibly be autonomous in some sense. However, if it were to turn out that my feet are
tied to my chair and that I cannot get the tea after all, then I would plausibly be lacking
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autonomy in the other sense.18 The former sense of autonomy is psychological, and the
latter is external. I am concerned exclusively with the former, so I am only interested in
the ways in which self-respect can inform us regarding what it would take for us to guide
our own choices, where I am understanding a choice as a mental act.
A second distinction is one between an autonomous choice and an autonomous
person. It seems to make sense to talk about a person as a whole as having or lacking
psychological autonomy, but as I suggested in the previous paragraph, my focus will be
on choices in particular. The relationship between autonomy of choices and autonomy of
persons is a contentious one; some think that we have to understand the former before we
can understand the latter, and others think just the opposite. There is also little agreement
about how, exactly, the two are connected (e.g. perhaps there some percentage of one's
choices that need to be autonomous in order for one as a person to count as autonomous,
or perhaps as long as one's important choices are autonomous then one counts as an
autonomous person). I will not discuss the relationship between autonomy of choice and
autonomy of persons at all, or assume that one is more fundamental than the other.
Instead, I will simply consider what is required in order for one's choice to count as
autonomous, leaving open how this is related to questions about autonomy of persons.
3.4.1 Self-Respect and Self-Guidance
One idea that may seem obvious is that there is no use in attempting to determine
what kinds of choices a self-respecting person would make given that I've already
discussed at length what it means to be self-respecting. One might think that the kinds of

18

You might think that this is just a lack of freedom, not autonomy, but some, like Marina Oshana (2006)
and Joseph Raz (1988), describe these kinds of barriers as interfering with autonomy.
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choices a self-respecting person would make just correspond with the discussion above
regarding what a self-respecting person is like more generally. However, it seems to me
that the matter is not quite this straightforward since I take it to be important that
perfectly self-respecting people may not be perfect in other ways; that, is, they can make
mistakes regarding what follows from an appreciation of their worth as a person while
still being self-respecting. Self-respect is simply a recognition of the moral status we have
as persons, rational agents, and individuals, and a motivation to act in a way that reflects
that value. But it is perfectly possible for us to draw mistaken conclusions about what
kinds of acts do, in fact, reflect it. This is a distinction that I hope will become clearer as I
discuss self-respecting self-guidance in more detail.
The first feature of persons that warrants respect is their personhood itself. Having
recognition respect for oneself as a person is to appreciate one's equal moral standing
with other persons and the fact that one's own pursuits and preferences count for no less
than those of any other. It is also to appreciate that we have this value regardless of
anything we do or any features of ourselves that are particular to us (e.g. our great looks
or impressive intellect). The question, then, is what role this appreciation must play in our
choice-making in order for our choices to count as self-guided, or autonomous, on my
view. Is it necessarily the case that a choice to be servile, to play the fool, or to suffer the
abuse of others is thereby non-autonomous?
The answer here is that so long as our choice to be servile, play the fool, or suffer
abuse is motivated by a lack of self-respect, then it is not autonomous. However, it may
be possible to make these choices in spite of one's respect for oneself because of the
circumstances one is in. Return to Hill's case of the Deferential Wife who believes that
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her preferences and pursuits matter less than her husband's do because her role as a wife
is to support her family, regardless of what she prefers. It's clear that she is lacking selfrespect here, so her choice to, say, go to the restaurant her husband chooses because his
preferences are the only ones that matter is not an autonomous one. But suppose that her
husband takes his preferences to count for more than hers and that he is quick to anger;
suppose in addition that she is completely financially dependent on her husband, that she
lacks reliable friends, and that she fears that she will lose her children if she were to
become separated from her husband. If she appreciates the fact that her preferences
matter just as much as her husband's do but consistently defers to him regarding
restaurant options, her choice here seems to be a perfectly autonomous one even though it
is deferential. She is motivated not by a failure to recognize her worth, but by a desire for
self-preservation.
One might think that her willingness to consistently defer to someone who fails to
respect her in itself signals a lack of self-respect, and that as a result her choice to remain
with her husband cannot count as an autonomous one on my view. Here I'd like to make
two points. First, it seems plausible to me that there is a sense in which she is lacking
external autonomy, since the world is such that it does not seem possible for her to act on
her true desires. This is important to note because I am keeping psychological and
external autonomy distinct, and a lack of external autonomy may explain some intuitions
that women who are stuck in abusive relationships are lacking autonomy. Thus, she may
be lacking one kind of autonomy while retaining the other.
Second, recall that we can make mistakes about what kinds of actions are worthy
of us while still appreciating our value. Perhaps it is simply true that to remain in a
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relationship with someone who does not appreciate your value is always a failure to act in
accordance with your value. Even so, it seems to me possible for someone who
recognizes their own worth to reasonably believe that staying in the relationship is all
things considered the best thing to do, especially in cases in which the alternatives
plausibly involve destitution or being deprived of a healthy relationship with your
children. Additionally, Dillon has argued (and I agree) that self-sacrifice can be
consistent with self-respect so long as one recognizes the value of what one is giving up.
So if a parent decides to live a difficult life for the sake of making their children's lives
better, this can be an autonomous choice if they are not motivated by a belief that their
children matter more than they do, or that they will lose worth as a person if they are not
willing to make this sacrifice.
In general, one's choice meets the requirements for autonomy that are set by the
standards of recognition self-respect of oneself as a person so long as one's choice isn't
motivated by false beliefs about one's worth as a person or a failure to be appropriately
motivated by this belief. So if the Uncle Tom decides to move to the other side of the
road when he sees a white person walking toward him, and he does this because he
believes that the white person has more value than he does, then his choice was not
autonomous. And if the Self-Deprecator decides to laugh along when his co-worker
makes a humiliating joke at his expense, and his decision to do so is motivated by his
belief that he deserves to be mocked in such a way, then his choice was not autonomous.
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But if these choices are motivated by considerations that are consistent with their proper
appreciation of their own value, then their deference may be perfectly autonomous.19
The second kind of recognition respect that one owes oneself is respect for
oneself as a rational agent. To have this kind of respect for oneself is to care about one's
reasons for acting (whether or not they are good ones, whether or not they are consistent
with one another, etc.). It is to recognize our ability to act in the world and contribute to
shaping who we are, and to take this power seriously. This will require us to engage in a
certain amount of self-reflection and self-correction. If we care about our reasons then we
will reflect on them honestly and modify them when necessary. We will also have faith in
our capacity to do so. We must strike a balance between taking ourselves to already be
perfect agents and taking ourselves to be incapable of making accurate judgments about
ourselves by recognizing that we are capable enough to self-correct but flawed enough to
need self-correction. While we need not constantly be self-consciously reflecting in these
ways, self-respect requires us to be disposed care about having good reasons for acting
and to stop and reflect when find that we’re not sure what we should do (especially when
the choice is a reflection of our values or will have a significant impact on our lives).
This means that when a choice is motivated by a failure of self-reflection that selfrespect would require of us (either because one has too much confidence in one's
practical reasoning abilities, takes oneself to be incapable of guiding one's choices well
anyway, or simply doesn't care about one's capacity for rational agency), that choice is
thereby lacking in autonomy. Of course, self-respect does not require us to reflect on all
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One might think that "deference" that isn't motivated by a lack of self-respect isn't deference at all. That
seems plausible enough to me, but it is of no consequence for this argument.
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of our reasons. If I am motivated to choose chocolate ice cream rather than vanilla, or to
take the back stairs into my office rather than the front stairs, I need not at any point have
reflected on whether or not my reasons for making these choices are good ones in order
to count as properly self-respecting. Caring about acting for good reasons that are
coherent with one another is consistent with recognizing that some reasons just don't
really matter.
This gives us the plausible result that my choice is not lacking in autonomy when
I choose to have chocolate ice cream over vanilla even when I have not reflected on
whether or not my reason is a good one. My choice is lacking in autonomy, however,
when I choose to marry Josh over Jocelyn without really thinking about why I'm doing it,
or to have a child without sufficiently appreciating how it will affect my ability to live my
life the way I would like to. This is because the choice of which ice cream to eat does not
have a significant impact on our lives and whatever we choose will be consistent with our
values, whereas the latter two choices are likely to have tremendous effects on the course
our lives take and impact our abilities to live with integrity and in accordance with what
we value. Thus, in these latter cases, self-respect requires us to care what these effects
will be and whether our integrity will be threatened.
The final requirement of recognition self-respect is respecting oneself as the
particular individual one is. This requires us to appreciate ourselves for who we are, but
also to care about shaping ourselves into someone with values and goals that we take to
be worth having based on intersubjective standards (though we need not think that all
must share them with us). It requires us to figure out what we could do with our lives that
would have value, and then to pursue that. This feature of self-respect also requires us to
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engage in self-reflection, as we have to be conscious of what it is about ourselves that we
take to make us who we are, or what standards we feel as though we would never be able
to fall below while still remaining true to ourselves.
It follows from this that making autonomous choices requires us to have some
conception of who we are and how the choices we make contribute to or conflict with
that self-conception. When we act without appreciating the significance of our actions to
our character or our goals, we are failing to act autonomously. Similarly, when we fail to
consider who we want to be and go on making mundane choices about how to live
without any reflection, our choices are lacking in autonomy. A final consequence of this
feature of self-respect is that once I have determined what my values are and what
standards I will never fall below, I am making a choice that is, to some extent, lacking
autonomy if I later choose (without actually changing my values) to undermine those
values or fall below those standards. It is for this reason that the artist who "sells out" was
not fully autonomous when he made the choice to do so.
3.4.2 The Plausibility of This View
We now have a sketch of the theory of autonomy that understands autonomy as
the kind of self-guidance a self-respecting person engages in, but we have yet to
determine whether or not this account of autonomy is a plausible one. In this section, I'll
begin by considering some of the cases I discuss that may seem implausible to some in
order to defend the answers this view gives. I'll then discuss some cases and ideas that
come from other theories of autonomy and explain how this view can account for them
nicely. Finally, I'll consider the objection that this view cannot account for lack of
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autonomy in people who are psychologically manipulated by others and argue that it can,
in fact, account for cases like these.
Consider first some of the cases in which the view I am proposing determines that
some choices are lacking autonomy, such as the case of the Deferential Wife or the Uncle
Tom, the unscrupulous business person, the person who gets married or has a child
without putting much thought into it, or the artist who "sells out." The claim that these
people's choices lack autonomy may seem implausible to some, but many of these results
are in line with some of the most popular theories of autonomy out there. The Deferential
Wife, for example, is one that Oshana (2007), Stoljar (2014), and Benson (1994) all take
to be lacking in autonomy. Since the Deferential Wife and the Uncle Tom are motivated
by the same considerations and have been subjected to similar kinds of oppressive
socialization, it seems as though reason for thinking one is lacking autonomy is reason
for thinking the other is as well. Regarding the person who, say, decides to have a child
without thinking about whether or not it coheres with their other goals in life, it seems
clear that Meyers's view of autonomy would leave them lacking autonomy as well. She
has a degreed notion of autonomy according to which we are autonomous insofar as we
develop and utilize our capacities for self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction.
Since this individual is not developing or utilizing these capacities, it seems safe to say
that Meyers would come to the same conclusion about them that I have.
The cases of the unscrupulous business person and the artist are tougher. After all,
both of them seem to be intentionally guiding the course of their lives and both of them
seem to appreciate their ability to determine what is good for themselves. But recall that
the unscrupulous business person as described by Dillon does not reflect on himself and
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what he takes to be valuable, attempt to determine whether or not his goals are, in fact,
valuable, or open himself up to criticism from others in an attempt to ensure that he is
living a worthwhile life. And once we consider a version of the case in which he does, in
fact, reflect and attempt to self-correct in this way, but he remains deeply immoral, it
does seem to me that he is self-respecting so I have no reason to doubt that he is
autonomous as well. Again, I take this to be a very unlikely case, and I suspect that most
deeply immoral people are experts at self-deception and evading self-reflection and are
for this reason lacking in self-respect and autonomy.
Finally, return to the case of the artist who understands himself to essentially be a
dedicated artist, where being a dedicated artist entails not "selling out," but who does start
selling meaningless and poorly crafted prints for the sake of paying the rent (without
changing his values). We could imagine at least two versions of this case. Imagine first
that he does this only temporarily all the while committed to returning to meaningful
work and actively working toward that goal. In a case like this, it seems to me that he has
retained his psychological autonomy, though his external autonomy may have been
compromised due to an inadequate range of options. His psychological autonomy seems
to have remined in tact because while he faced a temporary setback in expressing his
values, he did not give up on them and continued to work toward them.
However, imagine now a version of the case in which he falls into the routine of
making a living in this way, and although he resents himself for it, he continues on
because it is easier than finding an alternative, more meaningful line of work. While the
person in this version of the case also plausibly lacks external autonomy, here his
psychological autonomy is also compromised. He has failed to respect himself in some
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sense by failing to respect himself as the individual he is and living a life that he thinks is
worthy of him. It follows from the view I am proposing, then, that his choice to sell these
prints would be lacking in autonomy. This may seem implausible since he has
presumably considered his options over and over again and determined that selling the
prints is the most reasonable thing for him to do. If his choice is based on his all-thingsconsidered judgment that it is the right choice, then he may seem self-guiding in any
important sense.
However, there is some sense in which his "self" is not guiding him at all in this
case. For he takes himself essentially to be a dedicated artist, and that self is not guiding
the relevant choice at all. We find the same kinds of considerations in a number of
theories of freedom. Consider first that of Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder who
argue that an action counts as our own to the extent that it is motivated by our "deep
self," or those of our beliefs and desires that are hardest for us to give up and most wellintegrated (1999). They could explain the artist's motivation to sell the prints as less his
own than his desire to remain true to himself because it is less well integrated, or it
conflicts more with his other desires and beliefs. And it would likely be easier to
convince him to give up his desire to sell the prints than it would be to convince him to
give up his desire to be a dedicated artist since he takes his desire to be a dedicated artist
to be essential to who he is. Some other views that seem to give the same results in this
case are those of David Shoemaker (2003), who thinks that an action is our own only if it
is motivated by what we most care about (with respect to the situation we’re in), and
Gary Watson (1989), who thinks that an action is our own only if it expresses what we
value. On both views, the artist's choice to sell the prints would not be free since he is not
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doing what he most cares about or what he values. While I am discussing autonomy, not
freedom, the point here is that it is not uncommon to think that it is significant whether or
not the self that is guiding one's choices is one's true self.
So while the view I am proposing does give some results that may seem initially
implausible, there is quite a bit of support out there for drawing the conclusions that I
draw. Not only that, but this view can account for some other common ideas regarding
autonomy that many take to be of importance. Paul Benson (2000), for example, argues
that in order for our choices to be free we must take ourselves to be answerable for our
actions, or to take ourselves to have the standing in our community to be accountable for
what we do. It would follow from this that in cases of gaslighting, in which a person is
made to question their mental stability, the choices that are partially motivated by
feelings of self-doubt and unworthiness to guide one's choices are not free ones. The view
I am proposing can explain why these actions are not autonomous because in order to
respect ourselves as agents we must take ourselves to be capable of determining what
kinds of reasons are good ones for acting on.
Another common theme in discussions of autonomy is oppressive socialization
and the extent to which it undermines the autonomy of women in particular. Authors
including Benson, Christman, Meyers, Oshana, and Stoljar have argued that oppressive
socialization does, at least to some extent, undermine autonomy in some cases. However,
they have not (it seems to me, anyway) been able to give a satisfying account of exactly
when and why autonomy is undermined by this socialization or why oppressive
socialization should be taken to be any different from regular socialization to which
everyone is subjected. One nice feature of the view that I am proposing is that it does
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seem to do this and it does so in a way that lines up nicely with many of the intuitions
that these authors share. Any time socialization undermines a person's sense of respect
for themselves, it thereby undermines their ability to choose autonomously, and when
their choice is motivated by a lack of self-respect resulting from that socialization, then
that choice was lacking in autonomy. This allows us to recognize that many women who
spend hours daily grooming themselves to meet the standards that society has set for
them are not autonomously choosing to do so, while also acknowledging that a woman
can autonomously choose to wear expensive make-up or uncomfortable shoes, so long as
she is not motivated by a sense that her self-worth depends on doing so.
This view can also explain why we do not have to reflect on every choice we
make or be aware of all of our motivations in order for the choices to count as
autonomous. Not all of our choices have any reflection on ourselves as persons; as I
noted above, my choice to have chocolate rather than vanilla or to use the back stairs
rather than the front ones are of no consequence for who I am as a person. They are not
related to my sense of respect for my agency or myself as an individual. Reflecting on
choices that we have no reason to believe are interesting is not required in order to count
as respecting ourselves as agents; we need only to reflect on those reasons that contradict
one another, that others claim are problematic, or that we feel we have some other reason
to reflect on. Since a person can be perfectly self-respecting without analyzing every
choice they make, they can be autonomous without doing so as well. However, many
other theories of autonomy do not seem to give us an explanation of why we need only to
reflect on some of our reasons for actions and not all of them.
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One final feature of this view that will be important to some is that it can account
for the sense in which autonomy is relational, or the sense in which autonomous humans
are dependent on others in important ways. A common feminist claim is that we ought
not to think about the autonomous individual as the self-creating individual whose
reasons for acting are never influenced by those around them. Instead, it is important to
recognize the ways in which all of us are influenced by our societies and the ways in
which this can often help us to be autonomous. The view I propose accounts for this in
recognizing that a person cannot come to respect themselves without getting respect from
others. When those around us consistently deny that we have the same moral standing
that they do, it becomes difficult if not impossible for us to go on believing that we have
that moral status. And when we are told over and over again by our peers that our mental
processes cannot be trusted, we will lose our ability to trust them ourselves. Since we
cannot be autonomous without self-respect, and we cannot have self-respect without the
respect of others, autonomy is something that we achieve only in community with others
who value us. Additionally, the self-respecting person cares about getting things right,
and this should motivate her to engage with others in search of a fuller selfunderstanding.
So we can see that this view leads to results that are widely endorsed, and that it
can account for intuitions that many other views do not seem to be able to account for.
But before concluding, I will address one final potential objection. Consider a woman
who cares deeply about her work and her family, but who becomes infatuated with a
religious leader. After attending a number of meetings, she decides to give up her job to
live in a cooperative with other members of the religious group. As time goes on, she has
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less and less communication with her family, and the things she once cared most about
become absent from her life. While those who used to be close to her claim that she has
been manipulated by the religious leader, she claims that she is happier than she has ever
been and that she feels as though she has finally discovered her true self. This is a case in
which many of us are inclined to say that her choice to give up her old life was not an
autonomous one, but it may seem as though my account of autonomy does not provide us
with the resources to do so. After all, it does not seem as though the problem is one
having to do with her own sense of worth; instead, it seems to have to do with
manipulation by an external force.
Of course, we would need to know significantly more about this case to say
anything for certain about it. Perhaps the protagonist is not mistaken at all and she really
is acting in a way that is consistent with who she takes herself to be. Perhaps she really
has come to believe that her old way of life was problematic and that this new way of
living will be more fulfilling and allow her to express herself more truly. It is not
particularly hard to image the details such that this is rather plausible (e.g. her family has
always been rather toxic, her job was somewhat empty but it was the best she thought she
could get, etc.). If she has reached this decision while remaining self-respecting, I see no
reason to think that she is lacking autonomy in this case.
But supposing that this is not what went on, and that the case is, in fact,
problematic, it will be because she has been manipulated, so it is important to think about
what manipulation of a human being involves. Sometimes it can merely involve lying,
but in a case like this it seems clear that a simple lie will not be sufficient to get the
protagonist to give up her life. Instead, a set of complicated lies will be required, and in
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order for those lies to go undiscovered, there will more than likely involve some amount
of gaslighting. In addition, it is likely that the protagonist in a case like this will be made
to feel as though she does not have the value that she does, in fact, have. Her sense of
worth will likely be wrapped up in the approval of the religious leader or the other
members of the cooperative. Diminishing a person's sense of self-worth and their
confidence in their ability to reason well tend to be key ingredients in manipulation, but if
this is what is going on, then it is clear that her self-respect has been diminished and that
she is thereby lacking in autonomy.20
3.5 Conclusion
I have argued that one plausible understanding of autonomy takes the kind of selfguidance necessary for autonomy to be the kind of self-guidance that a self-respecting
person would engage in. I began by describing three components of recognition selfrespect for persons as commonly understood in the literature on self-respect: respect for
oneself as a person, respect for oneself as a rational agent, and respect for oneself as the
particular individual one is. I then argued that the self-respecting person need not be
particularly morally good because we can appreciate the value of these three things and
be genuinely motivated to act in a way that reflects their value without having an accurate
conception of what it takes to do so. We can make no mistakes at all in recognizing our
worth while still making significant mistakes in trying to live a life that is worthy of us.
The significance of this is that on some views (such as Kant's), self-respecting people are

20

Perhaps there is some other way of explaining the case such that her choice does not seem to be
autonomous but the manipulation does not involve undermining her self-respect. I can't think of one,
though.
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morally good in at least some ways, but if self-respect is required for autonomy, it would
follow that we cannot autonomously make immoral choices. Thankfully, this is a result
that we have avoided by appreciating the fact that it is all to easy for us to make mistakes
even when we are guided by facts and good intentions.
I then described the kind of self-guidance a self-respecting person would engage
in: she would not consistently defer to others because of misconceptions about her own
worth; she would care about whether or not she was engaging in practical reasoning well
so she would self-reflect and self-revise as needed; and she would care about living up to
her value by developing some of her skills and making and achieving objectively
worthwhile goals. I argued that this notion of self-guidance seems to correspond nicely
with many features of some more popular accounts of autonomy and that it can explain
some intuitions that other theories don't seem to be able to explain while giving us a
consistent way to respond plausibly to various cases in which someone's autonomy is at
issue. While understanding self-respect as a necessary condition for autonomy likely
sounds initially like an overly moralistic and implausible route, I hope to have shown that
it is rather promising as a way to provide a coherent, well-grounded theory of autonomy
that lines up nicely with many of our pre- and post-theoretical intuitions.
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CHAPTER 4
RESPECTING THE OPPRESSED IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE
AND CONTENT-NEUTRAL THEORIES OF AUTONOMY
4.1 Introduction
It is common in the autonomy literature to claim that the more restrictive a
particular theory of autonomy is, the more at risk it is of disrespecting the individuals it
excludes, or deems non-autonomous. This claim is often made in the context of the
debate between substantive and content-neutral theories of autonomy. While this
distinction has been made in different ways by different people, I will define a
substantive theory of autonomy as one which places constraints on the values, desires, or
general pro-attitudes a person can have while still being fully autonomous, and contentneutral theories of autonomy are those according to which a person can be fully
autonomous regardless of the particular pro-attitudes she has. Since substantive theories
place more constraints on who counts as autonomous than content-neutral theories do,
proponents of content-neutral theories often argue that, in deeming certain people nonautonomous, the substantive theories disrespect those people. They take this to be reason
to accept content-neutral views over substantive views.
Consider, for example, Thomas Hill’s example of the Deferential Wife (Hill
1991).
This is a woman who is utterly devoted to serving her husband. She buys clothes he
prefers, invites the guest he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the
mood. She willingly moves to a new city in order for him to have a more attractive job,
counting her own friendships and geographical preferences insignificant by comparison.
…[S]he tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and, when she does, she
counts them as less important than her husband’s. She readily responds to appeals from
Women’s Liberation that she agrees that women are mentally and physically equal, if not
superior, to men. She just believes that the proper role for a woman is to serve her family.
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As a matter of fact, much of her happiness derives from her belief that she fulfills this
role very well. No one is trampling on her rights, she says; for she is quite glad, and
proud, to serve her husband as she does.

On Natalie Stoljar’s substantive theory of autonomy the Deferential Wife (DW) would
not be autonomous insofar as she is motivated by false norms of womanhood that take a
woman’s worth to be tied up with her ability to please men (Stoljar 2000). In contrast, a
content-neutral theory of autonomy would have no problem maintaining that the DW is
fully autonomous so long as she has certain capacities for self-reflection and selfawareness, say, or is not alienated from her desire to serve her husband at the expense of
her own preferences. One argument frequently given by proponents of content-neutral
theories is that the substantive theories disrespect people like the DW by denying that she
is autonomous, and that this fact lends support to the plausibility of content-neural
theories.
We see this appeal to respect in arguments for content-neutral theories of
autonomy throughout Marilyn Friedman’s discussion of autonomy in Autonomy, Gender,
Politics. She makes this point most clearly when she claims:
If content-neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy are roughly equally
convincing on conceptual and intuitive grounds, then a content-neutral account
should be preferred for the fact that it will serve better in one of the normative
roles that an ideal of autonomy fills, that of motivating people to treat others with
an important form of respect. An account of autonomy that is too demanding will
prompt persons to regard a greater number of others as failures at personhood and
thereby reduce the number of others they will regard as respectworthy. (23)
Friedman is far from alone in her pursuit of this line of argument. Paul Benson uses this
line of argument to defend a weaker version of a substantive view (2014); John
Christman uses it to defend a content-neutral view (2009); and Diana T. Meyers also
defends a content-neutral over a substantive view on the basis of this appeal to respect
(2014).
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Despite its ubiquity, this concern about disrespect is hard to pin down precisely.
The first question to ask here is who, exactly, is supposed to be disrespected by
substantive views? Surely, we need not claim that everyone is autonomous merely in
order to avoid disrespecting anyone, so who is it that we must include on these grounds?
The obvious answer, of course, is that we need our theory of autonomy to deem
autonomous everyone who is, in fact, autonomous, and that it is disrespectful to deny that
someone is autonomous when they are. But this is not what the proponents of contentneutral theories are proposing, as that would be straightforwardly begging the question
against the proponents of substantive views. What they need is a category of persons who
we can determine ought—on the grounds of respect—to be deemed autonomous before
we even know what autonomy is. But what features must persons have in order for us to
know that respect requires us to deem them autonomous?
The second question that needs to be answered in order to understand this
objection to substantive theories is: Why is it that excluding people with these features is
disrespectful? We claim that some people are immoral, unfree, vicious, and so on without
worrying that doing so will disrespect them, and we don’t seem to think that respect for
persons must play a role in our theoretical attempts at defining these notions. Instead, we
start by coming up with a plausible definition and then we take it to be a matter of respect
to apply it consistently and accurately. The objection to maximizing act utilitarianism
isn’t that it is a disrespectful theory because it deems too many people immoral; instead
we simply appeal to examples of apparently morally permissible behavior that

101

maximizing act utilitarianism would claim is immoral.21 And while Frankfurt’s example
of the unwilling addict has spawned tremendous disagreement about a number of things,
no one has argued that it is disrespectful of Frankfurt to claim that the unwilling addict is
unfree. So what is it about deeming certain people non-autonomous that is so widely
thought to be disrespectful?
In this paper I consider a number of possible answers to each of these questions
and argue that none of them gives us a plausible explanation of why we should think
substantive theories of autonomy are disrespectful to anyone. No matter how we fill in
the details, I will argue, there is simply no reason to prefer content-neutral theories of
autonomy over substantive ones on the grounds of respect. In fact, once we get clear
about who it is that the proponents of content-neutral views are so concerned about
respecting and why, it seems to me that the substantive theories turn out to do a better job
of respecting them.
In what follows, I begin in Section I by discussing three possible features a person
could have that would make it disrespectful to deny that they are autonomous: a) they
believe they are self-guiding, b) they meet a set of standards that some take to be
plausible criteria for autonomy, and c) they are oppressed, and features of their
oppression explain why substantive views deem them non-autonomous. In Section II I
move on to laying out some possible explanations of why it would be disrespectful to

While it does seem that some people think it is disrespectful to call any behavior or person “immoral,”
philosophers generally take great pains to argue that it is not; perhaps you’ve experienced this yourself
when a student has argued for moral relativism by asserting that any categorical moral claims are
disrespectful to those who disagree with them. While there may be some intuitive appeal to the idea that
our theory of morality should deem everyone morally good on pain of disrespect, no philosopher I’ve heard
of defends such a view.
21
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deny that people in these categories are autonomous. For example, perhaps it is
disrespectful because by denying their autonomy we are sanctioning paternalistic
intervention in their lives, or because denying that a person is autonomous fails to
recognize the ways in which she may still engage in some kinds of self-guidance. In
Sections I and II I am simply providing us with the available options for filling in the
details of this objection to substantive views, but in sections III and IV I evaluate them
and argue that they do not do the work proponents of content-neutral views need them to.
I end section IV by arguing that, in fact, substantive theories of autonomy do a better job
of respecting certain people than content-neutral theories do.
4.2 Who might we disrespect by claiming they are not autonomous?
When proponents of content-neutral theories accuse substantive theories of
disrespecting certain people, they tend to focus on people who have one or more of the
following qualities: they take themselves to be self-guiding (call this self-confidence),
they’ve achieved a certain level or kind of self-guidance—perhaps by reflectively
endorsing their behavior or rationally considering multiple courses of action (call this
self-guidance)—or they are a member of an oppressed social group and their autonomy is
being denied in part because of their oppression (call this oppressed). In this section, I
will lay out these three features a person might have and provide the reasons people give
for thinking that they are significant in determining who deserves, on the basis of respect,
to be deemed autonomous.
4.2.1 Self-Confidence
The first feature of persons that many content-neutral theorists of autonomy take
to warrant the relevant kind of respect is that they take themselves to be autonomous,
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self-guiding, or generally in control of the course of their lives and the decisions they
make. Benson22 expresses this idea explicitly in “Feminist Commitments and Relational
Autonomy,” though others such as Marilyn Friedman (2003) and Diana T. Meyers (2014)
seem to hint at it. Benson explains that on substantive views like Stoljar’s, some women
who experience themselves as autonomous will not be autonomous after all. He claims
that this result reveals that substantive views fail to respect these women’s experiences
and their voices. Consider, for example, Hill’s DW. She is not coerced or manipulated in
any straightforward way. She believes that a woman’s role is to serve her family, and she
takes great pride in fulfilling this role well. She takes herself to be freely choosing her
course in life; it’s just that she consistently chooses to do whatever her husband prefers in
virtue of the fact that he prefers it. It seems as though she takes herself to be self-guiding,
but on most substantive views she would not meet the relevant criteria for autonomy for
various reasons (e.g. her lack of power or her lack of self-respect).
This is something Benson takes to be particularly problematic for a view like
Stoljar’s since she is motivated largely by what she calls “the feminist intuition,” or the
intuition that when women are motivated by false, oppressive gender norms, they are not
choosing autonomously. The motivation here is to show proper respect for women by
recognizing the harms that result from this feminine socialization, but Benson claims that
this approach to defining autonomy ends up disrespecting women in a different way by
ignoring their voices.

22

Benson defends a substantive theory of autonomy, but he takes it to be more inclusive than some other,
“stronger” substantive theories like Stoljar’s. For this reason, I sometimes note his objections to stronger
substantive theories and I sometimes note his objections to content-neutral theories which he takes to be too
inclusive.
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On Stoljar’s account, the familiar feminist dictum that we should take women’s
experiences seriously cannot mean that women’s sense of their own agential
authority must be respected… For the feminist intuition entails that women who
regard themselves as competent and worthy to answer for their actions can
nevertheless suffer diminished autonomy if their attitudes and decisions are the
products of internalized oppressive socialization that they do not see to be
misguided. (Benson 2014, 95)
Benson is claiming here that there is a particular kind of respect that is due to women
who are autonomous, but that on certain substantive accounts of autonomy some women
who take themselves to be autonomous will nonetheless fail to be and will therefore not
be due this respect. He claims that this is a problem for these theories and that we should
instead accept his own weaker substantive view according to which being autonomous is
largely a matter of taking oneself to be answerable for one’s choices, or taking oneself to
speak for one’s decisions. This will allow for more overlap between those who take
themselves to be self-guiding and those who are deemed autonomous, which Benson and
others maintain is crucial for showing people proper respect.
4.2.2 Self-Guidance
Of course, even Benson notes that there must be some objective standards for
autonomy and that we shouldn’t maintain that the only criterion for autonomy is that one
takes oneself to be autonomous. This leads to the second feature of persons that many
claim warrants the respect of being deemed autonomous, namely, that they do have
certain capacities for self-guidance. For Benson, one’s belief that one is answerable for
one’s choices must be reasonable, and it is only reasonable if one has certain capacities
including the ability to reflect and to regulate one’s intentions (2005, 118). Thus, when it
is disrespectful to deny autonomy to those who take themselves to be autonomous, this is
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partly because they have good reason to think they are autonomous because they have
these abilities.
Benson seems to express a similar idea when he endorses the view that the result
of substantive theories like Stoljar’s is “the silencing, or exclusion, of authentic voices”
(2014, 107). The claim seems to be that failing to deem autonomous those who are able
to express their genuine preferences and values is failing to give those people the respect
they deserve. Similarly, John Christman claims that if we deny the autonomy of someone
who is subservient when “she has accepted this subservient position out of sincere and
reflective religious devotion, without defects in her competence as a reasoner,” then
denying her autonomy is “tantamount to silencing [her] voice” (176).
Friedman gives further support to this approach when she claims that respect is
“the distinctive reaction owed to those who have perspectives comprising important
wants and values they can reflect on and evaluate and who can act accordingly” (2003,
74). The respect she has in mind here is the respect that she takes to be owed to
autonomous individuals. She seems to be claiming that, as a result, we must conclude that
individuals who have these perspectives and are able to reflect in this way are
autonomous. For Christman and Friedman, individuals are owed the respect of being
deemed autonomous when they have certain capacities, and for Benson, they are owed
this respect when they have certain capacities and conclude on that basis that they are
answerable for their choices. Since these individuals are owed the respect of being
deemed autonomous, Benson, Christman, and Friedman take this to be good evidence
that they are, in fact, autonomous.
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4.2.3 Oppression
The third and final feature of persons that content-neutral theorists of autonomy
seem to take to warrant the respect of being deemed autonomous is that our only or main
reason for denying the individual’s autonomy is a factor only because of the oppressive
socialization the person has undergone. We can see this idea, again, in Benson. His focus
on protecting the voices of women in particular reveals that he is concerned with
protecting women as members of an oppressed group which has historically been
dismissed and whose voices have been ignored. Meyers makes this explicit when she
claims that “[f]eminists have repeatedly underscored the personal and societal damage
caused by silencing women’s voices. Value-neutral autonomy theory guards against
suppressing the diversity of women’s perspectives and concerns because it does not
preemptively deny the autonomy of any woman’s beliefs about how she should live.”
(2014, 130-1)
Friedman echoes this concern: “Whenever an ideal has more extensive
requirements, the risk arises that it will turn out in practice to be attainable, or viewed as
attained, by only a privileged minority. The ideal of autonomy is hampered by a history
in which it has been associated in Western cultures with a select few, typically, successful
white men.” (23) Not only this, but it is the deprivation of the oppressed—which inhibits
their autonomy—that allows for the privileged to have the freedom that enhances their
autonomy (46). Friedman takes this to be good reason to support a content-neutral theory
of autonomy since it tends to be easier for members of oppressed groups to count as
autonomous on those views than on substantive ones.
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To recap, it is commonly claimed in the autonomy literature that theories of
autonomy that are particularly restrictive are disrespectful to certain individuals who fail
to count as autonomous on those views. In order to attempt to better understand this
claim, I have so far looked for answers to the question: Who is it that is disrespected
when they are not counted as autonomous? I’ve considered three possible answers to this
question: those who take themselves to be self-guiding—or those who have selfconfidence—those who have the ability to engage in some forms of self-guidance, and
those who are oppressed and whose autonomy is denied at least in part because of
features of their oppression. I will critically consider these answers later in the paper,
ultimately arguing that none of them is satisfactory. However, I will first lay out some
answers to the second question I’ve asked about this claim regarding respect: Why is it
that these (variously specified) individuals are disrespected when we deny that they are
autonomous? This is the project I undertake in the next section.
4.3 Why might it be disrespectful to maintain that they are not autonomous?
We have so far considered some groups of people who might be disrespected if
we conclude that they are not autonomous, but it is not yet clear why we should think that
people who are members of these groups would be disrespected in this way. After all, as I
mentioned above, it does not seem disrespectful to claim that someone is immoral simply
because she claims that she is morally good. And while a person may meet some
plausible utilitarian standard of morality, it is not disrespectful of the deontologist to
claim that she is not moral after all. Finally, while some people might, given their
circumstances and through no fault of their own, have a particularly difficult time making
the moral choice, we do not take a moral theory to be disrespectful if it gives us the result
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that they have still done the wrong thing (though we may take it to be implausible for
other reasons). So what is it about denying a person’s autonomy in these circumstances
that makes it so intuitive to many that we have disrespected them?23
In this section I lay out five possible answers to this question which are as
follows: 1) to deny someone’s autonomy is to thereby authorize paternalistic interference
in their affairs, 2) to deny the autonomy of oppressed people in particular is to place
unjust burdens on them, 3) to deny that a person is fully autonomous is to overlook the
ways in which she might, in fact, be self-guiding (even if not fully so), 4) if we claim that
a person is not autonomous then we are thereby claiming that she is not a moral agent and
perhaps does not deserve the same moral consideration that moral agents do, and 5) it is
simply inherently respectful to claim that a person or her action is autonomous.
We should understand each of these possible answers as saying that it is
disrespectful to deny someone’s autonomy for these reasons if they have one or more of
the qualities of self-confidence, self-guidance, or oppression. Since the proponents of this
view have their strongest case when they are discussing people who have all three of
these qualities, I will assume for now that this is what they all have in mind. Thus, in
laying out the five possible answers to the “why?” question, I will be understanding them
as attempting to explain to us why it is disrespectful to deny autonomy to individuals who
are self-confident, self-guiding, and oppressed.

23

Of course, to claim that something is true need not involve saying it to anyone in particular. We can
claim that certain kinds of individuals or certain particular individuals lack freedom or virtue without
saying it to their faces or discussing it as gossip. Doing those things likely would be disrespectful, but
claiming it, by itself, does not seem to be.

109

4.3.1 Answer 1: Sanctioning Paternalism
The first reason for thinking that it is disrespectful to deny that these people are
autonomous is that to deny that they are autonomous is to sanction paternalistic
intervention in their lives, and this kind of intervention is inappropriate for people of this
sort. This is probably the most frequently discussed reason for thinking that substantive
theories are disrespectful24, with Christman being its most ardent defender. Christman
defines autonomy in a way that allows it to play certain roles in political theory. Not only
does he want autonomy to be the characteristic that makes citizens’ perspectives a source
of legitimacy for laws and institutions, but he also wants it to be the characteristic that
“places limits on paternalistic interferences or manipulative dealings” (135). Thus, as a
matter of stipulation, if a person is not autonomous on Christman’s view, they are not
protected from this paternalistic interference. For this reason, it is important for him to
have a theory of autonomy that includes anyone who we think ought not to be subjected
to this interference. Plausibly, this would include the self-confident, self-guiding,
oppressed person.
Christman makes a clear connection between respecting persons, recognizing
them as autonomous, and refraining from paternal intervention in the following passage:
So the autonomy of participants in collective deliberation projects onto the
outcomes of those deliberations a particular legitimacy, in the same way that the
autonomy of a single person grants status to the choices such a person makes.
This distinguishes such decisions, in at least a minimal way, from pathological,
addictive, manipulated, or compulsive ones. We might properly respond to the
latter in any number of ways—with compassion, tolerance, strategic maneuvering,
or resistance. But autonomous acts have a minimally self-validating imprimatur;
they command a degree of respect that non-autonomous choices do not. (135)

24

See, for example, Benson, 1991; Nussbaum, 2001; Oshana, 2003 and 2006.
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When Christman claims that autonomous choices demand a degree of respect, he seems
to mean that they cannot be responded to in the same ways we may respond to nonautonomous choices, such as strategic maneuvering or resistance. So to respect a choice
is to not interfere with it, and only autonomous choices warrant such respect. Since
Christman endorses a liberal political theory that allows for a wide variety of conceptions
of the good, he claims that we are compelled “toward a maximally flexible notion of
autonomy, so that a broad variation of conceptions of the good, ideals of personhood, and
approaches to personal and social life receive full respect” (161). On this view, we would
begin by determining who should be free from paternalistic intervention, and then
conclude that they must be autonomous; to conclude otherwise would be to endorse
paternalism when it is inappropriate to do so, and this would disrespect them. He makes
this straightforward connection between autonomy and paternalism when he claims that
“autonomy in this sense must pick out all and only those agents whose capacities and
point of view should matter as the sources of valid claims in collective decisions and
toward whom paternalistic intervention would be disrespectful.” (162)
Friedman also maintains that to respect a person’s autonomy is to refrain from
interfering with their choices. She claims that respecting someone’s autonomy involves
“…not interfering unduly with her choices or behavior (assuming she is not harming
others)… giving her the freedom to choose and act unimpeded by such hindrances as
deception, manipulation, and coercion,” and “…treat[ing] her appropriately in virtue of
what she wants and values” (73-74). On Friedman’s view, so long as a person has
reflectively endorsed their choices in a particular kind of way, they are due the respect of
not being interfered with, and she takes this to be good evidence that content-neutral
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views are preferable, all other things equal, to substantive views (75). It is noteworthy
that both Christman and Friedman have stipulated rather than argued for the claim that
respecting autonomy involves avoiding paternalistic intervention and that this
intervention is appropriate with regard to the non-autonomous.
4.3.2 Answer 2: Burdening the Oppressed
A second answer to the question of why it might be disrespectful to deny that the
self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed person is autonomous is that in denying that they
are autonomous, we are suggesting they are failing in some way and that they thereby
have some reason to remedy the situation so that they can become autonomous. But since
this person is oppressed, and features of her oppression explain why we are inclined to
deny that she is autonomous, it seems as though we are placing more burdens on victims
of oppression than we are placing on those who benefit from this oppressive system. On
the face of it, this seems unjust. Meyers expresses this concern when she states:
A final worry about identifying more emancipated behavior with more
autonomous behavior is that it assigns disproportionate responsibility for social
change to individual women. It seems to me that the onus of confronting and
overcoming structural injustice should be borne by social movements and persons
in politically or economically powerful positions. Yet to avoid having their
autonomy downgraded by a value-laden or value-saturated account of autonomy,
women facing entrenched patriarchal institutions and repressive practices would
be obliged to devise individual workarounds consonant with progressive values.
In my estimation, then, such theories load too much of the work of fighting
injustice onto vulnerable individuals. (133)
This concern is related to the worries people have about victim-blaming; to claim
that the oppressed display some moral failing in virtue of their oppression seems to shift
our moral blame from those who deserve it to those who instead deserve our compassion
and support. In Anita M. Superson’s discussion of right-wing women, she argues that
although they contribute to the harm that sexism causes women generally, we ought not
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blame them because they are victims of patriarchy and this is what explains their being
right-wing (1995). To blame them for the harms of sexism would be to suggest that they
are the cause of sexism, but Superson claims that this is parallel to the case of accusing
the rape victim of causing the rape by dressing provocatively:
In other words, the victim is the cause of the harm. But in truth, it is the rapist
alone who is at fault in the latter case, just as it is those men who ‘oil the gears’ of
patriarchy in order to profit who are at fault in the former case… To focus on
women’s contribution to the perpetuation of sexism is wrong in both cases
because it is sexist. (91)
According to Meyers’s line of objection, if we deny that the oppressed are
autonomous, we are somehow downgrading their moral status, and if they are to bring
their moral status back up to the ideal level, they must take on additional burdens that it is
unjust for them to have to take on given the cause of their lack of autonomy in the first
place. Similarly, to adapt Superson’s argument to the present discussion, the claim would
be that by denying that the oppressed are autonomous because they are victims of
oppression, we may seem to be suggesting that, in some sense, their oppression is their
own fault. This is because if they were to take steps to increase their levels of autonomy,
they would also thereby decrease the degree to which they suffer from oppression. Thus,
it would seem that their own failure to increase their autonomy contributes to their
oppression, and making a claim like this seems to be blaming them for their oppression.
4.3.3 Answer 3: Overlooking Certain Capabilities
A third consideration that is often appealed to in support of choosing a contentneutral theory of autonomy is that a person can have some important capacities for selfguidance without meeting some of the more stringent requirements in substantive
theories, and for the substantive theory to deny that the person is autonomous is to
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overlook or deny the importance of the self-guiding capacities they do have. To overlook
or deny these capacities would be disrespectful. According to proponents of substantive
views, oppression undermines women’s ability to choose for themselves with respect to a
number of important aspects of their lives. A woman’s choice to sacrifice her hard-earned
high-status career to stay home with the children while her husband works will, in many
cases, be such an example. For these substantive views, this stay-at-home-mom’s choice
to give up her career may not be an autonomous one (depending on the details of the
case), but denying her autonomy is arguably failing to appreciate the ways in which she
used certain practical reasoning skills to make the choice.
Uma Narayan argues that portraying women’s choices in this way is to adapt what
she calls “the engulfing view”:
In the engulfing view, women’s agency is represented as if it were completely
“pulverized by patriarchy”—so maimed that women have no wit, no capacity for
critical reflection or resistance, no real stakes in their way of life. They are
capable only of zombielike acquiescence to patriarchal norms, beings whose
desires and values are patriarchal excrescence not attributable to women as real
free agents. This engulfing view portrays women’s desires and attitudes as ‘not
really their own’ in any meaningful or legitimate sense, reducing them to mere
symptoms of their being individuals-subject-to patriarchy. (422)
Thus, by claiming that many of oppressed women’s choices are not autonomous, we risk
denying their agency altogether. We risk failing to recognize the ways in which women
consciously and rationally deliberate among their options, and while these options may
be unjustly limited, women are nonetheless capable of navigating them, on Narayan’s
view, as full-fledged agents.
Friedman shares this concern about substantive theories of autonomy. She grants
that theories like Stoljar’s are able to accommodate one “feminist intuition”—Stoljar’s
term for the intuition that choices motivated by oppressive socialization are not
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autonomous—but argues that there is another feminist intuition that can only be
accommodated by more lenient theories of autonomy—namely, that “traditionally
subordinate feminine lives nevertheless can and do often nonslavishly embody and
express values worth caring about” (Friedman, 25). She is echoing the idea that by
denying that a choice is autonomous, we are suggesting that the choice is “zombielike” or
“slavish”. She also takes issue with Marina Oshana’s theory of autonomy according to
which a person must have significant options available in order to be autonomous
(Oshana 2006). According to Friedman, even when a person’s options are severely
limited, “the alternatives facing her may differ in ways that have both personal
significance for the person facing those options and general moral significance” (26).
Thus, the more requirements we pack into our theory of autonomy, or the more stringent
those requirements are, the more likely we are to ignore or deny certain individuals’
admirable, or even morally praiseworthy, practical reasoning abilities.
4.3.4 Answer 4: Denying Moral Agency or Moral Worth
There is little agreement in the literature on autonomy (or in the literature on
moral responsibility) regarding how autonomy and moral responsibility are related. Some
take the two notions to be equivalent, others take autonomy to be necessary for moral
responsibility, and others seem to think the relationship is more complicated. But for
those who think that the notions are equivalent or that autonomy is necessary for
responsibility, it appears that the non-autonomous person will be incapable of being
responsible for her actions or that she will not be responsible for her choice if that choice

115

was not an autonomous one.25 Benson expresses as much when he claims that, for
example, “a woman whose socialization has impaired the autonomy of certain of her
actions will also have sufficient grounds for being excused from full liability to moral
criticism for those actions” (1991, 391).
On many substantive views of autonomy, the oppressed will frequently fail to be
fully autonomous persons, and many of their choices will fail to be fully autonomous
choices. Thus, there is some concern that these views of autonomy restrict the class of
responsible individuals (or the class of actions for which someone is responsible) too
much. Superson explains that “[b]ecause women’s agency historically has not been
respected or even acknowledged… it is particularly salient that we not make moral
claims about women that treat them as if they have no agency” (2010, 255). So not only
is it important that we hold people responsible when it is appropriate to do so because it’s
morally appropriate (Benson 2004), but it is also crucial that we appreciate women’s
status as morally responsible agents because this comes with an appreciation of the
constraints their preferences and choices place on us—constraints which have historically
been largely ignored.
Friedman builds on this idea when she explains that, historically, women have not
been thought of as full moral agents, and as a result their preferences and choices have
not been respected.
In the realm of heterosexual relations, when a woman’s ‘no’ is treated as a ‘yes’
and women’s own views are routinely disregarded, the result is women’s

There’s a distinction between a person being morally responsible generally versus a person being
responsible for a particular choice. There is also a distinction between a person being autonomous versus a
person’s particular choice being an autonomous one. The difference here is inconsequential for the
purposes of this paper so I move back and forth between talking about one or the other depending on what
makes the most sense in the context.
25
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widespread vulnerability to sexual harassment, sexual assault, and rape. The
importance to women of having their perspectives, their wants and values, treated
with cultural respect is thus crucial to women’s well-being. (75)
Friedman argues that the “surest and most plausible” way to justify taking women’s
choices seriously is by appealing to their agency as autonomous individuals. She
maintains that, as a result, we have good reason to choose a content-neutral theory of
autonomy over a more restrictive, substantive one.
To sum up, then, on this line of argument it is disrespectful to deny that the selfconfident, self-guiding, oppressed individual is autonomous because in doing so we are
thereby denying their moral agency. Not only does it seem disrespectful to deny that an
agent is responsible for her actions when, intuitively, she is responsible, but there is
further concern that by denying her agency we are denying that we should respect her
avowed preferences and choices. Plausibly, by denying the legitimacy of a person’s
preferences generally, we are suggesting that it is permissible to treat the person in ways
that conflict with what they say they want. Thus, it seems as though more restrictive
theories of autonomy provide moral justification for the mistreatment and abuse of
women and other oppressed individuals.
4.3.5 Answer 5: Inherently Disrespectful
A final reason one might think it is disrespectful to deny the autonomy of certain
individuals is that it is simply inherently respectful to recognize a person or action as
autonomous, and we owe this form of respect to the self-confident, self-guiding,
oppressed person. In the same way that we seem to show respect to someone when we
call them “brave” or “noble,” so too do we seem to show them respect when we call them
“autonomous.” Friedman suggests as much when she notes that “[m]any philosophers
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agree that respect is owed to persons simply by virtue of their potential for being
autonomous [and] someone’s actual manifestation of autonomy may warrant yet another
form of respect, also connected to sheer personhood” (22).
In understanding this option, it will be useful to discuss two different kinds of
respect as explained by Stephen Darwall in “Two Kinds of Self-Respect.” Darwall
distinguishes between what he calls recognition respect, on the one hand, and appraisal
respect, on the other. To have appraisal respect for someone is to have "an attitude of
positive appraisal of that person either as a person or as engaged in some particular
pursuit" (184). Recognition respect, as he defines it, is a disposition to recognize the
significance of some thing or some feature of a thing, to give it appropriate weight in
one's deliberations, and to act accordingly. Dillon in "Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional,
Political" claims that we can have this kind of respect for a mountain when we recognize
how dangerous it would be to climb it, or for an agreement that we've made when we
appreciate the significance of violating it.
So while having appraisal respect for someone involves having a particular
positive attitude toward them, having recognition respect for them involves taking them
into consideration in appropriate ways and altering our behavior accordingly. When we
sanction paternalistic intervention in someone’s life when it is inappropriate to do so, this
signals a failure of recognition respect; we ought to have factored that person into our
deliberation about how to act in a way that we failed to. The same is true when we place
additional burdens on oppressed persons, because we are not appropriately considering
the harms they’ve already suffered. Denying a person’s moral agency is also denying
them a form of recognition respect since we are failing to appreciate some morally

118

relevant fact about them and as a result we are failing to alter our behavior towards them
in ways that we ought to.
In contrast, when we disrespect someone by overlooking certain of their agential
abilities we are failing to give them the appropriate appraisal respect. It seems as though
it is appropriate to positively appraise a person when they have the morally significant
feature of being a moral agent, so when we deny a person this status we are denying them
the appraisal respect that comes with it. It seems to me that this last option, that deeming
a person autonomous is inherently respectful, is also appealing to appraisal respect. The
idea seems to be that simply in calling someone “autonomous” we are expressing a
positive appraisal of them or some feature of them, and in deeming them “nonautonomous” we are denying that they have this positive feature and perhaps even
expressing a negative appraisal of them.
The idea that denying someone’s autonomy is disrespectful in this sense is hinted
at throughout the literature on autonomy, as authors frequently claim that it is
disrespectful to deny someone’s autonomy without giving any explanation of what they
mean by that. Benson does this, for example, in his summary of the motivation of many
content-neutral theorists: “Theories of autonomy should be as inclusive as they
reasonably can be, according to this approach, because this is the best way to ensure that
they respect appropriately persons’ authentic voices as realized in their decisions and
conduct” (2014, 107). Friedman also does this frequently in motivating her own view, for
example: “In practice, someone’s failure to manifest recognizable autonomy… may well
promote the conviction in others that she is not really capable of autonomy and, therefore,
does not deserve the respect that is premised on a capacity for it” (23).
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Of course, someone could maintain that denying that the self-confident, selfguiding, oppressed person is autonomous is disrespectful in multiple ways at once.
Perhaps it is disrespectful both inherently and because it sanctions paternalist
intervention in their lives. Or perhaps it is disrespectful in all five of the ways I’ve
discussed at once! Very few who appeal to respect are clear about which of these options
they have in mind, but as I will argue, no matter which of these we appeal to it is simply
false that denying the autonomy of the self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed person is,
by itself, disrespectful. Thus, this is not a legitimate objection to substantive theories of
autonomy. In the following section I evaluate each of these five interpretations of the
“disrespect” objection in turn and argue that none of them is successful.
4.4 Evaluating the Answers to the “Why?” Question
4.4.1 Answer 1: Sanctioning Paternalism
On this way of understanding the disrespect that arguably comes with denying the
autonomy of certain individuals, if a person is autonomous, then they cannot be subjected
to paternalistic interference, and if a person is not autonomous, then they can be subjected
to paternalistic interference. Thus, in determining who is and who is not an appropriate
subject of paternalistic interference, we will have thereby determined who is and who is
not autonomous. To deny autonomy to someone who is not an appropriate subject of
paternalistic interference will be disrespectful to that person because we will be
sanctioning paternalism when it is inappropriate to do so. Thus, Christman and Friedman
conclude that we should choose a theory of autonomy that makes autonomy less difficult
to achieve because paternalistic interference is rarely appropriate.
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But why should we think that there is a perfect parallel between the degree to
which someone is autonomous and the degree to which paternalistic interference in their
affairs is appropriate? In order for Christman or Friedman to use this argument to push
for a content-neutral theory of autonomy, they first need to convince us that autonomy
and paternalism have the relationship they claim it does. However, neither of them does
this. Christman stipulates that this is the role he wants autonomy to play in his political
theory, so it is plausible that a more substantive theory of autonomy won’t play the role
he wants autonomy to play in his theory, but this doesn’t go any distance toward showing
that substantive theories of autonomy are making some kind of mistake. One alternative
would just be that Christman’s political theory is mistaken, but a more charitable
response is that there are multiple conceptions of autonomy, each of which is important
in different contexts.
The latter route is the one that Oshana takes, and I follow her in maintaining that
there is an important distinction between political and personal autonomy. Oshana
describes political autonomy as having to do with “the status of the individual against the
state or against institutions of public and civic authority,” and “the idea that the
justification of political institutions must appeal to considerations recognized as valid by
all adult citizens of a society” (2006, 102). But she maintains that a person can be
politically autonomous without being personally autonomous, and that political liberalism
is meant to allow for a society in which a person can be free to pursue personal autonomy
or not. Christman’s liberalism is motivated by a concern for respecting different
conceptions of the good, so it takes into consideration the perspectives of everyone who
meets the requirements for political autonomy. But some of those people will not be
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motivated by the value of personal autonomy, and liberalism leaves room for them to live
lives of self-sacrifice and subservience in accordance with their values.
It seems to me that the way to understand the difference between these two
approaches to autonomy is that political autonomy is concerned with whether a person
has the authority to govern themselves, while personal autonomy is concerned with
whether or not a person is in fact governing themselves. And it is quite plausible that it
takes less to have the authority to govern oneself than it does to succeed in governing
oneself. So we can grant, with Christman and Friedman, that a person should be free from
paternalistic intervention and should have the opportunity to contribute to the political
process so long as they meet some minimal, content-neutral standards of autonomy while
still maintaining that there is a distinct notion of autonomy that better captures what it
means for a person to guide oneself.
It is not at all clear, then, why we should assume from the start that the
autonomous person just is the person for whom paternalistic intervention is morally
inappropriate. Christman has not adequately defended this claim, and it is open to
proponents of substantive theories to deny Christman’s political theory rather than to
deny substantive theories of autonomy. However, a more charitable response, and the
response I endorse, is to distinguish between political and personal autonomy. Christman
is concerned with political autonomy, since he is concerned with the self-guiding features
a person must have in order to have the standing to participate in the democratic process
and to remain free of paternalistic interference. In contrast, Oshana, Stoljar, Benson, and
others are concerned with personal autonomy, or what it takes for a person to actually be
guiding their own choices. The claim that substantive theories of autonomy disrespect the
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self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed person by denying her autonomy thereby sanction
paternalistic interference in her affairs is, as a result, based on a mistaken conflation of
political and personal autonomy.
4.4.2 Answer 2: Burdening the Oppressed
The second line of argument we considered was that it is disrespectful to deny
that the self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed person is autonomous because in doing so
we are placing additional burdens on her, but since she is a victim in this situation these
burdens are unfair and perhaps tantamount to victim blaming. The argument from Meyers
was that a substantive theory of autonomy would, in deeming these individuals nonautonomous, result in their having a lower moral status than they would on a contentneutral theory of autonomy. In order to match the moral status they would otherwise have
had, they must now take on the oppressive structures that undermined their autonomy in
the first place. To place the majority of the burden for remedying oppression on the
oppressed themselves is unjust. And according to the victim-blaming argument we
adapted from Superson, denying the oppressed this higher moral status because they are
oppressed is, in some sense, blaming them for their oppression since in taking steps to
become more autonomous they would thereby be taking steps to reduce the oppression
that undermines their autonomy.
While I do agree with Meyers that being autonomous is a moral good and that
failing to be autonomous is something that morality requires us to try to avoid, it does not
follow that any time someone fails to achieve autonomy they are blameworthy for it or
take on additional moral obligations as a result. In the case of an individual who lacks
autonomy on the substantive views because she is oppressed, it will very clearly not be
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her fault that she lacks autonomy. She will not have appropriate control over the
situation, and she could not reasonably be blamed for the moral failing.
When the Deferential Housewife, for example, chooses to consistently defer to
her husband, she does so because she has been socialized to believe that women’s
preferences count for less than men’s preferences do. While she is, I maintain, failing to
properly respect herself, she does not have the option to simply step out of the mental
framework that shapes the way she conceives of everything in her life and pursue an
autonomous life instead. Perhaps over time, with the right social conditions, she could
come to have values that are more in line with autonomy, but a person cannot simply
choose her beliefs and values in the way that would be necessary to correct the moral
failing in this case. As a result, she is not blameworthy for the moral failing, and she does
not come to have additional obligations to rectify the situation by taking on the
patriarchy.26
It is also not true that in denying that this individual is autonomous we are
blaming her for her oppression. For while it may be true that if she were simply to shed
the oppressive socialization that undermines her autonomy she would thereby be fighting
the oppression that caused this socialization, it does not follow that she has caused the
oppression. To return to Superson’s example, the outfit did not cause the rape even
though the rape would not have occurred without it; similarly, the lack of autonomy did
not cause the oppression even though the oppression would not have occurred (to the
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Of course we all have a moral obligation to take on the patriarchy, so she has this obligation to the extent
that everyone else does, but she does not have any additional obligation over and above this in virtue of her
lack of autonomy (and there is still room for the privileged in a society to have more of an obligation here).
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same degree) without it. Patriarchy—not oppressed women—causes women’s
oppression, and maintaining that certain oppressed women lack autonomy does not
conflict with that claim. Denying the autonomy of certain oppressed individuals, then,
does not place unfair burdens on them or blame them in inappropriate ways, so this
cannot be a way in which they are disrespected.
4.4.3 Answer 3: Overlooking Certain Capabilities
According to Narayan and Friedman, when we deny that the self-confident, selfguiding, oppressed person is autonomous, we thereby fail to appreciate any of the
significant ways in which she is self-guiding, or any of the important skills she has that
allow her to effectively navigate the difficult choices she faces. She may even develop
skills that are lacking in those who have more power—and who we may therefore be
more inclined to call “autonomous”—because her ability to live in accordance with her
values may require her to engage in more self-reflection on what she really cares about
and more conscious consideration of the ways in which her set of options might hold her
back or help her in various ways. To deny that she is autonomous, according to Narayan
and Friedman, is to deny or overlook her possession of these skills, and respecting them
requires us to acknowledge and appreciate the value of these skills.
It is not at all clear to me why we should think that denying that an individual is
autonomous is overlooking or denying the self-guiding skills they do have. Autonomy is
a complicated phenomenon, and any theory of autonomy has multiple requirements that
must be met in order for a person to qualify as fully autonomous.27 For any theory, a
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For simplicity, I have been talking about whether an individual is autonomous or not rather than about
whether an individual is fully autonomous or not. However, all theories of autonomy that I am familiar with
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person may meet some of those requirements but not others and so fail to be fully
autonomous. On Friedman’s own content-neutral theory, an agent is more autonomous
with respect to a choice the more the agent reflectively endorsed the values that
motivated that choice. So Friedman would claim that many, if not most, agents are less
than fully autonomous, but it does not follow from this that she is ignoring the degree to
which they are autonomous. Similarly, for Meyers’s content-neutral view, being
autonomous involves having multiple skills, but there’s no reason to think that a person
could have some of these skills without having others.
The same is true for substantive theories of autonomy. They contain multiple
requirements for an agent to be fully autonomous, but an agent can be more or less
autonomous to the degree that they satisfy those requirements. Thus, the stay-at-homemom will show some degree of autonomy on the basis of her ability to reflect on her
choices and act in accordance with the one that will most likely allow her to achieve her
goals, but she will lack autonomy to the degree that her goals are shaped by problematic
socialization that undermines her sense of self-worth (or whatever other substantive
requirement we have in place). Additionally, we have no reason to think that contentneutral theories of autonomy give the result that agents are fully autonomous more
frequently than substantive theories do. Friedman claims that “[n]o finite being is
thoroughly self-determined” (7), so she denies that any agent can be fully autonomous.
So if the concern is one about the number of individuals who count as fully autonomous

leave room for there being degrees of autonomy, and many explicitly state that there are degrees of
autonomy (including Stoljar’s; see Stoljar 2014).
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on a particular theory, then the focus should not be on the division between contentneutral and substantive theories.
To deny that an agent is fully autonomous is not to deny that they meet any of the
requirements set forth by the relevant theory of autonomy. Content-neutral theorists
themselves must accept this claim because they maintain that autonomy comes in degrees
and at least some of them deny that anyone can be fully autonomous. As a result, they
had better not maintain that to deny full autonomy is to deny any autonomy at all and is
therefore disrespectful, because this argument could be used against them just as well as
it could be used against the proponents of substantive views. Additionally, there’s simply
no reason to think that in denying full autonomy we necessarily overlook significant selfguiding skills the individual has. Many substantive theorists take care to point out the
valuable skills possessed by individuals they claim are not fully autonomous.28 In the
end, while it may be disrespectful to overlook or deny someone’s estimable self-guiding
skills, denying that they are fully autonomous does not, in itself, do this.
4.4.4 Answer 4: Denying Moral Agency or Moral Worth
For those who think that autonomy is equivalent to or necessary for moral
responsibility, a theory of autonomy that deems many non-autonomous will thereby deem
them incapable of moral responsibility (or if it deems many choices non-autonomous it
will thereby deem individuals free of responsibility for those many choices). This might
be a problem if, intuitively, they are morally responsible and denying that they are would
be disrespectful, or it may be a problem if we seem to be denying these individuals the
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status of a moral agent and so denying that they have certain moral rights. Superson and
Friedman have both expressed concern that it would be particularly problematic if our
theory of autonomy gave the result that we may deny women’s moral rights given the
long history of women’s moral rights being denied.
Regarding the first concern, that substantive theories don’t match up well with our
intuitions about who is morally responsible and who is not, I see no reason to assume a
priori that autonomy is equivalent to or necessary for moral responsibility. So if we are
debating about what autonomy is, I don’t see why we should think a particular theory is
better than another just because it lines up better with our intuitions about who is morally
responsible and who is not. For it could simply turn out that autonomy is not related to
moral responsibility in any straightforward way, in which case our intuitions about moral
responsibility would be largely irrelevant. It is only once we know what autonomy is (and
what moral responsibility is) that we can determine how they are related. For this reason,
it seems to me a mistake to appeal to our intuitions about who is morally responsible and
who is not in our defense of one theory of autonomy over another.
Regarding the second concern about denying the moral rights of non-autonomous
individuals, I would again like to point out that until we have determined what autonomy
is, we have no reason to suppose that it has this important connection with moral rights.
In fact, when people do talk about who has moral rights and who does not, to the degree
that autonomy is relevant at all people seem to think that it is the capacity for autonomy
that makes it the case that one has moral rights rather than the achievement of
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autonomy.29 In addition, I want to remind us that on most, if not all, theories of
autonomy, autonomy comes in degrees. Perhaps there is a threshold one must meet in
order to count as autonomous at all, and perhaps this is also the point at which one has
any moral rights at all, but this is perfectly consistent with the claim that a person who is
not fully autonomous still has certain moral rights and is due a certain amount of respect.
One final point on this topic that is, I think, worth noting, is that the substantive
theories of autonomy are motivated by a concern for women and other members of
oppressed groups getting the respect they are due. They have an idea of what moral rights
we have and how we deserve to be treated in virtue of that, and they take this to be
important for autonomy in one way or another. For Benson, we are not autonomous
unless we have some understanding of our own status, and for Stoljar we are not
autonomous if we have been subjected to oppressive socialization at least in part because
this causes us to believe false things about our worth. So it is because the proponents of
substantive views are so concerned with the moral worth of members of oppressed
groups that they include certain requirements in their theories. For them, to ignore certain
ways in which individuals’ preferences are overridden and just call them autonomous
anyway would suggest that their preferences aren’t so important after all. So rather than
holding society to a lower standard by denying that women’s preferences should be
respected, as Friedman claims, these substantive views are holding society to a higher
standard by insisting that women’s preferences must be respected in spite of all of the
ways in which oppression makes this difficult.
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See, for example, Friedman 2003, 23; Benson 2014, 101.
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4.4.5 Answer 5: Inherently Disrespectful
The final reason I’ve considered for thinking that it is disrespectful to deny that
the self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed individual is autonomous is that in denying
that a person is autonomous we are either failing to have a positive appraisal of them that
we ought to have or we are having a negative appraisal of them when we ought not to.
The idea is that just as we have a positive appraisal of someone when we deem them
“brave” and a negative appraisal of someone when we deem them “cowardly,” the same
is true for “autonomous” and “non-autonomous.” Of course, any theory of autonomy is
going to deny the autonomy of some individuals—even content-neutral ones—so the
problem can’t be that any time we deny that someone is autonomous we are disrespecting
them in this way. It is only when it is inappropriate to deny their autonomy that we
disrespect them by expressing this negative appraisal or lack of positive appraisal.
In section I of this paper, I laid out three possible cases in which it would be
inappropriate to deny that someone is autonomous: they are self-confident, self-guiding,
or oppressed (or some combination of these). The remaining questions, then, are 1) Is it
necessarily the case that when we deny that someone is autonomous we express a
negative appraisal of them or fail to express a positive appraisal of them? And 2) If so, is
it inappropriate to do this with the self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed person? In the
remainder of this section, I will consider the first question, and I will consider the second
question in the next section of the paper. Ultimately, I will argue that while it is
implausible that we express a negative appraisal of someone merely by denying that they
are autonomous, it is plausible that we express a failure to have a positive appraisal of
them in doing so. However, it is perfectly appropriate to fail to have this positive
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appraisal of the self-confident, self-guiding, oppressed person as autonomous if, in fact,
they are not autonomous.
In considering what we express when we claim that someone is not autonomous,
it will be helpful to start with an example. This example comes from Stoljar’s discussion
of women who had abortions after freely engaging in sex with men without using
contraception despite its availability (Stoljar 2014). The choice to engage in this risky
behavior may seem like an irrational one, but Kristin Luker, in her discussion of these
women, argues that in fact their choices were rational given the costs of using
contraception that stem from the stigmatization of sexually active women in our society.
While Stoljar agrees with Luker that these choices are rational, she argues that they are,
nonetheless, non-autonomous; this is because the women interviewed had internalized
false norms of feminine sexuality and were motivated by them in their choice to engage
in this risky behavior.
It is clear in this case that it is not the women’s fault that they internalized these
norms and thereby failed to make a fully autonomous choice. They are, in some sense,
victims of an unjust system. They are lacking a capacity that they would be better off
having because society got in the way of them attaining it. They are certainly not
blameworthy for their lack of autonomy in this case, and I hope it is clear that when
Stoljar claims that they are not making an autonomous choice, she is not blaming them.
Instead, she is negatively evaluating the socialization that prevented them from achieving
autonomy and the society that continues to bring women up in this way. The majority of
the cases that proponents of substantive theories rely on to motivate their views are of
this kind; the person who lacks autonomy is not to be blamed for this failure, but instead
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some individual(s) in their lives or society more generally is. We might even be
impressed with the ways in which they are able to navigate their options given the values
that have been imposed on them, so we may positively evaluate them while still
maintaining they are not fully autonomous. Clearly, then, it is possible to maintain that
someone is not autonomous without having a negative evaluation of that person.
The second option is that in maintaining that someone lacks autonomy, we are
failing to have a positive appraisal of them. Here the idea is that deeming someone
autonomous and positively appraising them go hand-in-hand, and it seems plausible
enough to me that this is so. I assume that anyone who works on autonomy takes
autonomy to be a good thing, and while I’m not convinced that we always have a positive
attitude toward someone to some degree whenever we deem them autonomous (as
appraisal respect, by definition, requires), it seems like a harmless assumption. The
remaining question is just whether we ought to have this attitude of positive appraisal that
comes only with deeming someone autonomous whenever they are self-confident, selfguiding, oppressed, or some combination of these, and I take this up in the next section.
4.5 Evaluating the Answers to the “Who?” Question
The self-confident person is the person who believes that she is autonomous, selfguiding, or otherwise in control of the course of her life and the choices she makes. But it
is implausible on any approach to autonomy that we owe a person the positive appraisal
that comes with deeming them autonomous merely because they believe they are
autonomous. Even the proponents of the content-neutral views have objective standards
that must be met for a person to count as autonomous, so this cannot be what they have in
mind when they claim that substantive theories are disrespectful. Most theories of
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autonomy do not even think that believing we are autonomous is on the list of
requirements for autonomy. Benson’s view is the exception here, as he does require that
agents take themselves to be answerable for their choices, but as we noted in the first
section, he also requires that this belief is reasonable. For the belief to be a reasonable
one, they must also meet some objective standards of self-guidance, so the appeal to selfconfidence alone will not get us far.
A second possibility is that we owe it to those who meet some specified standards
of self-guidance to positively appraise them in the special way that we positively appraise
autonomous individuals. The problem here is that we have to figure out which standards
of self-guidance a person must meet in order to be due this positive appraisal, and it isn’t
clear why we shouldn’t just go with those standards of self-guidance that qualify one as
autonomous. Of course we can positively appraise a non-autonomous person on the basis
of her abilities to self-reflect, rationally consider her options, or prioritize various of her
values, but I see no reason to think that we owe her the special kind of positive appraisal
that we are supposing only comes with deeming someone autonomous unless she is, in
fact, autonomous. If this is right, then we should first determine what it takes to be
autonomous, and only then will we know whether or not we are disrespecting someone
by failing to deem them autonomous.
Perhaps the situation is different if the person has self-guidance and selfconfidence. For in a case like this, she believes she is autonomous and she has some good
reason for thinking that she is. Even still, any theory of autonomy will have objective
standards, so even a content-neutral theory will have to deem some self-confident, selfguiding people non-autonomous. This is because, while the individual may meet some
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plausible standards of autonomy, they may not meet the standards that the proponent of
the relevant view endorses. While there is a disagreement here between the self-confident,
self-guiding individual and the proponent of the relevant theory of autonomy, I see no
reason to think there is anything disrespectful going on. The case seems parallel to a case
of someone writing about the wrongness of meat-eating, all the while there are meateaters out there who take themselves to be doing nothing wrong. There is disagreement,
but there need not be any disrespect.
The third possibility is that we owe it to oppressed individuals to positively
appraise them as autonomous so long as it is features of their oppression that seem to us
to undermine their autonomy. This might initially seem plausible because it is not their
fault that they fail to meet the requirements that we have mind, but we must remember
that a lack of a positive appraisal is not the same as a negative appraisal. We can
recognize that it is not their fault that they do not meet the relevant standards, and we can
positively appraise them for all kinds of other skills and praiseworthy attributes they may
have.
Rather than thinking that denying autonomy in a case like this is disrespectful, it
seems to me that this is what properly respecting the person requires. Her access to a
moral good is being blocked by unjust institutions, and to ignore that injustice and
pretend she has all the self-guidance a person could want for the sake of being nice seems
patronizing and counter-productive. As Oshana says of an oppressed woman from her
examples, “[w]e can call [her] whatever we want, but doing so will make no difference if
her social situation and the institutions that support that situation continue to undermine
autonomy” (2006, 101). Calling the oppressed individual “autonomous” won’t fix
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anything, but perhaps acknowledging the degree of self-guidance she ought to have
access to but lacks will go some distance toward remedying the injustice and
strengthening her sense of self-worth.
In spite of the prevalence of the appeal to “disrespect” as an objection to
substantive theories of autonomy, it is rare for those who wield this objection to make
clear what they have in mind. In an attempt to determine what the substance of this
objection is, I have looked for possible answers to the following questions: 1) What
features must persons have in order for respect to require us to deem them autonomous?
And 2) Why is it that excluding people with these features is disrespectful? Based on
claims made throughout the literature, the possible answers to the first question seemed to
be: self-confidence, self-guidance, or oppression. However, in considering a number of
different reasons for thinking that it would be disrespectful to deny that a person with all
three of these qualities is autonomous, I argued that none of them is plausible except,
perhaps, that denying that this person is autonomous is intrinsically disrespectful.
In the end, though, I argued that we only have good reason to think that it is
disrespectful to deny the autonomy of someone who is autonomous. As a result, rather
than starting by determining who we would disrespect by denying their autonomy and
building our theory of autonomy based on those results, we should instead start by
determining what autonomy is. Once we have a set of criteria for determining who is
autonomous, we can use that same set of criteria to determine who, on the basis of
respect, we should deem autonomous. And to the extent that respecting the oppressed is
relevant to our theories of autonomy, it seems to me that substantive theories of
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autonomy do a better job than content-neutral ones of capturing what it would take for
our society to properly respect the autonomy of oppressed individuals.
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CHAPTER 5
A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE EXTERNAL CONDITIONS
FOR AUTONOMY
5.1 Introduction
Autonomy is often discussed as though it is something that we have or lack on the
basis of our psychology. It is sometimes thought that as long as our beliefs, desires,
values, etc., and the choices that result from them meet certain conditions—like being in
the right relationship with one another, having the right kind of history, or having the
right kind of content—then we count as autonomous.30 But some autonomy theorists
have argued that it is not just what’s going on inside our minds that matters, but also
what’s going on external to us.31 These thinkers maintain that if we don’t have the right
kind of options available to us, then no matter what our psychology is like, we still lack
autonomy. After all, they ask, how can we be understood as guiding the course of our
lives if we lack a significant range of options or if other people have significant control
over what we are able to do?
If we decide in response to these considerations to include external conditions on
autonomy in our theory of autonomy, then we face a number of difficult problems that
arise because of the apparently competing desiderata for such a theory. For example, on
the one hand, we want an account of autonomy that will be compatible with the fact that
all of us depend on others in various ways and have done so for all of our lives. Human
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beings are inherently social, and our identities and opportunities are shaped by those
around us. Similarly, we often give up certain important opportunities to provide care and
support to others, but we take this to be consistent with our autonomy. On the other hand,
though, we want our theory of autonomy to be able to explain when and why various
dependencies on others, external effects on our development, and voluntary losses of
opportunities interfere with our ability to guide our own lives. Call this tension between
the ways in which interdependency does and does not seem to undermine autonomy the
Interdependency Puzzle (IP).
Another desideratum that we have for our theory of autonomy is that it leave
space for people from various cultures and regions to be fully autonomous, regardless of
the level of wealth or technological development present in their society. This is
important in order to avoid a kind of cultural chauvinism according to which those who
do not have the specific kinds of opportunities we happen to have are thereby worse off in
spite of their ability to flourish. At the same time, though, lacking choices does
sometimes undermine autonomy, and if our theory of autonomy were unable to capture
this fact it would be wholly deficient. So how do we determine which or how many
options must be available to us in order for us to be autonomous? Call this the Range of
Options Puzzle (ROP).
In this paper, I provide a solution to both of these puzzles that ultimately appeals
to the ways in which others must be appropriately moved by us in order for us to be
autonomous. After laying out the competing desiderata and the puzzles that result from
them in more detail in Section I, I move on to my proposal which has two main parts. The
first of these involves focusing on cases in which a person’s options are restricted by non-
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persons rather than persons, which I do in Section II. I begin by distinguishing between
the ways in which non-personal forces shape our options generally, versus the ways in
which non-personal forces drastically change our options. In talking about the ways in
which non-personal forces shape our options, I am referring to the fact that we all have a
certain set of options available to us from the moment we are capable of any degree of
self-guidance based on things like the climate, our physical surroundings, the way our
bodies function, our physical needs, etc. These differ from person to person, even within
societies, as some people are disabled in various ways, some can run faster than others or
lift more than others, some can reproduce and some cannot, etc. I argue that neither the
shaping of our options nor drastic changes in our options by non-personal forces
undermine our autonomy directly, and that this is a necessary component of a naturalistic
and inclusive approach to autonomy. However, these things may undermine our
autonomy indirectly by making it difficult for us to have psychological autonomy. This
allows for a fair amount of flexibility in the theory, since two people might have the same
options available but those options might undermine one person’s psychological
autonomy while being compatible with the psychological autonomy of the other.
I then move on in Section III to discussing cases in which other persons are
affecting the shape of our options or causing drastic shifts in our options. While there are
important parallels between the non-personal case and the personal case, there are
differences as well. For example, we are social beings who are necessarily shaped by
those around us, and what options we have depends on the choices made by others in our
society. For this reason, I argue that the mere shaping of our options by others is not
sufficient to undermine autonomy—if it were, then none of us would be autonomous.
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However, there are cases in which the ways that others shape our options undermine our
ability to guide the course of our lives. These arise when the best explanation for our set
of options is a lack of respect for us from those doing the shaping. This is because, in
order for us to effectively guide the course of our lives, our decisions, preferences, etc.
must have the appropriate effect on others. So, for example, if I am unable to carry out
my plans because others have not been appropriately moved by my choice to do so, then I
am lacking self-guidance because whether or not I can carry out my plans depends on the
whims of others. Of course, my autonomy does not depend on others doing whatever I
want them to. It just depends on their respecting my personhood. When their lack of
respect for my personhood impacts my options, they thereby undermine my autonomy. In
any case in which my options are affected in this way, I argue that my autonomy is
undermined regardless of whether my psychological autonomy is affected.
5.2 Motivating Considerations
The purpose of this section is to lay out some reasons that a theory of external
autonomy might be important, why it is a difficult to construct a satisfying one, and what
a satisfying one would look like. I begin by summarizing what psychological autonomy is
and what conditions must be met on my account for us to count as having psychological
autonomy. I then describe in a bit more detail why a focus on psychological autonomy
alone might feel unsatisfying as an account of what it takes to be guiding one’s life, and I
explain some of the difficulties we face when we try to broaden our understanding of
what is required for autonomy by including external constraints as well. I end the section
by laying out some of the desiderata that I maintain a theory of external autonomy must
meet in order to be plausible.
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Before beginning, I should make a quick note on terminology. In this paper, I will
assume that in order to be autonomous, it is not enough that our minds meet certain
requirements but that the world around us must meet certain requirements as well. These
requirements that our minds must meet I will refer to as psychological constraints on
autonomy, and for convenience I will talk about whether or not we satisfy these
constraints as whether or not we have psychological autonomy. The requirements on
what the world must be like for us to be autonomous I will call external constraints on
autonomy, and for convenience I will talk about whether or not we satisfy these
constraints as whether or not we have external autonomy. In addition, I should note that I
take it that autonomy comes in degrees, so that some beings are not autonomous at all,
some beings have some autonomy, and others have even more autonomy. The degree of
autonomy we have depends on whether we have a tendency to make autonomous choices.
When we have a strong tendency to make autonomous choices, then we have a high
degree of autonomy, and we lack autonomy to the degree that we tend not to make
autonomous choices. To complicate things further, I take it that each individual choice
can be more or less autonomous as well. This is because there are various requirements
that must be met for a choice to be fully autonomous, and we can satisfy some of these
without satisfying others. We can also satisfy the requirements more or less fully in ways
that should become clearer throughout the paper.
5.2.1 Psychological Autonomy
When I discuss psychological autonomy, I am concerned primarily with what our
choices need to be like in order for them to be autonomous, where I am understanding a
choice as a mental act. My view is that our choices lack autonomy to the degree that they
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are best explained by our failure to respect ourselves as persons. Respecting ourselves as
persons has three components, which correspond to the three features of ourselves that
deserve respect. We must respect ourselves as moral equals to other persons, as rational
agents capable of practical reasoning, and as the particular individuals we are. If a choice
is best explained by a failure to respect ourselves in one of these three ways, then that
choice lacks autonomy.
I would lack autonomy, for example, if I were to choose to choose to have a child
merely because my partner wanted one and without thoroughly considering the ways in
which doing so might interfere with my own goals in life. This is because my choice is
best explained, in part, by a failure to take seriously the fact that my own goals and
preferences count for just as much as my partner’s do, and by a failure to care sufficiently
about having good reasons for making important choices. I would also lack autonomy if I
were to act without proper regard for my values, even if those values are morally neutral
(e.g. my love of gardening), or if I were to lose my faith in my own ability to effectively
guide the course of my life and so depend on others to do it for me.
The world around us affects our capacity for psychological autonomy in various
ways. One of the most impactful ways it does this is through socialization. We’re taught
about our worth by parents, friends, television advertisers, politicians, and others, both
implicitly and explicitly. The expectations people have for us and the standards they hold
us to influence our beliefs about whether we matter as much as others, whether we are as
capable of guiding our lives as they are, and whether our goals and values are actually
worth pursuing. And the situation we’re in might influence our beliefs about our worth
without any person saying or doing anything at all; perhaps if we try and fail at
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something enough times, we will come to doubt our own worth or the value of our goals
regardless of whether anyone else even knows about it.
But it is a further question whether the world can affect our autonomy directly,
without impacting our psychological autonomy. Consider, for example, cases in which
certain people are not allowed to vote based on their skin color or their sex, or in which a
person is enslaved or imprisoned. More commonly in our society today, we might see
cases in which a person is stuck in a relationship for financial reasons, or feels forced to
work a job they hate. We might be inclined to think that the people in these cases lack
autonomy in some sense even if their psychological autonomy remains unaffected by
their circumstances, perhaps because they lack a sufficiently wide range of options, or
because they don’t have the opportunity to pursue what they most care about.
If this is right, then there are some external constraints on autonomy in addition to
the psychological constraints, and the world around us can undermine our autonomy
directly. But establishing a satisfying theory of external autonomy is extraordinarily
difficult. In what follows, I lay out two general puzzles that arise when we try to lay out
these external constraints on autonomy—the Interdependency Puzzle and the Range of
Options Puzzle—and I then propose some desiderata for or theory of external autonomy
that seem to become apparent when we consider these puzzles.
5.2.2 Puzzles for Establishing External Constraints on Autonomy
The Interdependency Puzzle (IP) arises because of the ways in which
interdependency seems to sometimes undermine our autonomy but at other times to be
perfectly consistent with it. One example of this has to do with our giving up certain
options for ourselves because another person has become dependent upon us. In some
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cases, this appears to be autonomy undermining. Consider, for example, the case of a
woman who decides to marry knowing that her husband will expect to have complete
control over when then they have sex, or a parent who must give up their goal of learning
to play the violin because all of their time and resources have to go to paying for their
child’s lifesaving medical treatment. Both of these cases intuitively involve a lack of
autonomy resulting from an individual’s options being reduced because someone else is
dependent on them for something.
On the other hand, consider a case in which a woman decides to become a single
parent through in vitro fertilization; although having the child will significantly reduce
the number of options available to her and the range of things she will be able to do for at
least the next ten or so years, she seems to be a paradigm of autonomy in that she has
made her choice and overcome the obstacles she faced in reaching her goal. She has
guided the course of her life effectively, though doing so has reduced her options because
another being will become utterly dependent on her alone and she will be responsible for
caring for them. So a loss of options resulting from someone else’s becoming dependent
upon us does not always seem to undermine our autonomy. In addition, whether or not
we anticipated or planned this loss of options does not explain its effect on our autonomy
because the loss of options was anticipated in both the marriage case and in the
reproduction case.
An alternative suggestion for when this kind of interdependency does and does
not undermine autonomy comes from Marina Oshana, who has argued at length for the
claim that having external conditions on autonomy is crucial if we are to have a plausible,
feminist account of autonomy. She claims that “The individual is not required to take
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responsibility for another’s needs, expectations, and failings unless doing so is reasonably
expected of the individual in light of a particular function” (2006, 87), and that having
this responsibility when it is not reasonably expected in light of their function is
autonomy undermining. But it isn’t clear what it means for it to be reasonable to expect
someone to be responsible for another person. After all, it seems reasonable to expect a
parent to be responsible for their child’s needs, but it still seems like the parent lacks
autonomy to some degree when they have to give up a hobby they love for their child’s
sake—especially when they were not expecting to have to make that sacrifice and it
caused a disturbance or interruption in their life. So it seems to me that a particular
sacrifice can be a reasonable one to expect of a person, but that their making it can still
interfere with their ability to guide the course of their life in important ways. As a result,
we’ll need to look elsewhere for our explanation of when this kind of interdependency is
autonomy undermining.
A second way in which interdependency sometimes seems to undermine
autonomy and sometimes seems not to is that our own dependency on others can
sometimes limit the options that we have. This kind of dependency seems to be autonomy
undermining, for example, in a case in which a wife is financially dependent on her
husband and so lacks the option to leave the marriage. It also seems autonomy
undermining in a case in which an employee is forced to work in inhumane conditions
but is unable to quit because he is financially dependent on the job. Oshana has said that
this financial dependence on others is in itself autonomy undermining (2006, 87), but it is
important to note that financial dependence on others can take different forms. For
example, individual women in developing countries might want to start a business but be
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unable to do so on their own. In contributing their respective talents to a shared goal, they
might be able to create an income stream they would not otherwise have had, but they
may remain financially dependent on one another as the business will be unsuccessful
without all of them continuing to contribute. In addition, they will lack the option to leave
the business in a similar way in which the financially dependent wife would lack the
option to leave her marriage. But in spite of this similarity, it seems as though the women
who started the business are in stark contrast with the financially dependent wife because
they seem to be quite autonomous. After consideration of cases such as these, it seems as
though financial dependence itself cannot explain why the wife or the exploited employee
lack autonomy.
A final component of the IP that I will consider here has to do with the way in
which another person’s control over our options sometimes seems to undermine our
autonomy and sometimes does not. Consider a case in which I have a principled
opposition to wearing shoes, and as a result I am unable to eat at restaurants, shop at
grocery stores, etc. Contrast this with a case in which I am outspoken on certain political
issues and have been banned from certain restaurants and grocery stores in response.
Suppose that in both cases I could change my ways and thereby come to be allowed in
these places again. Intuitively, I do not lack autonomy in the first case, whereas in the
latter case I do. But why should this be? According to Oshana, “We cannot sensibly
claim a person is autonomous if she is party to social relations or institutions that would
enfeeble her ability to determine how she will live if it were the will of others that they do
so” (2006, 83), but both of these cases involve the will of others interfering with my
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ability to live my life how I want to. It seems, then, that an alternative explanation of
what has undermined my autonomy in the second case is in order.
Joseph Raz raises a related issue when he argues that the presence of coercion
undermines our autonomy regardless of the range of options that remains available to us.
“That is why slaves are thought to lack autonomy even if they enjoy a range of options
which, were they free, would have been deemed sufficient.” (377-8). But we need some
explanation of why the mere fact that someone else is limiting our options in this way is
relevant to our autonomy rather than just the range of options themselves. How do the
intentions of another person have such a powerful effect on our ability to guide our lives,
even in cases in which they have no impact on what options we have available to us?
This concern regarding how another’s intentions can limit our autonomy without
altering what options are available to us leads directly to the Range of Options Puzzle
(ROP), which has to do with the difficulty of determining with any precision what our
range of options must be like in order for us to be autonomous. First, how many options
must we have, and how do we determine their adequacy? As Raz points out, “No one can
control all aspects of his life. How much control is required for the life to be autonomous,
and what counts as an adequate exercise of control (as opposed to being forced by
circumstances, or deceived by one's own ignorance, or governed by one's weaknesses) is
an enormously difficult problem” (373). And while Oshana claims that “There is some
fact about the extent to which a person can suffer restricted options and still maintain her
autonomy,” (Personal Autonomy in Society, 85) she doesn’t tell us what that fact is.
In an attempt to begin addressing this problem, Raz claims that “The autonomous
person must have options which will enable him to develop all his abilities, as well as to
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concentrate on some of them. One is not autonomous if one cannot choose a life of selfrealization, nor is one autonomous if one cannot reject this ideal.” (376) But if this is
right, then it seems that only really, really rich people in recent history will be
autonomous, since having the opportunity to develop all of our abilities is extraordinarily
rare. We have good reason to avoid a classist conception of autonomy, though, and
should look instead for a way of defining autonomy that allows for autonomy to be
attainable to many, if not most of us.
Raz’s way of thinking about this seems to be ableist as well. He claims that
“Some of the capacities with which the human species is genetically endowed come
coupled with innate drives for their use. We have innate drives to move around, to
exercise our bodies, to stimulate our senses, to engage our imagination and our affection,
to occupy our mind.” In addition, he claims that in order to be autonomous, a person must
“have options which enable him to sustain throughout his life activities which, taken
together, exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well
as to decline to develop any of them” (375). But it seems important to appreciate a
person’s ability to guide the course of their lives regardless of whether they can exercise
their bodies, for example, which gives us another reason to reject Raz’s way of defining a
range of options that is consistent with autonomy.
Another question we might ask about what our range of options must be like in
order for us to be autonomous is whether we should weigh options more heavily when
they matter to us more, or whether a range of options can be adequate if it is broad
enough even if it excludes the option to pursue what matters most to us. Oshana argues
that our range of options must include those things that matter most to us if it is to be
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consistent with our autonomy. “Because self-governance is governance over matters of
central importance to human life, the options available must be relevant to the
development of a person’s life and they must be ones a person can genuinely hope to
achieve.” (2006, 85).
And while Raz reaffirms this idea, he also suggests that the options that matter
less to us are just as important for our autonomy. “It is intolerable that we should have no
influence over the choice of our occupation or of our friends. But it is equally
unacceptable that we should not be able to decide on trivia such as when to wash or when
to comb our hair. This aspect of the requirement of adequate choice is necessary to make
sure that our control extends to all aspects of our lives. This is clearly required by the
basic idea of being the author of one's life.” (Raz, 374) But some people—in developing
countries, for instance—don’t have the option of when to wash or when to comb their
hair, and they seem autonomous, nonetheless. Still, Raz seems right that if we were to
lose control over that part of our lives, we would thereby become less autonomous. So
what account of autonomy can we give that will be consistent with both of these
intuitions?
Yet another question that relates to this puzzle is whether another person can
undermine our autonomy by increasing our options. For example, imagine that someone
is applying for a job, and the hiring committee is leaning strongly against their
application but is open to reconsidering them if someone they trust vouches for the
applicant. Then someone the committee trusts offers to the applicant their support, so
long as the applicant will perform certain sexual favors for them. In this situation, the
applicant lacked the option to get the job, and the friend of the committee is making an
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option available to them that they would not otherwise have had. But we might feel
nonetheless like the autonomy of the applicant is undermined when they are faced with
this difficult choice that they did not previously face. The same kind of thing seems to be
going on in cases in which an impoverished society is suddenly given the option to work
in a sweatshop, or a group of people without access to medications is given the option to
be in a clinical trial.
A final question about what our range of options must be like in order for us to be
autonomous has to do with whether we should treat options to do morally bad things in
just the same way that we treat options to do morally good or morally neutral things. One
question related to this issue is whether our autonomy is reduced when we are unable to
do morally bad things. On the one hand, Oshana makes the following intuitive claim:
“The [autonomous] individual can have, and can pursue, values, interests, and goals
different from those who have influence and authority over her, without risk of reprisal
sufficient to deter her in this pursuit.” (87). But what if the thing we want to do is morally
bad? Does it reduce our autonomy when governments, for example, don’t let us harm
others? The intuitive answer here, I think, is “no,” but why should this be, especially
given the very plausible point just noted from Oshana?
In the following two sections I will lay out my own account of what is required
for us to have external autonomy, and in the conclusion I will explain how this account
can allow us to respond to the various puzzles raised in this section. I begin in Section II
by giving a general outline of what is required for external autonomy when other agents
are not involved in shaping our options. In Section III I consider when and why the
shaping of our options by others is autonomy undermining and when it is consistent with
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our full autonomy. Here I argue that other agents undermine our external autonomy when
they shape our options in ways that conflict with a proper recognition of our personhood.
5.2.3 Resulting Desiderata for a Theory of External Autonomy
In thinking about these puzzles, some desiderata for a theory of external
autonomy seem to become apparent. I will list some of these here and provide reasons in
favor of thinking that they are important, but I will not argue extensively for them. I take
them to be quite intuitive, and I am content with the result that those who do not find
them appealing will be unconvinced by some of the arguments that come later in the
paper. The first desiderata I will propose is that a theory of external autonomy (or
autonomy more generally) must be such that a reasonably high degree of autonomy is
attainable by many (or perhaps even most) persons. I take it that we need not get the
result that anyone is completely autonomous; after all, while the most fortunate of us
seem to have quite a lot of control over the course of our lives, there will always be
things that are of great importance to us that are out of our control.
Perhaps many of our particular choices should be able to count as completely
autonomous, but surely we should accept that all of us sometimes make choices that lack
autonomy to some degree and so that no person is completely autonomous. Still, many of
us should count as having a very high degree of autonomy; for a theory of autonomy
which makes it out of our reach entirely seems to be the wrong theory of autonomy for
persons. I take it that some of us do, for the most part, effectively guide the course of our
lives, and our theory of autonomy should explain what that means and what is going
wrong when we are not effectively guiding the course of our lives.
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A second desiderata of our theory of autonomy is that it must be inclusive, that is,
not classist, ableist, sexist, etc. We don’t want to make the mistake of thinking that only
those with precisely the same opportunities and social structures that we have can be
autonomous. We must recognize that a person can guide the course of their lives
effectively even without the wealth, education, or career choices that we have. This also
relates to the previous desiderata, that many persons count as having a high degree of
autonomy. This is because we live in a time and place that is quite different from what
most of the world has been like for most of human history. If the precise range of options
we have now were required for autonomy, then most persons throughout history would
not have been autonomous. In addition, a person need not be able to do the precise things
we are able to do with our bodies in order to be autonomous. So when people with
physical disabilities say that they are effectively guiding the course of their lives, we
should take that as very strong evidence that they are.
Still, it is important for our theory to be able to appreciate the ways in which
things like poverty and social injustice can undermine autonomy. This is the third
desiderata for our theory. As Oshana insists in her writing on this topic, “We cannot
sensibly claim a person is autonomous if she is party to social relations or institutions that
would enfeeble her ability to determine how she will live if it were the will of others that
they do so.” (83) If a person has a physical disability, this need not undermine their
ability to guide the course of their lives in itself, but if all of the buildings in a society are
constructed such that they cannot enter them, then this will very likely interfere with the
person’s autonomy. Similarly, if a person has very little wealth, this can be consistent
with their autonomy depending on their values and the way their society works. But if a
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person’s lack of wealth prevents them from pursuing the life they want, this may
undermine their autonomy; this is especially true in cases in which they are entitled, in
some sense, to more than they have. So it seems that autonomy is relevant in some ways
to justice since it is sometimes not the options that are available to us themselves that are
relevant to our autonomy, but instead the relationship between the options we have and
the options we ought to have. Our theory of autonomy should be able to explain this.
The final desiderata for our theory of external autonomy I will address here is that
it must be consistent with the fact that humans are social and dependent on one another in
various ways. None of us is self-creating, and all of us came to be who we are in part
because of the influence that others have had on us. We depend on one another in our
various pursuits, and we have the preferences and goals we do in part because of the
values held by our families, friends, and societies more generally. As a result, our theory
of autonomy cannot give us the result that we lack autonomy whenever we depend on
someone else; after all, we all depend on others in various ways, and our theory of
autonomy is supposed to make it possible for many of us to be largely autonomous. It
also cannot give us the result that we lack autonomy whenever we are influenced to have
the values or preferences we have by the world around us. Again, we are all influenced in
these ways, yet many of us have a high degree of autonomy. In addition, it is important
that our theory can appreciate that our relationships with others are what make it possible
for us to be autonomous at all. So not only do these relationships not undermine
autonomy, but they also facilitate and often strengthen it.
In what follows, I propose an account of external autonomy that can respond to
the various puzzles described above while also satisfying the desiderata I have laid out in
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this section. In Section II, I focus on the impact that non-personal forces have on our
autonomy, arguing that they only affect our autonomy when they affect our psychological
autonomy, and in Section III I discuss the various ways that other persons can affect our
autonomy. I argue that persons can undermine our autonomy directly, without
influencing psychological autonomy, thought they do, of course, also often have effects
on psychological autonomy. Persons undermine autonomy directly, I will argue, when
they shape the options that are available to us without properly respecting us as persons
with the particular goals and values we have.
5.3 When Our Options Are Not Shaped by Persons
In this section I will argue that non-personal forces never undermine our
autonomy directly. What I mean by this is that these external forces do not violate
external constraints on autonomy. However, they can undermine our autonomy by
undermining our psychological autonomy. This means that there is no rule regarding
what options must be available to us in order for us to be autonomous, or how many
options we must have, or how drastically or frequently our options can change. Instead,
these things can only undermine our autonomy to the degree that they undermine our
psychological autonomy. And since each person will be psychologically affected in
different ways by these factors, there will be significant variation from person to person
with respect to the impact these factors have on autonomy.
5.3.1 Why Non-Personal Forces Never Undermine Autonomy Directly
One noteworthy distinction is between the ways in which non-personal forces
shape our options generally, versus the ways in which non-personal forces drastically
change our options. We each come into existence in a particular body with certain
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limitations, in a particular area with a given landscape and climate, and in a particular
universe with certain laws of nature. These are some of the general ways in which nonpersonal forces shape our options. We cannot fly or breathe underwater or lick our
elbows, and we must eat and sleep and give ourselves time to recover when we are sick
or injured. Many of us are free to run and jump, but some are not; many of us can bear
children, but many cannot; and some of us have the time and resources to enjoy art and
music, but many do not. These are some of the ways in which non-personal forces
outside of us shape the options that are available to us.
But sometimes we start with one set of options, and those options change. This
can happen expectedly or unexpectedly, gradually or suddenly. Those of us who can bear
children know that a day will come when we no longer can. Many of us expect that, over
time, we will lose the ability to do some of the things we currently do with our bodies,
like run and jump, and some people lose these abilities quickly as a result of an accident
or a sudden illness. And sometimes we find ourselves quickly going from having the time
and resources to pursue hobbies to suddenly having to spend all of our time and resources
just to get by. Having a restricted set of options, then, and having those options change
from one moment to the next, is a part of life for all human persons, and I maintain that it
is a part of life that does not directly undermine our autonomy to any degree at all.
This claim might seem implausible when we consider some of the cases Raz
proposes, like the Man in the Pit or the Hounded Woman. The Man in the Pit falls into a
deep pit and is trapped in it for the rest of his life; he has the resources he needs to get by
without suffering, but “His choices are confined to whether to eat now or a little later,
whether to sleep now or a little later, whether to scratch his left ear or not.” (374) The
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Hounded Woman is on an island alone with a carnivorous creature that spends all of its
time hunting her, so she must spend all of her time avoiding it. Avoiding the creature is
an extraordinarily difficult task, and she has no opportunity to do (or even think about
doing) anything but escape.
Raz quite plausibly claims that these individuals lack autonomy. The Man in the
Pit is said to lack autonomy because he has only trivial choices to make, and he does not
have the opportunity to make any significant choices. The Hounded Woman, on the other
hand, is said to lack autonomy because even though her choices are of great significance,
they do not offer her enough range since one misstep would result in her death. It follows
from these explanations of why these individuals lack autonomy that in order to be
autonomous we must have a wide range of options available to us and at least some of
those options should be important. But it is still not clear how wide the range of options
must be, how significant they must be, or how many significant options there must be.
In his attempt to address this problem, Raz makes various claims about what our
options must be like in order for us to be autonomous that violate at least one of the
desiderata laid out in Section I. For example, he claims that “To be autonomous and to
have an autonomous life, a person must have options which enable him to sustain
throughout his life activities which, taken together, exercise all the capacities human
beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as to decline to develop any of them,”
(375) where he claims that we have an innate drive to “move around, to exercise our
bodies, to stimulate our senses, to engage our imagination and our affection, to occupy
our mind,” and so on. Of course, we do not have to actually exercise all of these
capacities, but we must have the opportunity to exercise all of them. But this requirement

156

seems to be ableist, at the very least, and perhaps also classist or exclusionary in other
ways.
While I cannot consider all of the possible requirements a person might propose
for a range of options to be compatible with autonomy, I suspect that any clear, concrete
requirements will be exclusionary in some problematic way and make it too difficult for
many or most persons to be autonomous. After all, if The Man in the Pit knew no other
life and was happy with his modest range of options, it seems to me reasonable to think
of him as guiding the course of his life. So perhaps just having the choice of when to eat
and when to sleep can be sufficient for autonomy in certain situations. As a result, it
seems to me that an inclusive theory of autonomy must allow that there is no specific set
of requirements that a range of options must meet in order for it to be compatible with a
person’s autonomy.
5.3.2 How Non-Personal Forces Can Undermine Psychological Autonomy
One might object that, in spite of what I have said, it still seems to be the case that
Raz’s Man in the Pit and Hounded Woman are less autonomous than you or I. I think that
this is likely right, but not because they lack external autonomy. Instead, I think that their
psychological autonomy is damaged by their circumstances. To remind us, on the view
that I propose, psychological autonomy is self-respecting self-guidance. This means that
we must take ourselves to have as much moral worth as other persons, to have
worthwhile reasoning abilities that allow us to guide our lives, and to have goals and
values that are worth having. Being in the situations Raz describes would make it
difficult, I suspect, to maintain these attitudes about oneself and one’s abilities.
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Consider first the requirement that to be psychologically autonomous we must be
guided by respect for ourselves as moral equals to those around us. Having a restricted set
of options available to us can make this difficult in various ways. First, it seems plausible
that being around others who treat us as having a certain moral status makes it easier for
us to see that we have that status. Without others providing us with this evidence, it may
be difficult to come to have the appropriate beliefs. In addition, if we are consistently
unable to achieve our goals or live in accordance with our values, this might also cause us
to come to doubt our moral importance; even if there is no agent preventing us from
achieving our goals, it can be difficult to trust in our worth when we feel like a failure or,
alternatively, feel like the world is working against us. For these reasons, the Man in the
Pit or the Hounded Woman might lack respect for themselves as moral equals to other
persons, and if this were to contribute to their motivation for making certain choices (e.g.
in thinking that the loss of their lives would be insignificant, or that they’re better of
alone anyway because they don’t have the standing to have meaningful interactions with
others), then it would be autonomy undermining.
Next, consider the requirement that to be psychologically autonomous we must be
guided by respect for ourselves as rational agents with valuable practical reasoning
abilities. It may be difficult to believe that these reasoning abilities are valuable if we lack
the opportunity to use them, or if we are consistently unable to reach our goals even when
we do use them. So while I suspect that the Hounded Woman would value her practical
reasoning abilities because she depends on them to stay alive, the Man in the Pit may not
value his because he has little use for them. If this lack of appreciation of the value of his
rational abilities plays a role in the choices he makes (e.g. by choosing not to bother to
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develop them or to consider his options carefully), then the resulting choices would
thereby lack autonomy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the kinds of cases under consideration
here, consider the requirement that to be psychologically autonomous we must be guided
by respect for ourselves as the particular individuals we are. Respecting ourselves in this
way involves appreciating that being a person always involves being some particular
person, and that those particularities are part of what make us the valuable beings we are.
We must have some particular goals and value particular things, and respecting this about
ourselves means not only attempting to have goals and values that are worthy of us, but
also living with integrity by pursuing those goals and living in accordance with those
values. As Robin Dillon puts it in her discussion of this form of self-respect, “Her
commitment to being a worthy person living a worthy life means that it matters very
much to her that the person she is or is becoming and the life she is leading are genuinely
worthy, genuinely congruent with and expressive of her dignity as a person” (2004, 52).
While there is no determinative list of activities that are worthy of pursuit in this way, the
crucial point is that the self-respecting person cares about living in this way and actively
tries to live this way.
But the Hounded Woman will likely feel as though she does not have the
opportunity to cultivate a life that is in line with her dignity as a person. It seems
plausible that she will feel as though she has little control over where the course of her
life takes her, and as a result she might feel that any of her goals or values are irrelevant
are unattainable. Perhaps it is possible for her to continue caring about living a worthy
life and thinking about ways she might do this, but I suspect that it would be difficult to
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maintain this attitude over time in the circumstances she is in. Furthermore, reflecting on
her goals and values in a situation in which she cannot pursue them for reasons outside of
her control might make it difficult to go on respecting herself as a moral equal to other
persons; she may start feeling like her life is insignificant since she lacks the opportunity
to pursue things of value.
The Man in the Pit will likely face similar problems in that he lacks the
opportunity to pursue worthwhile goals, though for different reasons than the Hounded
Woman does. In his case, he has time to think and reflect on what a worthy life would
look like and what values he should have and live in accordance with, but he has little
opportunity to pursue any of those goals or act on those values. There may be things he
can do from inside the pit that will reflect his values—like create art, garden, think deeply
about important problems, and so on—but many things he may take to be worthwhile
will simply be out of his grasp. This situation would likely be disheartening and cause
one to feel that one’s life does not truly express one’s values. It’s hard to be motivated to
live in accordance with one’s values when one feels (for good reason) that this is largely
impossible. But of course, whether this is possible from inside the pit will depend on the
person. Depending on one’s goals and values, perhaps a life in the pit is perfectly
consistent with living a life that expresses one’s dignity. For this reason, it is not the
circumstances themselves that undermine autonomy; instead, it is the way in which the
circumstances affect the individual’s ability to have psychological autonomy, and this
will vary from person to person.
These same general considerations also explain why autonomy can be
undermined by things like physical disabilities, lack of educational or career
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opportunities, or living in an area that does not allow for various activities like browsing
art galleries, climbing mountains, or surfing. These things may not affect autonomy at all
in some individuals, but may undermine it to more or less of a degree in others depending
on how much of an impact it has on their ability to guide their lives as self-respecting
individuals. If a person’s identity is wrapped up in their athletic ability, then becoming
physically disabled may undermine their psychological autonomy in significant ways, but
someone who is able to live a fulfilling and meaningful life with a disability may feel as
though it does not decrease their autonomy to any degree at all (though perhaps a lack of
accessible buildings, discrimination in employment, etc., does—these issues will be taken
up in the next section). And someone who loves the work they do as, say, a farmer, may
feel perfectly autonomous even if they lack the opportunity to do anything else, but
someone who wishes to become a poet or an engineer may have their autonomy
undermined when their only option is to work as a farmer.
In this section I have argued that it will be extraordinarily difficult to construct a
theory of autonomy that has requirements regarding how many options we must have or
what the quality of those options must be like without at the same time violating the
desiderata of inclusiveness. This is because a certain range of options that appears very
limited to many people may be perfectly adequate for others, and concluding that they
lack autonomy because they lack the options we’d like to have is a kind of cultural
chauvinism, ableism, or other exclusionary stance that it would be best to avoid.
However, we can still appreciate the ways in which a very limited range of options can
undermine autonomy of certain people by undermining their psychological autonomy.
This is because lacking opportunities that matter to us or losing control over something
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we used to control can make it difficult for us to maintain our sense of self-worth either
as a moral equal to other persons, as a rational agent whose reasoning abilities matter, or
as the particular individual we are whose goals and values are worth pursuing. In this
way, we can have an inclusive account of autonomy that still appreciates the ways in
which our range of options does matter for our autonomy.
5.4 When Our Options Are Shaped by Persons
Although our range of options can only undermine our autonomy by affecting our
psychological autonomy, I will argue in this section that other persons can undermine our
autonomy directly, without necessarily having any effect on our psychological autonomy.
Being autonomous, or effectively guiding the course of one’s life, requires us to be able
to have an impact on the world around us. We cannot guide our lives if our desires and
plans have no influence on the world. But there are, of course, significant limits on the
kind of influence we need to be able to have. I have argued that there is no particular way
the world must be set up for us to be autonomous, in that there is no set number of
options we must have available to us and we can lack some significant options while
retaining autonomy in many cases. However, all of us have an important kind of power
over the world around us that is necessary for autonomy. We can move things around,
anticipate various consequences of our actions with some amount of reliability, and plan
for the future. This minimal kind of influence on the world can be, I have argued,
sufficient for autonomy.
But now the questions is what kind of influence we must have on other persons in
order to be autonomous. Presumably our plans and desires should have some impact on
them, but we need not have complete control over others in order to guide our own lives.
162

To return to some of the examples from Section I, it seems that I lack autonomy if I’m
forbidden from shopping at certain stores because of the color of my skin or my religion,
but it does not seem as though my autonomy is undermined when I am forbidden from
entering because I refuse to wear shoes. And an individual who is stuck in an unwanted
relationship for financial reasons seems to lack autonomy, but at the same time it does not
seem as though autonomy requires us to have the power to extract money from others
whenever we need it. So what kind of influence do our desires and values need to have on
others in order for us to be autonomous?
I propose that our autonomy depends on others properly respecting us as
persons—that is, they must respect us as moral equals, as rational agents, and as the
particular individuals we are. What it will take to properly respect us in these ways will
vary depending on the circumstances and the relationship we have with the person, but
whenever their lack of respect for us is part of the best explanation for the options we
have available, then our autonomy is undermined. There is, I take it, a fact of the matter
about what kind of influence it is appropriate for us to have over others, and this is in
virtue of the respect we are owed; thus, if we fail to have this influence over others
because they fail to give us the respect we are due, then we lack an important kind of
control over the course our lives take.
The relevant kind of respect that others owe us is the same kind of respect we owe
ourselves, namely, what Stephen Darwall (1995) calls recognition respect. Being
deserving of recognition respect means that deliberators ought to appreciate the facts
about us that are relevant to the situation and weigh them appropriately in their
deliberations about what to do. On my view of psychological autonomy, having
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psychological autonomy requires us to have recognition respect for ourselves, and here I
am arguing that in order for us to have external autonomy, others must have this kind of
respect for us as well.
To illustrate what this means in practice, return again to the example of being
barred from entering a store on the basis on one’s skin color. It seems clear in this case
that anyone who is refusing someone entry into a store on the basis of their skin color is
not properly respecting them. The person who wishes to shop at the store has desires and
plans that deserve to be taken seriously, and they are not being taken seriously in this
situation. They also have an equal moral status to other persons with different skin colors,
and this is not factoring into the shop owner’s policies in the way it ought to. However, if
an individual is being refused access to the store because they will not wear shoes, then
refusing them access to the store can be consistent with properly respecting them. The
store owner may appreciate that their desire to shop at the store is one that deserves to be
taken seriously and that they are moral equals with other patrons, but still refuse them
entry for health reasons or in order to follow a law that they reasonable take to be
legitimate.
Regarding the person who is trapped in an unhealthy relationship because they are
financially dependent on another, it seems likely that they are not being properly
respected either by their partner or by society more broadly. The details will matter here,
but financial dependence often arises when one partner is expected to tend to the home
and children, while another makes money. In a case like this, it seems that the person in
charge of the home may be disrespected by their partner, perhaps because their desire to
work was never taken sufficiently seriously, or because their contribution to the

164

wellbeing of the family is not being appreciated and appropriately compensated. If this is
the case, then the financial dependence is best explained in part by the partner’s lack of
respect for them. They may also live in a society that does not have proper respect for
their wellbeing. In a case like this, society as a whole might undermine their autonomy by
failing to appreciate the relevant facts about them and weigh them appropriately in their
deliberations about how to vote, for example, or how to spend their money.
Of course, this account depends heavily on our having some intuitive
understanding of what it would mean for others to properly respect us, but making
determinations about what this respect requires will not always be so easy. For example, I
take it that there can be reasonable disagreement regarding whether voting in particular
ways shows proper respect to certain individuals, or regarding how much of our resources
we should be willing to share with others in order to properly respect them. But it seems
to me that this is a fine feature of the view I’m proposing, as it would be too much to
expect from a theory that it can tell us what, exactly, properly respecting others always
involves in any possible situation. There will be hard cases. Nonetheless, I maintain that
whenever a lack of respect from others is part of the best explanation for the range of
options we have, then we thereby lack autonomy. This theory of autonomy will be
available to anyone who thinks that we owe others respect in virtue of our personhood,
and is compatible with different ways of spelling out exactly what this respect involves.
I have so far argued that when others fail to properly respect us as persons, and
this lack of respect for us in part determines what our range of options is, then we thereby
lack autonomy to some degree. This is so even if our psychological autonomy is not
affected by our options or by this lack of respect. So, for example, if I am not able to
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pursue math because I live in a sexist society that does not allow women to pursue
careers in math, but I didn’t want to be a mathematician anyway and so this has no effect
on me, my autonomy is still undermined. This is because, as Oshana puts it, “We cannot
sensibly claim a person is autonomous if she is party to social relations or institutions that
would enfeeble her ability to determine how she will live if it were the will of others that
they do so” (83). The idea is that if others have power over us to influence the course of
our lives in ways that are inappropriate, then we lack control over the course of our lives
that it would be appropriate for us to have. This is the case even if it does not affect our
psychology.
In addition to this, it is worth appreciating that other persons can undermine our
psychological autonomy, and this can happen in cases in which they fail to properly
respect us or in cases in which they are properly respecting us. So, for example, if I
cannot pursue math because my society is sexist, this undermines my external autonomy,
but it may undermine my psychological autonomy as well by causing me to feel that I am
not a moral equal to others, that I lack certain rational capacities, or that my own goals
and values don’t matter as much as those of others. But return to the case in which I am
not permitted to enter grocery stores because I will not wear shoes. If I have a principled
reason for not wearing shoes, then I may feel many of the same things that the woman in
the sexist society may feel. Even though the store owner’s refusal to allow me shop there
without shoes may be consistent with properly respecting me, I may still feel as though
my goals and values do not matter as much as others’ do. So other people can undermine
our psychological autonomy without disrespecting us and without violating our external
autonomy.
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5.5 Conclusion
I have argued that there is no determinate feature our range of options must have
in order for it to be consistent with our external autonomy. We need not have any
particular number or options, nor need we have options available to us that are
particularly important. This is because different people need different things in order to
be able to guide the course of their lives effectively, and any attempt to spell out in detail
what that will involve for one person will end up excluding another person, even if they
take themselves to be guiding the course of their lives. This will end up being
exclusionary in various problematic ways, like by being classist and ableist. However, the
shape of our options can undermine our psychological autonomy, so in this way we can
appreciate that our options are importantly relevant to autonomy while also allowing for
differences in what is required for autonomy from person to person.
I’ve also argued that other persons can undermine our external autonomy by
having an effect on our options in a way that fails to properly respect us as persons with
equal moral standing to other persons, with valuable rational abilities, and with value as
the particular individuals we are. This is because being self-guiding involves being able
to have a certain kind of impact on the world around you, and this includes being able to
have an impact on other persons as well. In particular, if others are not properly
responsive to the features of us that ought to factor into their decision-making, then we
lack a kind of power over the world that we need to guide our lives effectively. In
closing, I explain how the account of autonomy I’ve proposed allows us to respond to the
two puzzles described earlier in satisfying ways.
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The Interdependency Puzzle (IP) arose when we considered the cases in which
interdependency sometimes seems to undermine autonomy along those cases in which
interdependency seems perfectly consistent with and even necessary for autonomy. The
first example of this we considered involved giving up certain options for the sake of
someone else who is dependent upon us, like the wife who, in getting married, knowingly
gives up control over when she will have sex, or the parent who must give up their
hobbies to save for their child’s life-saving medication, or the single woman who decides
to become pregnant through in vitro fertilization. While the former two seem to lack
autonomy, the latter seems to be quite autonomous.
The explanation for the lack of autonomy in the first case is that the husband is
not properly respecting the wife if her preferences regarding when to have sex are not
factoring into his decision-making. Additionally, consistently having sex that one does
not want to have will, plausibly, undermine their conception of themselves as moral
equals to others whose preferences matter as much as those of others, and this will
undermine the wife’s psychological autonomy as well. And in the case of the parent who
must give up their hobby, their psychological autonomy may also be undermined since
they value playing music and are being forced, in some sense, to stop pursuing that value.
We may also think that society is not properly respecting parents of sick children if it
allows for the costs of the life-saving treatment of those children to bankrupt the parents,
but this is perhaps debatable. But in the case of the single-parent using IVF, while her
range of options shrinks when she chooses to have a child, this does not undermine
autonomy. And she will likely have strong psychological autonomy since she is
successfully pursuing those things that she values in spite of the obstacles she faces.
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A second version of the IP involved our own dependency on others. Remember,
for example, in the wife who is financially dependent on her husband (who intuitively
lacks autonomy), versus the women who collectively form a business and are now
financially dependent on one another (and intuitively do not lack autonomy). Here the
explanation is straightforward: the wife is not properly respected by her husband,
whereas the women who work together to create a business do not disrespect one another.
Additionally, of course, the husband’s failure to properly respect his wife by taking her
contributions to their well-being sufficiently seriously may also undermine her ability to
have psychological autonomy by causing her to lose self-respect in one form or another.
A final version of the IP we considered had to do with one person having control
over another’s options. Here we contrasted the shop keeper who refuses service to
someone on the basis of skin color versus one who refuses service to someone on the
basis of their refusal to wear shoes. As I noted above, this is because, in the former case,
the shop keeper lacks proper respect for the prospective customer and that disrespect
contributes to the shaping of their options, but in the latter case the shop keeper does not
disrespect the prospective customer. Raz claims that coercion itself undermines
autonomy even when it does not affect the range of options available to us; this is a claim
that is intuitive in some ways, yet hard to find a good explanation for. On my account, it
is not quite right. Coercion only undermines autonomy when it involves a failure of
respect. But when you coerce someone without shoes on not to come into your store, you
need not be undermining their autonomy after all.
The second puzzle we considered was the Range of Options Puzzle (ROP), which
has to do with the difficulty of determining with any precision what our range of options
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must be like in order for us to be autonomous. While Raz and Oshana claim that there is
some range of options we must have to be autonomous, I have argued that this approach
should be rejected because it will almost certainly lead to a problematically exclusive
theory. Oshana has claimed that we need to have control over things that are of central
importance to us, and my view can account for this in that lacking control over things that
are of central importance to us will likely undermine our psychological autonomy in
some way. However, I maintain that it does not directly undermine autonomy by
undermining external autonomy. Raz has claimed that having control over things that are
insignificant is just as important, and while I have argued that this is sometimes, but not
always true, my account can explain why this is so. If a person doesn’t care about
whether they have control over when to wash their hair and they lack this control simply
because of their environment, then their lack of control over this will not affect their
psychological autonomy. Thus, they will not lack autonomy at all. However, if another
person prevents them from having this control for reasons that involve a failure of
respect, then they will lack autonomy after all, on my view. And if they come to lack this
control, either because of the disrespect of another person or simply through
happenstance, then their psychological autonomy may be undermined if losing this
control is important to them and their conception of themselves.
A second version of the ROP had to do with whether autonomy could be
undermined when our options are increased, for example, in a case of offering a job in
exchange for sexual favors, offering sweatshop work to impoverished people with no
alternatives, or offering access to a clinical trial to those without access to medical care.
On my account, these things can undermine autonomy to some degree by reducing
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psychological autonomy, by reducing external autonomy, or both. They can reduce
external autonomy when the option is provided to the person out of a failure to properly
respect that person. This is clearly the case in the former cases involving offering a job
for sexual favors or putting people to work in sweatshops. It may also be occurring in the
clinical trials case, but plausibly it need not be. But the undermining of psychological
autonomy can be occurring in all three of these cases as well. Being offered a job in
exchange for sexual favors, working in a sweatshop, or having medications you need
dangled in front of you but ultimately refused you (or alternatively, being used like a lab
rat) are all things that could reasonably damage a person’s respect for themselves and
thereby damage their psychological autonomy.
The final version of the ROP we considered asked whether our autonomy is
reduced when we are not permitted to do morally bad things. While intuitively it is not, it
wasn’t obvious why this should be so, since external autonomy seems to require that we
can pursue values and goals that differ from those with power and influence, as Oshana
argues. But we can now see that we need not be free to act immorally in order to be
autonomous because others can properly respect us while refusing to allow us to act
immorally. So while it is true that being autonomous will require the ability to pursue a
wide range of values, some values can respectfully be condemned by those in power and
in these cases, this condemnation will not undermine our autonomy unless it negatively
affects our psychological autonomy.
My account of external autonomy maintains that there is no range of options that
must be available to us in order for us to have external autonomy; instead, external
autonomy is only undermined when (part of) the best explanation for the options
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available to us is a lack of respect from others. Still, our range of options can affect our
autonomy by undermining our psychological autonomy. This allows for a degree of
flexibility in our theory that is crucial for it to be sufficiently inclusive while still
allowing it to explain why social injustices, etc., can and does undermine autonomy. In
this way, the account can explain away all of the puzzles described in Section I, and it
can do so while still satisfying the desiderata set out at the end of the section.
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